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Abstract 
 
The current thesis aimed to extend existing research on intergroup 
forgiveness by considering historical context as an important element. The clear 
victim and perpetrator roles in the European and East Asian post World War II 
settings provided the context for this research. Social representations of history 
provided the theoretical framework for four studies.  
Study 1 employed a meta-analytical approach to explore the impact of 
contextual variables on interpersonal forgiveness across 13 societies. Based on 
Berry‘s ecocultural framework and Inglehart‘s affluence theory it was expected 
that socio-political, societal well-being and socio-economic variables are linked to 
interpersonal forgiveness. Significant differences in interpersonal forgiveness 
between the 13 societies emerged, which could be explained by conflict potential, 
socio-economic and socio-political context variables, societal peacefulness, societal 
well-being, and negative societal evaluations of historical calamities.  
Study 2 explored conceptualisations of interpersonal and intergroup 
forgiveness using a qualitative approach with interviewees from Japan, Germany 
and the Philippines. Facets, antecedents and outcomes of forgiveness were 
identified as main themes. Differences in the relevance of forgiveness as a means 
of conflict resolution were revealed across cultures. An illuminating concept was 
identified and labelled as ―historical closure‖, signifying an attitude towards 
historical issues as relevant or irrelevant to present and future relationships between 
groups. 
Study 3a and 3b included victim perspectives from three formerly 
victimized European nations (France, Poland, Russia) and three formerly 
victimized East Asian nations (China, Taiwan, Philippines).  
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Study 3a examined differences in intergroup forgiveness across the six 
societies. Between-society differences were found. Chinese participants were less 
forgiving compared to French participants, pointing to the different historical 
contexts as an explanatory source. Study 3b investigated the ability of historical 
closure and other group-based constructs to predict intergroup forgiveness. In both 
settings, historical closure was a consistent significant predictor and contributed to 
explain unique variance. A cross-level operator analysis revealed that political 
apologies by the perpetrator country during the last 20 years was negatively 
associated with intergroup forgiveness, indicating that external context related 
variables can contribute to explain intergroup forgiveness. 
Study 4 investigated perpetrator perspectives from Japan and Germany, 
with focus on the cognitive and behavioural components of the willingness to make 
amends. Japanese and Germans differed significantly on the behavioural 
component: it was predicted by lack of closure in the Japanese sample; whereas in 
the German sample guilt and shame were positive predictors. Lack of historical 
closure consistently contributed to predicting the cognitive component of the 
willingness to make amends. Japanese experienced more guilt and shame feelings 
than Germans. Stronger national identification did not contribute as expected and 
had a reversed effect in Japan by being a positive predictor.  
Historical closure is an intriguing concept, as it is a positive predictor for 
intergroup forgiveness among participants from formerly victimized nations, but a 
negative predictor for the willingness to make amends among participants from 
formerly perpetrating nations. This is an interesting interdependency in coming to 
terms with history: closure seems to be needed by victims to be ready to forgive, 
whereas the lack of closure for perpetrators seems to drive the willingness to make 
amends. 
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 One of the most challenging political endeavours in the post-Cold War age 
is how to deal with the aftermath of extreme conflicts and their repercussions, with 
the aim of developing sustainable peace. Despite continual attempts to foster 
peaceful coexistence, the world we live in looks very different from living in a 
world free of intergroup violence (Hartwell, 2005; Ergüner-Tekinalp, 2007). 
Minow (1998) asks whether the twentieth century will mostly be remembered for 
mass atrocities. Undoubtedly, the twentieth century was one of the bloodiest 
centuries in human history with gross human rights violations, and genocides 
beyond imagination (McCullough, Thoresen, & Pargament, 2000).  
The present also rears its ugly head with global terrorism, interethnic and 
intergroup violence and other gross human rights violations proving once more the 
inability of human kind to solve conflicts peacefully. The origins of many conflicts 
today instigate from past conflicts between nations or groups and are plainly new 
variations of old conflicts (Hartwell, 2005; Staub, 2000). Furthermore, the 
interpretation of past conflicts is often used by elites to justify actions against 
specific groups or nations, exacerbating boundaries between groups (Hilton & Liu, 
2008; Liu & Hilton, 2005). 
In this context, it seems surprising that the investigation of the concept of 
intergroup forgiveness in times of past and present injustices, and unclosed 
disputes over past conflicts is not well developed (Roe, 2007). Overall, little is 
known about the process of forgiveness between groups or nations engaged in 
conflicts (either at the symbolic or physical level) or groups still suffering from 
past conflicts (Roe, 2007). Interdisciplinary perspectives have promoted 
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forgiveness as a proactive, reasonable means to resolve conflicts and work towards 
reconciliation. The forgiveness process focuses on creating and enhancing 
conditions to ensure the empowerment of victims and to provide an opportunity to 
release victims from victimhood (Amstutz, 2005; Digeser, 2001; Minow, 1998; 
Oliner, 2005; Shriver, 1995). Overall, forgiveness between nations and groups 
sparks a glimpse of hope for the ability to transform deep-seated conflicts and 
disrupt cycles of violence, which may lead to genuine and sustainable 
reconciliation.  
The post World War II (WW II) context is a crucial historical context that 
still has an influence on younger generations. For instance, just recently a trial 
against a Nazi war criminal has begun in Germany. Since the German legal system 
proposes that war crimes, such as mass murder and assistance to mass murder 
during WW II will never be subject to a limitation period, criminal charges against 
WW II war criminals can be pressed any time (Frei, 2009). Frei (2009) argued that 
Germany owes it herself and her victims to bring justice to war crimes committed 
during WW II. On the other hand, Japan has in recent years had to defend herself 
several times from the charges that Japan is engaged in ―whitewashing‖ past war 
crimes in officially sanctioned high school textbooks (e.g. Schneider, 2008). 
Intergroup forgiveness research in the context of such a crucial event as WW II and 
the comparisons between the European and East Asian context can advance the 
overall understanding of forgiveness.  
Brief Historical Background 
World War II in Europe 
The Holocaust encapsulates the pure evil of WW II and is a symbol of 
atrocities, which remains a burden for present-day Germans. This is evident in 
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relatively low historical pride where only 8% Germans replied ―yes‖ to the 
questions concerned about historical pride compared to a 34% general mean across 
23 European, Asian and American Nations (UNESCO, 2000; cited in Hilton & Liu, 
2008). Hauss (2003) noted that every German government since the formation of 
the federal republic in 1949 has aimed to establish good relationships with Israel 
and with her neighbours, guided by the consequences of this war. Furthermore, 
there have been active efforts to redress the harm inflicted in the past resulted in to 
date $70 billion of compensations and reparations payments made directly to 
victims of slave labour, Holocaust survivors and their descendents (Oliner, 2008).  
Willy Brandt was the first German chancellor who made a public 
expression of repentance to Jewish people by kneeling in front of the Warsaw 
ghetto memorial to weep for the victims. His efforts of rapprochement and 
reconciliation opened up a new dialogue in the East-West politics in the 1970s and 
were internationally acknowledged with the Nobel Peace Prize (Oliner, 2008). In 
1985 Federal president von Weizäcker recognized the unspeakable horror of the 
Holocaust as always being a part of German history in a renowned speech. He 
stressed the importance of remembering regardless whether Germans bear guilt or 
not, no matter whether they are old or young, as everyone is affected by the 
consequences (Bindenagel, 2002). Oliner (2008) considers the numerous attempts 
of apologies from German governments made since 1949 as successful, because 
they have taken responsibility for their harmful actions in the past. These apologies 
have come alongside coherent actions and policy implementations towards 
reconciliation.  
Furthermore, the German educational system has integrated coverage of the 
rise and fall of the Third Reich in its educational syllabi. Generally, Germany and 
her neighbours share the same historical facts and agree on them. This is a result of 
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long-term textbook commissions starting in 1951 between France and Germany, 
followed by Poland, the Czech Republic, and Israel, involving historians and 
teachers. The textbook commissions aimed for an international understanding, and 
reduction of enemy stereotypes (e.g. Ruchniewiecz, 2005; Viedt, 1993).  
The victims of Germany‘s war crimes were primarily Jews, Gypsies, and 
other ―deviant‖ groups, such as homosexuals or people with disabilities. However, 
in terms of nationalities, Poland and Russia suffered the most, followed by France. 
In Poland three million people lost their lives, in Russia 22 million, and in France 
almost half a million excluding Jewish victims. After WW II the era of the Cold 
War started, and this can explain the relatively fast attempts of rapprochements 
between France and Germany and the relatively slower attempts at rapprochement 
with Poland and Russia.   
World War II in East Asia 
The Japanese political elite have been very ―inept at political mea culpas‖ 
(Oliner, 2008, p. 84, italics in original), as they have been divided over issuing 
apologies for the unspeakable crimes committed as a result of Japanese militarism 
in the 1930s and 1940s (Hauss, 2003). The efforts of apologizing for and 
acknowledging the past harm done by Japan are far from ideal, especially in 
comparison to Germany‘s efforts to make amends for their role in WW II (Hein & 
Selden, 2000). People in many East Asian countries have suffered at the hands of 
imperial Japan, who inflicted cruelty and war crimes that were similar in magnitude 
to the crimes committed by Nazi Germany (Liu & Atsumi, 2008; Oliner, 2008). 
Victims of Japan during WW II were mostly Chinese, Koreans, and Filipinos 
among other East Asian nations. Twenty million Chinese, almost half a million 
Koreans, and one million Filipinos lost their lives during WW II.  
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The Nanjing Massacre and the Comfort Women Issues (forced prostitution) 
are symbols of this era for victimized East Asian nations. The victims of these war 
crimes were mostly Chinese, Filipinos, Indonesian, Malaysians, and Koreans to 
mention just a few. The Japanese government have attempted to apologize (Hauss, 
2003; Oliner, 2008; Yamazaki, 2006). However, these apologies were mostly 
ineffective and were characterized as being personal rather than political apologies. 
These apologies often deepened the anger of victims (Oliner, 2008; Yamazaki, 
2006), because they were perceived as hypocritical and deceptive due to concurrent 
non-acknowledgement and non-admittance of the atrocities committed during WW 
II in some textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education (Liu & Atsumi, 2008).  
Japan‘s crimes during WW II were portrayed as minor incidents in some 
Japanese textbooks, if mentioned at all (Hein & Selden, 2000). This reluctance to 
reveal the truth by some segments of the political elite has led to a refusal and non-
appreciation of issued apologies made by Japan throughout East Asia. Many 
survivors of those crimes and their descendents continue to hold grudges against 
Japan. The so-called ―Rape of Nanking‖ where perhaps as many as 300,000 men, 
women, and children were killed in 1937-38 (Chang, 1998) remains unresolved and 
is factually contested, leaving Chinese victims and their offspring with continued 
anger (Liu & Atsumi, 2008). Filipino and Korean former comfort women who 
were used as sex slaves during WW II still demonstrate in front of the Japanese 
embassy in Manila and Seoul respectively for an official apology and 
compensation for their suffering. The survivors fear that their suffering will be 
forgotten once they die (Pennebaker, Páez, & Rimé, 1997). So far, the Japanese 
government has refused to come clear about its own past. Therefore, the apologies 
it has issued are perceived as half-hearted and not trustworthy, and may have made 
matters worse rather than better (Oliner, 2008).  
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Have these differing traditions of dealing with a dark past influenced the 
process of peacemaking and intergroup reconciliation in Europe and East Asia? 
The focus of this particular thesis is on the applicability of the concept of 
forgiveness in dealing with a troubled past between groups. 
Aim and outline of the current thesis 
The aim of the current thesis was to investigate the relevance of the societal 
and historical context for intergroup forgiveness, allowing further predictions and 
explanations of differences in the propensity to forgive and the willingness to make 
amends for past injustices respectively. The post WW II relations in the European 
and in the East Asian context take centre stage for this research. This is a novel 
undertaking, since previous research has focused on within-group conflicts where 
the victim and perpetrator roles were intertwined (e.g. Northern Ireland). In 
addition to the European context, the current thesis attempted to shed some light on 
the post WW II relations between Japan and her formerly victimized East Asian 
neighbours, since the East Asian context has been neglected for too long.  
The current thesis consists of four studies reported in Chapters 3 to 6. The 
thesis closes with a general discussion and conclusion in Chapter 7. In Chapter 3, 
Study 1 investigates in a cross-national meta-analytical approach if and how 
societies differ on interpersonal forgiveness. Study 1 aimed to reveal whether 
contextual/societal factors influence interpersonal forgiveness. Subsequently, 
sources of explanations for observed differences are examined and associations 
between socio-economic, socio-political, peacefulness of society and societal 
evaluations of historical calamities and interpersonal forgiveness across 13 
societies are investigated. 
Study 2 in Chapter 4 provides an insight into how Japanese, Filipino and 
German participants differentiate between interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness 
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using a qualitative approach. Study 2 explored how participants articulate 
conditions and relevance of forgiveness for conflict resolution. The identification 
of key concepts in the intergroup forgiveness process provided new concepts 
(historical closure in particular) that are investigated in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Chapter 5 examines victim perspectives from three formerly victimized 
European nations (France, Poland, Russia) and three formerly victimized East 
Asian nations (China, Taiwan, Philippines). Study 3a tested whether the historical 
context in Europe and East Asia influences the forgiveness process. If this impact 
occurs, it should be reflected in substantial differences in the outcome variable of 
intergroup forgiveness, which are also associated with mean differences between 
nations and contexts in variables such as collective guilt, and historical closure. 
These variables and the convergent validity of historical closure and costs of 
granting forgiveness were assessed to investigate these claims. 
Study 3b examined the impact of established psychological antecedents 
(such as guilt and trust) and new concepts (such as historical closure) on intergroup 
forgiveness in post World War II contexts in Europe and East Asia using regression 
analysis. The unique contribution of the new concepts are assessed and discussed in 
Chapter 5. Notably, Study 3b employed a statistical technique called cross-level 
operator analysis to tackle the influence of context variables. In this analysis, 
external contextual variables (i.e. number of issued public apologies during the last 
two decades) were assessed in terms of their contribution to explain variation in 
intergroup forgiveness at the individual level. Contextual variables that reflect the 
historical context were chosen. 
Chapter 6 examines perpetrator perspectives from Germany and Japan. It is 
proposed that the historical context influences the process of being willing to make 
amends. Making amends complements the forgiveness process, since it is argued 
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that the overall forgiveness process includes both a victim and perpetrator side. The 
impact of the historical context may reflect crucial differences between Japanese 
and German participants on the outcome variable of willingness to make 
amendments. Furthermore, established psychological antecedents and historical 
closure among other new concepts (such as face concerns) are investigated in their 
ability to predict the willingness to make amendments. The unique contribution of 
the new concepts to explain variance in the willingness to make amends is 
examined and evaluated.  
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes, discusses and integrates major findings. The 
chapter deals with the limitations of the current research and suggests future 
research. It closes with concluding remarks.  
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Chapter 2 
Introduction to intergroup forgiveness 
 
Summary of developments in forgiveness research 
 
The concept of forgiveness has been of interest and encouraged for 
centuries by major religions (McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000). Before 
philosophers and other scholars have gotten interested in this topic, theologians 
devoted their scholarship to understanding the age-old experience of forgiveness. 
Forgiveness‘ strong religious ties caused neglect in scientific research. Due to a 
high reluctance to mix religious and scientific topics, serious attempts to study 
forgiveness psychologically did not start until the mid 1980s. Furthermore, 
research has been restricted to understanding interpersonal forgiveness (see for an 
overview Worthington, 2005).   
The scientific psychological research of interpersonal forgiveness can be 
categorized into three sequential waves. First, clinicians, therapists, and family 
counsellors were interested in applying forgiveness to interventions to foster 
healing among their clients (e.g. Smedes, 1984). Second, developmental 
psychologists (Enright & the Human Development Group, 1989) started 
researching the development of forgiveness reasoning, and personality 
psychologists began researching forgiveness as a trait (e.g. Kamat, Jones & 
Lawler-Row, 2006). Third, health psychologists commenced researching physical 
health outcomes (e.g. Lawler, Younger, Piferi, Billington, Jobe, Edmondson, & 
Jones, 2003) and social psychologists initiated studies on how forgiveness occurs 
in everyday interactions including a recent interest in studying interpersonal 
forgiveness cross-culturally (e.g. Takaku, 2001). The latter field of study remains 
under researched (see Sandage & Williams, 2005).  
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Studies have addressed questions such as how forgiveness as a process is 
able to heal hurt caused by the harm done, and its power to bring people together 
again (Fincham, Jackson, & Beach, 2005). This literature generally incorporates an 
analysis of the benefits of forgiveness and the drawbacks of not forgiving in 
interpersonal (but not intergroup) settings (for an overview see McCullough et al., 
2000; Worthington, 2005). For example, forgiveness has been proposed as an 
intervention method and has been applied in therapeutic settings. An important 
finding of this work is that forgiveness is positively related to an individual‘s 
psychological well-being (Karremans, van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Kluwer, 2003; 
Rye, Folck, Heim, Olszewski, & Traina, 2004), greater life-satisfaction (Poloma & 
Gallup, 1991) and happiness (Maltby, Day, & Barber, 2005).  
Although a reasonable amount of research has addressed and explored the 
concept and process of forgiveness, many questions remain unanswered in the 
domain of interpersonal forgiveness (Worthington, 2005). However, Worthington 
noted that despite the tendency for each researcher to state that there is no 
consensus about the definition of forgiveness, ―there seems to be a near consensus‖ 
(p. 557). In the following section, I define and distinguish the two concepts of 
interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness.  
What is interpersonal forgiveness?  
Many scholars argue that forgiveness is distinct from excusing, exonerating, 
justifying, condoning, pardoning, or reconciling (for a summary see Worthington, 
2005). Worthington argues that while the landscape of various forgiveness 
definitions seems confusing, forgiveness tends to be conceptualised in two ways: 
one definition focuses on the intrapersonal experiences of forgiveness, and the 
other one considers the interpersonal process of forgiveness.  
An often-cited definition of forgiveness at the interpersonal level is:  
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―Forgiveness is a person‘s decision to substantially 
reduce or even abandon resentment, negative 
judgment, and indifferent behaviour toward another 
person who unjustly injured him or her, while 
fostering compassion, generosity and even love toward 
the other person‖ (Enright, Freedman, & Rique, 1998, 
pp. 46-47). 
 
Worthington and McCullough (1999) defined interpersonal forgiveness as a 
positive change in emotions, cognitions and behaviours toward the transgressor 
party. That is, when people forgive, their emotional, cognitive and behavioural 
responses towards people who have offended or injured them become more 
positive and less negative. Hargrave and Sells (1997), who come from a therapeutic 
background, define forgiveness as an unfolding process in which the victim and the 
victimizer rebuild trust and promote an open dialogue about the offence with the 
aim of rebuilding the relationship. Scobie and Scobie (1998) regard forgiveness as 
―a prosocial facilitator‖ pointing to the relational aspects involved in rebuilding the 
relationship as the outcome of the forgiveness process. McCullough and colleagues 
(2000) conclude that existing definitions suggest that forgiveness is an 
―intraindividual, prosocial change toward a perceived transgressor that is situated 
in a specific interpersonal context‖ (p. 9). 
Later, Worthington (2005) summarized definitions of forgiveness and 
distinguished three types of forgiveness: decisional forgiveness, experience of 
forgiveness and the process of interpersonal forgiveness. The focus of this thesis is 
on the process of intergroup forgiveness (see Chapter 1). According to 
Worthington (2005), the process of interpersonal forgiveness is defined in the 
following way. Forgiveness involves interactions surrounding a transgression. 
These interactions include various micro-processes (e.g. seeking forgiveness or 
rejecting the need of forgiveness by the offending party) and cognitions (e.g. 
attributions) as well as emotions (victimized party‘s expression of emotional 
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forgiveness). Furthermore, the process of forgiveness is influenced by whether 
there is a desire to continue the relationship. Worthington further refers to the 
societal level and acknowledges that the historical context and salient identities 
may have an impact on the interpretations of events (Worthington, 2005). 
What is intergroup forgiveness? 
The significance of context within the mentioned definitions is unclear, 
although Worthington (2005) did acknowledge that context influenced the 
forgiveness process. The stated definitions emphasise the role of the individual and 
intrapersonal changes. The definitions paid little attention to how transgressions 
and the forgiveness process affect people as a group. Indeed, there is no clear 
definition of intergroup forgiveness in the literature. The seeds for the 
conceptualisation of intergroup forgiveness in previous research have come from 
definitions of interpersonal forgiveness (e.g. Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, McLernon, 
Niens, & Noor, 2004). Some conceptualisations of interpersonal forgiveness might 
be applicable for forgiveness processes between groups (e.g. role of the situation, 
severity of harm done), but others may be not appropriate (e.g. independence from 
the context).  
Most previous research acknowledges that there are substantial differences 
between interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness (e.g. Hewstone et al., 2004). 
Intergroup forgiveness is predominantly defined based on Enright‘s and the Human 
Development Group (1991, 1998) definition (quoted above), or a mix of definitions 
based on McCullough and colleagues‘ (2000) and Enright‘s understanding of 
forgiveness applied to the intergroup level.  
Strictly speaking, the definitions provided by Enright and the Human 
Development Group (1991, 1998) are not applicable in intergroup contexts, as they 
are mostly concentrated on the individual and focus on unilateral, intrapersonal 
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change which is independent from any actions of the former perpetrator. 
Furthermore, according to Enright and the Human Development Group (1991), the 
most developed form of forgiveness transcends social contexts (Andrews, 2000). 
However, the context is a necessary part to understand interpersonal and even more 
so intergroup forgiveness (Andrews, 2000).  
Andrews‘ (2000) conceptualisation of negotiated forgiveness and Montiel‘s 
(2000, 2002) conceptualisation of constructive socio-political forgiveness are 
useful for the definition of intergroup forgiveness. Forgiveness is based on 
fulfilling preconditions before forgiveness is granted – although fulfilling these 
preconditions does not guarantee that forgiveness will take place. Applied to the 
intergroup context, negotiated forgiveness involves the idea of accountability and a 
dialogue between the victim and perpetrator party that may further understanding 
and trust (Mellor, Bertherton, & Firth, 2007).  
Montiel (2000) stressed the existence of qualitative differences between 
intrapersonal, interpersonal and socio-political forgiveness. From her point of 
view, socio-political forgiveness involves large pluralities of individuals and not 
human individuals (intrapersonal) or dyads (interpersonal). Furthermore, she 
argued that socio-political forgiveness deals with social healing that goes beyond 
intrapersonal healing. Moreover, she argues that an increase of subjective 
intrapersonal wellbeing does not automatically transform into social healing. 
Montiel (2000, p. 95) regards this assumption as ―an analytical error of those who 
take a highly individualistic stance‖. Forgiveness at the intrapersonal and 
interpersonal level is a private experience whereas socio-political forgiveness is a 
public one (Montiel, 2002). The public and external character of ―public 
forgiveness requires a sensitive handling of the historical, cultural, and political 
contexts of both conflicting groups‖ (Montiel, 2002, p. 271). 
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What is the difference between forgiveness at the individual and at the group level? 
Forgiveness at the individual level can be described as a ‗virtue‘, since it is 
a moral response to transgressions (Enright & Rique, 2000). It can also be 
described as a process depending on the situation and the relationship between the 
victim and perpetrator (e.g. this is more likely for people who have ongoing contact 
with each other, such as life partners). Furthermore, it entails a conscious decision, 
but not necessarily involving both parties. Forgiveness at the individual level 
allows victims to gain a sense of closure, reflected in reported increase in well-
being and decrease in anxiety. Therefore, the benefits of forgiveness at the 
individual level are many, including a release from a damaging cycle of negative 
emotions and actions.  
As aforementioned, the boundaries between forgiveness at the individual 
and group level are blurred in the literature. First and foremost, the fact that 
forgiveness has been conceptualized by scholars from different disciplines as a 
purely interpersonal affair only involving the victim and the perpetrator directly 
connected to an offence, or even as a solely intrapersonal process, has led to the 
impression that forgiveness has no place between groups or even between nations.   
The notion of forgiveness as a strictly interpersonal process does not 
consider that many harmful acts in social life involve collectives (Minow, 1998; 
Thomas & Garrod, 2002). Particularly in war and other contexts in which severe 
human rights violations occur, harm done is not only targeted at individuals but at 
societies as a whole or what societies represent (Neto, Pinto, & Mullet, 2007a; 
Thomas & Garrod, 2002). Therefore, one of the major differences between 
forgiveness at the individual and at the group-level is that offences in interpersonal 
contexts can be directly attributed to an individual, whereas in intergroup contexts 
it is difficult to ascribe an offence to any specific individual (Enright & the Human 
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Developmental Study Group, 1991; Tavuchis, 1991). Hewstone and colleagues 
(2004) noted that the link between forgiveness and trust suggests that it must be 
easier to forgive an individual than a group since it is easier to trust an individual. 
Furthermore, they suggested that forgiveness is easier if there is an apology or 
acknowledgment of the harm done, and that a lack of public acknowledgment can 
fuel grudges and grievances. Moreover, it may be easier to gain closure and depart 
from the past between two individuals, as it is possible to break-up a relationship 
that is no longer desired, or to effectively intervene if a continued relationship is 
desired. This complexity makes it difficult to define forgiveness at the group level. 
Working definition of intergroup forgiveness 
Based on the outline of definitions above and the claim that reconciliation is 
the outcome of forgiveness (see McLernon, Cairns, Lewis, & Hewstone, 2003; 
Montiel, 2000, 2002; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008), intergroup forgiveness is 
defined as follows. 
Intergroup forgiveness is a contextualized, dynamic process between the 
victimized and perpetrating party that involves negotiation and understanding. It is 
an unfolding and continuous process, in which the perpetrator party provides 
reasons for the victimized party to consider forgiveness and reconciliation. 
Importantly, it involves psychological closure for both parties (e.g. a form of 
‗social healing‘), in which a symbolic departure from the past is reached. A shared 
and consensual interpretation of the conflict between both parties is necessary in 
order for them to be able to empathize and gain trust with the other side. The 
process entails acknowledgment of harm done and a public apology that includes 
significant and coherent actions, and an acceptance by the victimized party that the 
approach by the perpetrator party is appropriate and genuine, leading to an open 
dialogue. This dialogue may include sharing historical understandings of the 
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conflict. According to research on the collective remembering of conflict 
(Pennebaker et al., 1997; Páez & Liu, in press), divergent versus consensual 
interpretations of the past between formerly conflicting nations is crucial in 
understanding why societies today are either reluctant or eager to engage in 
peacemaking efforts to resolve outstanding disputes.  
 
The psychology of intergroup forgiveness 
―Against the backdrop of a world in which hatred and resentment loom larger than 
amity and recognition, forgiveness appears an oddly idealistic theme to emerge as 
central to some recent political thinking.‖ (Janover, 2005, p. 222) 
 
Forgiveness between peoples and nations is capturing the attention of 
scholars across a range of disciplines (Oliner, 2005). The inability of human kind to 
live peacefully together without perpetrating psychological or physical harm on 
one another is the reality of the world we live in (Beatty, 1970; Oliner, 2008). 
Hence, it makes responses and experiences of forgiveness necessary in order to 
facilitate peaceful coexistence (McCullough, 2008). This thesis‘ focus is the setting 
of post WW II and the application of forgiveness in this setting comparing the 
European and East Asian context. In the following section, I will summarize 
previous research conducted in this domain and critically evaluate them.  
Social Identity Approach and the Contact-Hypothesis 
The steadily increasing psychological research on intergroup forgiveness 
has been carried out in the post-conflict context of Northern Ireland (e.g. 
McLernon, Cairns, Hewstone, & Smith, 2004; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; 
Tam, Hewstone, Cairns, Tausch, Maio, & Kenworthy, 2007), Chile (Manzi & 
Gonzáles, 2007) and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Čehajić, Brown, & Castano, 
2008). These studies have several points in common: the main theoretical 
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framework is provided by social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and 
self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, 1987, 1999) and/or the application of the 
contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954). The investigations focused on within-society 
dynamics (for example Protestants versus Catholics in Northern Ireland; Left-wing 
versus Right-wing in Chile). The main variables used to predict intergroup 
forgiveness in these contexts were SIT/SCT driven: group-based emotions, contact, 
outgroup attitudes, and affective concepts such as empathy, trust and competitive 
victimhood. Moreover, identity concepts with varying levels of inclusiveness 
(ingroup, common ingroup identity, human identity) were examined. These studies 
were either cross-sectional, longitudinal or experimental (mostly scenario-based 
studies). As intergroup forgiveness research is a rather young field, the key focus 
has been on understanding how forgiveness relates to other concepts and what 
drives intergroup forgiveness. The focus on similar research paradigms and 
underlying mechanisms of intergroup forgiveness has led to some comparable 
findings. I will summarize the social identity approach in the next section followed 
by a review of empirical research on intergroup forgiveness.  
Social Identity Approach: Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-categorization 
Theory (SCT) 
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) and its follow-up self-
categorization theory focusing on the cognitive component of SIT (Turner, 1987; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, 1999) are among the 
leading theories on intergroup relations. Social identity theory emphasises the 
social context and its influence on intergroup relations (Hornsey, 2008). The 
development of SIT was a European response and critique to the American social 
cognition paradigm, which has an individualistic and asocial interpretation of social 
psychology (for a review see Hogg & Williams, 2000).  
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SIT distinguishes between personal identities (interpersonal spectrum) and 
social identities (intergroup spectrum). Personal identity reflects self-definitions in 
terms of personal attributes, whilst social identity is how people regard themselves 
in terms of their social category membership (Turner, 1999). Overall, SIT argues 
that intergroup relations are influenced by an interaction of cognitions 
(identification with a social category), motivation (being positively distinct from an 
outgroup and attaining a positive social identity), social comparison, and socio-
historical components (social situations) (Hornsey, 2008). 
Social interactions incorporate a shift from the interpersonal spectrum to the 
intergroup spectrum depending on how individuals see themselves in relation to 
others (Hornsey, 2008). Furthermore, this shift is a function of an interaction 
between psychological and social factors (Turner, 1999). Individuals depend on 
contextually relevant signs to help them to define themselves in relation to a group 
and others‘ group membership. Turner (1975, p. 10, cited in Hogg & Williams, 
2000) argues that behaviour between groups can be regarded as ―a process of 
competition for positive identity‖. As soon as there is a salient ―us and them‖ 
distinction, it alters the view of how people see themselves and others.  
One goal of social identification is to find psychological meaning by 
identifying a certain group category through a social comparison process. Only 
through comparison with other groups does a particular group membership become 
psychologically meaningful (Hogg & Williams, 2000). The ultimate aim of this 
comparison process is to attain a positive social identity and to be positively 
distinct from the relevant outgroup(s). The strength of the identification with a 
particular group determines the drive to gain a positive social identity and a sense 
of belonging. This motivation can result in ingroup favouring behaviours resulting 
in an ingroup bias, and in the process of social comparisons may result in outgroup 
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derogation. The argument that ingroup favouritism is a sign of outgroup 
derogation, however, is disputed (see Brewer, 1979, 1999). Brewer (1999) argued 
that prejudice and discrimination are motivated by ingroup favouring behaviours 
rather than direct aggressions against outgroup members. Therefore, SIT is better in 
explaining ingroup favouritism than outgroup hostilities (Hornsey, 2008). 
According to Turner (1999), SIT proposed a clear line between individual and 
group behaviour, but it does not answer the question how social identities become 
salient.     
 Turner and colleagues (1987) moved beyond the intergroup focus of the 
SIT framework to elaborate on intragroup processes. They tried to address 
unanswered questions regarding the process of social identification and the 
interrelationship between interpersonal and intergroup behaviour. Although SIT 
and SCT overlap in terms of their theoretical underpinnings, these two theories 
have different foci (Hornsey, 2008). SCT deals with the role of the categorization 
process. Turner et al. (1987) and Turner (1999) examined the interrelationships 
between interpersonal and intergroup behaviours stemming from an underlying 
distinction between personal and social identity. They argued that identity operates 
at different levels of inclusiveness rather than as a dynamic shift between bipolar 
ends (Hornsey, 2008). They distinguished three levels: a superordinate level (self 
as a human being), an intermediate level (social identity), and a subordinate level 
(personal identity). The salience of one aspect of a person‘s identity is in some 
situations higher whereas the other two are lower. Therefore, in SCT identity is a 
flexible construct and is not static.  
Social categorization arises when social categories are perceived to 
represent social reality and when these categories deliver means for differentiation 
from an outgroup (comparative fit). SCT argues that this process is dynamic 
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because it varies depending on the context. This variation occurs according to the 
accessibility and fit of a category. A social category may fit well if the group 
behaviour and membership are consistent with stereotypical expectation or a group 
prototype (normative fit; see Hornsey, 2008). The salience of a social category also 
depends on its accessibility in a situation. For instance, it may be primed because 
of frequent salience or due to motivation to activate a particular category (Hornsey, 
2008). 
Hogg and Williams (2000) propose that the salience of social identities is 
driven by an interaction of five elements. These are individual motives self-esteem 
and uncertainty reduction, the accessibility of the social category dependent on the 
context and on memory, how well a social category helps to differentiate between 
people, and how well a social category can explain others‘ behaviour. According to 
Turner (1999) when a shared identity is salient, people tend to perceive themselves 
and other ingroup members as interchangeable exemplars of the same social group. 
This is termed prototype-based depersonalisation. Turner (1999) deems this 
process as the core psychological process of group behaviour.  
 What started as an ambitious response to mainstream American social 
psychology developed into one of the most influential, widely accepted and most 
applied theories to understand intergroup phenomena. However, the social identity 
approach also received criticism. SIT has been criticized for not being falsifiable, 
which means that the theory has become overextended: almost any outcome is 
explainable within its overarching framework (Hogg & Williams, 2000). Hogg and 
Williams pointed out that this is a weakness rather than strength.  
Farr (1996, cited in Hornsey, 2008) sees the claim of social identity theory 
as being nonreductionist and collective as contestable, as he argues that it 
represents the reductionist and individualist working shoulder to shoulder with 
  21 
mainstream social cognition. Furthermore, Brewer (1979, 1999) questioned the 
specific presumption that ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation are 
reciprocally related. The original SIT proposition that social identity (collective 
self) and individual self are cognitively independent has also been contested (Hogg 
& Williams, 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Duveen (2001) criticized SIT and 
SCT for focusing too much on the outcome of the identification process and too 
little on what an identity entails in each social situation. Overall, there are reasons 
to question the scope of identity for investigating intergroup forgiveness, since 
intergroup forgiveness is tied to a conflict that has a history and has several groups 
as agents involved in a conflict, which also have a history. The application of social 
identity to understand intergroup forgiveness runs the risk of being reductionist, 
since intergroup forgiveness is a very complex process and cannot be solely 
understood and reduced to issues over identity.  
Contact Hypothesis 
Allport (1954) originally formulated the contact hypothesis, proposing that 
intergroup relations can be improved through frequent positive interactions 
between members of different groups. Generally, frequent contact with outgroup 
members can alter stereotypes about the outgroup, increase perceptions of 
heterogeneity of the outgroup, and reduce prejudices (e.g. Rothbart & John, 1985). 
Furthermore, positive contact experiences with representative outgroup members 
can also reduce anxiety towards the outgroup as a whole (Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, 
Hamberger, & Niens, 2006). 
In order to be effective, interpersonal contact between rival groups should 
take place under four optimal conditions: equality of social status, purposeful 
cooperative activity, common goals and social and institutional support (Pettigrew, 
1998). The most widely accepted perspective has focused on changes in 
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categorization. Namely, decategorization (Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993) and 
recategorization of group categories can explain the effectiveness of intergroup 
contact to reduce prejudice (Gaertner & Dovido, 2000). Decategorization means to 
perceive oneself as a separate individual and not as a member of a group. Hence, 
decategorization loosens group boundaries; interactions between individuals take 
centre stage and the salience of distinctions between groups become redundant. 
Studies have provided empirical evidence for the existence of this effect (for an 
overview see Gaertner & Dovido, 2000). Emphasis on a common identity or 
recategorization of group categories (Common Ingroup Identity Model, CIIM; 
Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) may lead to the transformation from two (rival) groups 
into one inclusive group, and can alter perceptions of outgroup members (Gaertner 
& Dovidio, 2000). Overall, the contact hypothesis has been referred to as ―one of 
psychology‘s most effective strategies for improving intergroup relations‘‘ 
(Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003, p. 5). 
The contact hypothesis has also received criticism doubting the 
applicability of the optimal contact strategy, as it seems detached from social 
reality (e.g. Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005). The emphasis on positive factors 
in the contact situation rather than factors that may inhibit the reduction of 
prejudice and intergroup anxiety has been questioned (Hewstone et al., 2006), but 
remains under-researched (see Dovido et al., 2003; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).  
The criticism is justified when it comes to the aftermath of large-scale 
conflicts within which members of societies may, but more likely may not, have 
contact with other members of the societies (e.g. the aftermath of World War II in 
East Asia). The initial proposition of the contact hypothesis was about the 
reduction of prejudice by increasing of the quantity and quality of contact between 
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members of different groups. Most of the later propositions of the contact 
hypothesis are based on social identity theory and self-categorization theory.  
A recent meta-analysis carried out by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) gathered 
empirical evidence about the existence of a robust link between contact and the 
reduction of intergroup contact. This robust link goes beyond contact between 
racial or ethnic groups and is empirically independent from Allport‘s proposed 
optimal conditions. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) recommend to focus more on the 
inhibitors of intergroup contact and to conduct longitudinal studies in order to 
establish causal factors that lead to the persistence of positive effects of intergroup 
contact.  
Empirical research on intergroup forgiveness 
The next section reviews empirical research on intergroup forgiveness with 
the aim to summarize the main findings in studies that have applied the 
aforementioned theoretical frameworks. I will close the review by pointing to gaps 
in the literature and suggest an alternative theoretical framework for the 
investigation of intergroup forgiveness.  
Identity  
Research focusing on the identity aspects of intergroup focus process aimed 
to provide insight into the role and future of intergroup forgiveness in real post 
conflict settings using survey studies. Identification with one‘s ingroup (SIT; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979; Turner, 1999), or with a common identity (CIIM; Gaertner & 
Dovido, 2000) was examined as either a mediating variable (e.g. Noor et al., 2008), 
a moderating variable (Hewstone et al., 2004) or a direct predictor (e.g. Cairns, 
Tam, Hewstone, & Niens, 2004; Noor, Brown, Gonzales, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008) 
of intergroup forgiveness.  
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Noor and colleagues (2008) argued that intergroup forgiveness relates to 
identity concerns. Drawing from SIT, Noor and colleagues further argued that this 
distinguishes interpersonal from intergroup forgiveness. Moreover, they proposed 
that the strength of identification is an underlying force that drives the relationships 
between the independent variable (e.g. guilt) and intergroup forgiveness. In most 
studies, ingroup identification was negatively associated with intergroup 
forgiveness. When tested as either a mediator or moderator, ingroup identification 
was a significant contributor to reported levels of intergroup forgiveness. A 
common identity or superordinate group category was positively associated with 
forgiveness in Northern Ireland, Chile (Noor et al., 2008), and (to a marginal 
degree) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Čehajić, Brown, & Castano, 2008). Hence, 
common identity seems to work differently in some samples, as the moderating 
effect was only significant among the Catholic sample in Northern Ireland (Noor et 
al., 2008). 
The moderating role of ingroup identification has been tested in 
experimental designs, using scenarios describing an act of paramilitary violence 
with various intentions and motives to assess the effect of ingroup identification on 
intergroup forgiveness (Cairns et al., 2004). These studies found that ingroup 
identification drives a bias towards intergroup forgiveness over and above whether 
the harm done was perceived to be intentional. High identifiers showed a strong 
ingroup favouring bias in which they showed more forgiveness when the 
perpetrator was an ingroup member. There was no differentiation for low 
identifiers between ingroup or outgroup perpetrators in terms of levels of 
forgiveness. This effect occurred regardless of the perceived intentions and motives 
of the act.  
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However, as I will point out in the section on research gaps, although this 
research clearly pointed out the importance of investigating identity and the 
consequences of identification, it overlooks the relevance of the historical context 
as an influencing factor. Another reason for concern is that within-group dynamics 
possibly do not apply to between-group dynamics, such as relationships between 
nations involved in WW II. For example, little is known about how the various 
ways that Germany and Japan have dealt with their perpetrator role in WW II has 
affected or still affecting the relationship between nations rather than groups within 
a nation or region. In other words, the representation of the historical past may 
have a substantial impact on intergroup forgiveness between nations. 
Wohl and Reeder‘s (2004) series of experiments with hypothetical 
scenarios showed that ingroup members tolerated aggressive behaviour by ingroup 
members, if the behaviour was beneficial for the group. The act was judged as 
immoral, but the ingroup member was forgiven. On the other hand, outgroup 
members were judged harshly when the outgroup member undertook similar 
aggressive acts. Outgroup members were judged as less moral for the same offence 
and were not forgiven.  
Similarly, Wohl and Branscombe (2005) tested the mediating role of a 
human-level categorization and social identity categorization in group-level 
reactions to the Holocaust. Contemporary Jewish people were asked how forgiving 
they were towards today‘s Germans. When Germans were seen as fellow humans 
rather than Germans, contemporary Jewish participants were more forgiving.  
In another series of scenario-based studies in Lebanon, which included 
Catholics, Maronites, and Orthodox Christians, various vignettes were presented 
with varied scenarios: cancellation of consequences, intent to harm, religious and 
social proximity, and apologies (Azar, Mullet, & Vinsonneau, 1999). The results 
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showed slightly different patterns to the aforementioned studies. The only social 
factors that affected the propensity to forgive were the level of education. Better 
educated people expressed more willingness to forgive, regardless of community 
membership. Gender and age did not influence the findings. Therefore, the 
community membership was not important and participants expressed equivalent 
levels of forgiveness. A replication by Azar and Mullet (2001, cited in Azar & 
Mullet, 2002) of the same experiment, but with different communities in Lebanon 
(Druzes, Shiites, and Sunnis), confirmed previous findings: equivalent levels of 
forgiveness were expressed independent of the community membership of the 
offender.  
Therefore, it could be argued that the ingroup-outgroup differentiation is 
governed by the historical and social context rather than the mere social 
categorization process. One can speculate that depending on the methods (survey 
or an experiment), group membership is sometimes highly salient and sometimes 
not in previous research. A key question is why identity was driving the outcome 
so strongly in some settings, whilst in other settings it did not seem to impact. This 
inconsistent finding deserves further attention. One explanation could be the 
underlying historical context in given conflict (and interpretation of that context) 
can have different effects on how group boundaries are created and maintained 
(Breakwell, 2001; Hilton & Liu, 2008; Liu & Hilton, 2005). Considering - as 
Hartwell (2005) and Staub (2000) point out - that the roots of many current 
conflicts stem from past conflicts between nations or groups, the historical context 
is an essential force that should not be ignored.  
Contact 
In divided societies like Northern Ireland or Bosnia and Herzegovina, it 
seems appropriate to test the impact of cross-community contacts on intergroup 
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forgiveness. Overall, the findings indicated that cross-community contacts have a 
positive impact on intergroup forgiveness, confirming previous research on the 
positive effects of intergroup contact. These studies focused on either the effects of 
contact in integrated or mixed education in schools where Catholic and Protestant 
pupils share the same class-rooms in Northern Ireland (McGlynn, Niens, Cairns, & 
Hewstone, 2004); or the assessment of a self-reported measure of contact with the 
outgroup (Cairns et al., 2005; Čehajić, et al., 2008; Moeschbeger et al., 2005; Tam 
et al., 2007). The direct effects of contact were usually mediated by other variables, 
such as ingroup identification or infrahumanization (i.e. seeing the outgroup as 
more human); or group-based emotions like anger, empathy, outgroup attitudes.  
Tam and colleagues demonstrated (2004; cited in Cairns, 2005) that contact 
resulted in lower infrahumanization and promoted forgiveness. This mediation was 
stronger than the mediating effects of anxiety, empathy and respect variables. 
Čehajić and colleagues (2008) showed that the direct effect of intergroup contact 
and intergroup forgiveness was mediated by empathy, trust and outgroup 
heterogeneity. The positive impact of intergroup contact on trust, empathy and 
outgroup heterogeneity had an indirect positive effect on intergroup forgiveness. In 
Moeschberger, Dixon, Niens, and Cairns (2005) study, contact mediated the effect 
between empathy and forgiveness.  
In sum, contact contributed to promote intergroup forgiveness in divided 
societies like Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, one may 
point cautiously to the fact that the focus was on within-society dynamics where 
(structured) contact (e.g. integrated schools) between conflicting groups may be a 
practical solution. This is not the case in conflicts between societies. Furthermore, 
there were some inconsistencies in these findings. For example, in Hewstone and 
colleagues‘ (2004) study with a large general population sample, contact was a 
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positive contributor for the prediction of forgiveness for Catholics, but not for 
Protestants. Likewise, there were significant differences between Catholics and 
Protestant on many of the assessed variables (e. g. Catholics scored higher on 
forgiveness and trust than Protestants), whereas in other studies there were no 
differences between the two groups and samples were collapsed for more powerful 
statistical analyses (e.g. Noor et al., 2008; Hewstone et al., 2004). These studies fall 
short on explaining why the processes of forgiveness in Catholic and Protestant 
samples were different. The context of these conflict settings were explained and 
described, but the historical background was not considered as a source of further 
explanations or predictions.  
The following section reviews previous research on group-based emotions, 
such as collective guilt, collective shame and group-based anger and their effects 
on intergroup forgiveness. 
Collective guilt and collective guilt assignment 
In Northern Ireland the boundaries between victims and perpetrators are 
blurry as these roles are not clear and intertwined. During this conflict, victims 
became perpetrators themselves and vice versa, resulting in competitions over 
victimhood, which in turn may lead to inhibit the promotion of forgiveness and 
foster mutual guilt assignment over the past harm done (Noor et al., 2008; Noor et 
al., 2008). Collective guilt can be experienced when people categorize themselves 
into a group that has committed harm against another group (Branscombe & 
Doosje, 2004; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). Collective guilt is a moral emotion 
based on an appraisal of the responsibility of one‘s ingroup for past harm done that 
motivates reparation (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007). It has been identified as a 
positive antecedent for intergroup forgiveness in the Northern Ireland context (e.g. 
Hewstone et al., 2004). As already discussed, feelings of guilt towards the other 
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group enhances willingness to forgive the group who suffered due to one‘s ingroup 
(e.g. Hewstone et al., 2004). Manzi and Gonzáles (2007) showed that collective 
guilt had an important role in predicting forgiveness and reparation attitudes the 
context of Chile (Left wing vs. Right wing). Feelings of collective guilt towards an 
outgroup are less likely to occur when a person has high experiences of 
victimization (Hewstone et al., 2004).  
It is suggested that collective guilt functions to allow people to positively 
distinguish themselves from former perpetrators. Any act that would induce some 
sort of guilt feelings are thus rejected by people who identify highly with former 
perpetrating group, as opposed to those who identify not as strongly (Branscombe 
& Doosje, 2004; Montada, Schmitt, & Dalbert, 1986; Schmitt, Behner, Montada, 
Müller, & Müller-Fohrbrodt, 2000). Indeed, Hewstone and colleagues (2004) 
demonstrated that low ingroup identifiers felt more collectively guilty than high 
identifiers. However, even among theorists, the idea that a person can be guilty for 
something they have not done themselves is controversial.  
Collective guilt is assigned when people perceive that another group has 
violated moral standards (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). Being a member of a 
historically victimized society can lead to the expectation that former perpetrators 
should feel sorry and try to make up for what their ancestors have done in the past. 
If the former perpetrators or representatives of the former perpetrating society fail 
to fulfil these expectations, the former victims may feel resentful and therefore 
would assign more guilt. Furthermore, if collective guilt is assigned to a great 
extent, it is possible that there is no closure with the past and no grounds to depart 
from the past. The assignment of guilt depends on the level of social categorization 
of the outgroup. This was demonstrated by the perception of Germans as fellow 
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humans resulting in less guilt assignment by Jews than seeing the Germans as 
Germans (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005).   
Collective shame  
The appraisal of responsibility of harmful actions is also a basis for 
collective shame. Shame elicits different attributions for the harm doing than guilt 
and anger feelings (Brown et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2007). While guilt focuses on the 
action and the perception of control over the action, shame focuses on factors that 
are not controllable, such as the characteristics of the group being exposed as weak 
or even disgusting (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, 
Denson, and Schmader (2006) argued that guilt and shame have unique 
behavioural consequences: guilt educes more approach behaviour, like the 
motivation to repair the damage made, whereas shame elicits withdrawal from the 
situation. In three cross-sectional studies with non-indigenous Chileans in the 
context of the historical maltreatment of the Mapuche, Brown and colleagues 
(2008) revealed that collective guilt and shame predicted reparation attitudes. 
Furthermore, they provided evidence that collective guilt had longitudinal effects 
for the increase in reparation attitudes for low-shame people. Collective shame 
only seemed to have short-term effects on reparation attitudes, and was mediated 
by the desire to improve the ingroup‘s reputation.  
Group-based anger 
Intergroup relations often entail strong emotions. Mackie and Smith (2002) 
criticized social psychologists for tending to overemphasize cognitive processes in 
intergroup relations and failing to acknowledge the role of group-based emotions. 
Intense emotions such as anger can contribute more to predicting intergroup 
behaviour than cognition-based evaluations. In the context of intergroup conflict, 
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group-based anger is maintained through intra-group memories of the conflict, long 
after the violence and hostilities have stopped (Manzi & Gonzáles, 2007; Bar-Tal, 
2000). Furthermore, anger is related to a reluctance to forgive (Baumeister, Exline, 
& Sommer, 1998) and seems to drive actions against people associated with the 
former perpetrator group. In previous research, anger was strongly negatively 
associated with forgiveness and willingness to repair relationships (see Manzi et 
al., 2007; Tam et al., 2007). 
Concluding remarks about SIT/SCT based intergroup forgiveness research 
In sum, research applying the SIT and SCT paradigm found strong evidence 
that post-conflict intergroup forgiveness is influenced by identification and contact, 
and is supported by the development of positive attitudes. Although Worthington 
(2005) has pointed out that interpretations of events probably influence the process 
of forgiveness, previous research has not taken the historical context and the 
consequences of different historical accounts into consideration. Furthermore, little 
is known about how forgiveness processes work between nations rather than within 
a nation or region. Moreover, it is also disputable how contact can help resolve 
conflict for groups that do not usually have frequent contact or do not have the 
opportunity to get in contact under optimal conditions. Another point of concern is 
that most research has been conducted by Western psychologists with a focus of 
individualistic paradigms (e.g. desire to obtain a positive social identity), which 
may not apply in every non-Western contexts.  
The following section considers the research that has been conducted in 
cross-cultural settings and that had an applied focus. 
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Cross-cultural and applied research 
Cross-cultural research on intergroup forgiveness is virtually non-existent. 
The handful of studies that have been conducted are devoted to examining the 
applicability of this concept in settings after gross human rights violations (Kadima 
Kadiangandu & Mullet, 2007; Neto, Pinto, & Mullet, 2007a). The research showed 
that participants perceived intergroup forgiveness to be an important concept and 
favoured implementations in political processes similar to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions in South Africa. Furthermore, one study by Noor and 
colleagues (2008) empirically demonstrated that similar mechanisms underlie 
forgiveness processes in Northern Ireland and Chile with varying strengths. 
However, this was not the focus of their study.  
There are to date only a few studies that consider indigenous 
conceptualizations of intergroup forgiveness (Mellor, Bretherton, & Firth, 2007; 
Rata, Liu, & Hanke, 2008). These studies indicated that in unresolved disputes with 
unbalanced relationships, as it is the case in the Aborigines-White Australians and 
Maori-Pakeha relations, granting forgiveness is associated with potential costs that 
in turn threaten rapprochement between groups.   
Staub‘s (2000, 2006) research had an applied focus and was devoted to 
understanding the origins of genocide and mass killings, its prevention, and the 
possibilities of healing and reconciliation in the aftermath of such human tragedies. 
One of his focuses has been the Rwandan genocide in which during a 3-month 
period in 1994, 800,000 people were killed. In a number of projects in 
collaboration with local organizations in Rwanda, Staub, Pearlman, Gubin and 
Hagengimana (2005) designed a theory-based intervention to foster healing among 
victims and perpetrators. The intervention was based on five key elements (Staub et 
al., 2005, p. 304-306): (1) understanding the roots of the conflict and genocide, (2) 
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understanding the effects of trauma, victimization and paths to healing, (3) 
understanding of basic psychological needs, (4) sharing painful experiences in an 
empathic context and (5) vicarious traumatisation. In sum, experimental 
evaluations of this intervention showed that (a) the intervention reduced trauma 
symptoms and increased a positive orientation towards outgroup members; and (b) 
observations implied the importance to understand the origins of violence as this 
fostered empathy.  
In the following section, I evaluate previous research and point to gaps in 
the literature. 
Research gaps and critical evaluation of previous research 
The reviewed research predominantly conducted by Western psychologists 
demonstrated the relevance of ingroup identification, intergroup contact, and 
group-based emotions to the intergroup forgiveness process. Intergroup forgiveness 
seems to work as a precursor for sustainable reconciliation and to benefit both 
those who forgive and who are forgiven. This research has mostly been carried out 
within one society in the Western hemisphere (e.g. Northern Ireland). Furthermore, 
applied research yielding interventions in the aftermath of human rights violations 
has been conducted in the context of the Rwandan genocide. In Lebanon, East 
Timor and Congo research in a particular conflict situation has been undertaken to 
understand the meaning of forgiveness and its utility in interventions for peace. The 
East Asian context is continuously neglected, but may add to a more holistic 
understanding of the complex process of intergroup forgiveness. Some scholars 
have argued that East Asian societies may carry ―the burden of past conflict‖ post 
WW II more heavily than European societies, and therefore are important to 
include in intergroup research regarding this conflict (Buruma, 1994; Hein & 
Selden, 2000; Oliner, 2008). The historical, cultural and political context is critical 
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for both a practical and deeper theoretical understanding of intergroup forgiveness 
(Montiel, 2000, 2002). 
Cairns and Roe (2003) noted that the intergroup conflict literature often 
neglects the historical context of real life conflicts. They refer to memory issues 
that perpetuate conflicts. The studies conducted within the SIT and SCT 
frameworks showed that the role of identity and competing identities (e.g. 
victimhood) significantly influenced intergroup forgiveness. However, Cairns and 
colleague pointed out that identities are often constructed based on the historical 
context. However, the content of identities has been largely neglected in this 
research tradition, as it solely focuses on the consequences of the identification 
process (Duveen, 2001). Therefore, social identities in that sense are too often 
―empty forms‖ and have ―become a vacuous notion, a transparent glass enclosing 
nothing‖ (Duveen, 2001, p. 267).  
Liu and Hilton (2005) offered a theoretical solution to this dilemma through 
integrating social representations of history and the relevance of identity. The 
historical event World War II (WW II) has universal meaning and is a predominant 
representation of global history (Liu & Hilton, 2005). At the same time, it produces 
different content based on different group‘s representations of history, which 
influences group processes and defines how groups relate to one another. For 
example, from the same set of events and figures represented in WW II, Germany 
and the USA may draw different conclusions for future challenges. The USA sees 
itself as a protector of democracy and justifies present military interventions, 
through pointing to WW II and the role of the USA in ending Nazism. Germany as 
a former enemy and present ally may produce different perspectives in public. 
German leaders can both remind the public of the horrors of war and therefore seek 
to denounce military interventions. On the other hand, public reminders of 
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Germany‘s moral responsibility to protect Jews in Israel can motivate the support 
of military interventions (see Liu & Hilton, 2005). In the following section, I will 
briefly summarize the Social Representations Theory (SRT) and its application to 
history and identity (see Hilton & Liu, 2008; Liu & Atsumi, 2008; Liu & Hilton, 
2005, Liu & László, 2007). 
Social Representations Theory (SRT) 
Social Representations Theory (SRT) emerged similar to SIT as a European 
response to the American mainstream social psychological paradigm almost 50 
years ago, and has been outlined by Moscovici (1984). In general, social 
representations are shared conceptions about the world structured and processed 
through the implementation of new knowledge shared in societies. László (2003) 
argued that SRT ―investigates the process and content of representations in relation 
to social dynamics‖ (p. 182). The main objective of SRT is to link the society to the 
individual and the transformation of knowledge across societies. This already poses 
a problem since psychology as a discipline focuses on the individual level of 
analysis (Liu & László, 2007). SRT was formulated to bridge the divide between 
social and psychological phenomena, with emphasis on its novel and dynamic 
nature (László & Wagner, 2003).  
Moscovici (1988) argued that ―our past experiences and ideas are not dead 
experiences or dead ideas, but continue to be active, to change and to infiltrate our 
present experience and ideas. In many respects, the past is more real than the 
present‖ (p. 10). Furthermore, he suggested that social representations change and 
influence individual behaviour in a collective. Moscovici distinguished two 
mechanisms of thought processes, which are relevant in making the unfamiliar 
familiar, or in other words, convert the new and unknown into the known. These 
mechanisms are called anchoring and objectification. Anchoring is setting alien or 
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new ideas in a familiar context by classification and naming, which assists us to 
imagine and represent something. Objectification is transforming something 
abstract into something that is concrete by reproducing ―a concept in an image‖ 
(Moscovici, 1984, p. 38) that has a clear meaning in reality and becomes physical 
and accessible. Furthermore, Moscovici argued that social representations are 
dependent on memory. Anchoring and objectification are means to handle memory 
and to manage cognitions.  
Three types of social representations can be identified. Namely, these are 
hegemonic (representations shared by all members of a society), emancipated 
(development and circulation of shared knowledge and ideas within subgroups, 
alternative versions for each sub group) and polemical representations (generated 
due to social conflicts within societies, not shared, generated by opposing 
relationships between groups) (Breakwell, 2001; Brewer, 2001; Moscovici, 1984). 
Brewer (2001) referred to social representations as the ―‘glue‘ of social life‖ (p. 
308) and suggested that shared meanings determine group boundaries, since social 
representations provide content for social groups.  
There are three means to communicate, transmit and maintain social 
representations (Staerklé, 2006). Namely, this occurs through propaganda, 
propagation, and diffusion. Propaganda is about promoting a particular institution‘s 
or group‘s representations (these can be associated with stereotypes); propagations 
are attitudes where social representations of a group defend their point of view, but 
also accept different views; and diffusions are widely accepted opinions with little 
or no resistance to their validity (Moscovici & Marková, 2000; Staerklé, 2006). 
Therefore, hegemonic representations‘ means of transmission are diffusions; 
emancipated representations‘ means are propagation; and polemical 
representations‘ means of transmission are propaganda.  
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One example of the transmission of knowledge about the atrocities 
committed by Japan during WW II (e.g. Comfort Women Issue and the Nanjing 
Massacre) would be how the Japanese ―Association for liberal views of history‖ 
communicate their view. This representation can be regarded as propaganda as 
their view generates negative stereotypes of China in claiming that Chinese views 
on this matter are false and that Chinese evidence as well as Chinese testimonies 
have been fabricated (e.g. Takemoto & Ohara, 2000). An example of diffusion 
would be how knowledge about the Holocaust has been communicated via 
textbooks in Germany. Perspectives on the Holocaust are widely accepted there 
and not publicly contested as it is the case in Japan (Hein & Selden, 2000; Oliner, 
2008).   
Similarly, Voelklein and Howarth (2005) discussed the role of 
representations in constructing symbolic boundaries that define social identities. 
They proposed that the essence of representations as being social stems from their 
creation by collectives and validation through social processes. Additionally, they 
argued that the content of social representations is affected by the historical and 
cultural context. Therefore, there is the possibility that social representations 
precede social identities (see Brewer, 2001; Duveen, 2001; Voelklein & Howarth, 
2005). However, there is also considerable speculation that social identities come 
first (Breakwell, 2001) or that there is mutual exchange between the two (Brewer, 
2001). Brewer (2001) acknowledged that there is no conclusive argument for a 
priority of social identities over social representations and vice versa, since there 
are valid cases for both positions. Recently, Wagner and Hayes (2005) argued for a 
hermeneutical circle of meaning that connects identity and social representations.  
According to Raudsepp (2005) social representations are group-level 
phenomena and are an expression of a social process between members of a social 
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group rather than aggregates of individual minds. Furthermore, she argued that 
social representations function in different forms according to the level. At the 
individual level, social representations provide content; at the interpersonal and 
intergroup level, they develop through the process of communication or interaction; 
at the cultural and macro-social level, social representations are objectified in 
cultural or societal products. An interesting aspect of social representations is the 
notion of collective emotions fostering actions (Moscovici, 1998). This is in line 
with group-based emotions theorists promoting the importance of emotions in 
eliciting action-tendencies rather than cognition-based evaluations (Mackie & 
Smith, 2002).  
Raudsepp (2005) raised another interesting point, which I would like to use 
to transfer to the more specific focus of social representations of history. The main 
criticism regarding SRT is directed at theoretical problems. Since SRT is mainly 
theoretical itself, this is understandable. However, Raudsepp (2005) addressed the 
applicability of SRT to real life social problems. The point is that different social 
representations may exist for the same social object or event. These differences can 
evoke tensions and conflicts, which is not negative per se as it adds to the 
development of belief systems (Moscovici & Marková, 1998, cited in Raudsepp, 
2005). However, the downside is that it may induce conflicts at the symbolic level, 
if these representations are polemical rather than hegemonic. Many conflicts 
nowadays are rooted in the past and are symbolic in their nature. Raudsepp argued 
that these are ―mediated and regulated by certain social representations and social 
identities related to them‖ (p. 465). With special reference to disputes over the right 
account of historical events during WW II, she concluded that social 
representations need to be transformed to overcome conflicting group interests 
where a dialogue and the necessity of re-elaborations of common beliefs. This 
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conclusion comes very close to practices of textbook commissions between 
Germany, France and Poland regarding WW II textbook accounts aiming for a 
shared understanding of the past (Ruchniewiecz, 2005; Viedt, 1993) and Staub‘s 
and colleagues‘ (2005) intervention component of understanding the roots of the 
conflict. The following section describes social representations of history and their 
relevance for intergroup forgiveness. 
 
Social representations of history and intergroup forgiveness 
 
 ―…too much memory or not enough; too 
much enshrinement of victimhood or 
insufficient memorializing of victims and 
survivors; too much past or too little 
acknowledgment of the past‘s staging of 
the present …‖ (Minow, 1998, p. 2)    
 
Social representations of history are relevant for group cohesiveness and 
continuity as ―history is the story of the making of an in-group‖ (Liu, Wilson, 
McClure, & Higgins, 1999, p. 1023). The historical past of peoples and how it is 
communicated within and between social units is matter of social representation 
processes (László, 2003). Even today, many people still feel the consequences of 
the deadliest conflict in human history. For example, World War II (WW II) with 
all its connotations has become a crucial part of German history and the positioning 
of German identity today (Buruma, 1994; Hauss, 2003; Oliner, 2008). Germany‘s 
past war crimes (especially the Holocaust) are symbols of extreme atrocities and 
frequently used as a reference point when other crimes against humanity are 
committed. However, it is generally accepted by Germany‘s neighbours, especially 
in Western Europe, that Germany has expressed genuine contrition for her war 
crimes, and moreover that the Germany of today has broken with any sense of 
political continuity with Hitler‘s Germany.  
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Atrocities committed during WW II and the Sino-Japanese War in East 
Asia by Japan are less familiar to Westerners (Hein & Selden, 2000). However, the 
atrocities are salient, play an important role on the victimized side and have an 
unresolved legacy. That is, Japan‘s neighbours are less confident of Japan‘s 
genuine contrition for her misdeeds in WW II, less confident that Japan has fully 
condemned past harm done and that a decisive break with the past has been made. 
As a consequence, there are regular disputes over the representation of WW II in 
East Asia (Liu & Atsumi, 2008), including controversies over textbook accounts of 
WW II officially sanctioned by the Japanese government, and visits to the 
Yasukuni shrine (where Class A war criminals are interred) by the Japanese Prime 
Minister. Hence, the relationship between Japan and her East Asian neighbours 
(especially China and Korea) still suffers from lack of closure to narrative conflicts 
stemming from WW II (Hein & Selden, 2000; Liu & Atsumi, 2008; Oliner, 2008; 
Yamazaki, 2006). Therefore, the disputed representations of the historical past have 
the form of polemical representations that cause conflicts on a symbolic level 
(Breakwell, 2001; Brewer, 2001; Moscovici, 1984).  
Even more than a half century after the end of WW II, differences in the 
meaning of WW II impacts on international relations in Germany and East Asia. 
Therefore, differences in the content of the collective remembering of historical 
conflict produce different social representations. This may lead to differences in the 
propensity to forgive for WW II atrocities between the European and East Asian 
contexts. 
Liu and Hilton (2005) argue that social representations of history give a 
people anchors that help define ethnic and national identities, provide guidance on 
how to relate to other groups, and to construct and maintain a distinct political 
culture (Sibley & Liu, 2007; Liu & Sibley, in press). Social representations of 
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history provide a useful theoretical framework where the positioning of peoples 
around the world due to the social context may vary (e.g. the burden of WW II for 
Germany and Japan in relation to their neighbours). WW II is widely regarded as 
the most important event in world history (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Liu & Sibley, in 
press). Critical historical events and figures furnish raw materials that political 
elites can use to shape into symbols of a nation‘s origin, its current mission and 
justification for current actions. Representations of history can thus define 
privileges and responsibilities for groups, and legitimize social and political 
arrangements, nationally and internationally. Furthermore, a group‘s representation 
of history offers explanation as to why countries may respond differently to similar 
challenges (Hilton & Liu, 2008).  
History is part of the societal and inter-societal context of social relations 
between groups. That is, when Chinese and Japanese interact, they do so within the 
social context of an objective situation that is to varying extents infused by the 
collective remembering of historical experiences between these two groups (see 
Liu, Yamagishi, Wang, Schug, Lin, Huang, & Yu, 2009; Takahashi, Yamagishi, Liu, 
Wang, Lin, & Yu, 2008). A series of experimental studies using dyadic game 
theory to study social dilemmas over the internet (Liu et al., 2009; Takahashi et al., 
2008) found that that outstanding historical tensions between Japan and China 
shaped patterns of ingroup favouritism in trusting behaviour during controlled 
social exchange involving real money. When the two groups interacted, mainland 
Chinese were more ingroup favouring and more trusting overall than Japanese. The 
best predictor for ingroup trust were perceptions of historical anger against the 
outgroup; whereas a different pattern was found between Japan and Taiwan, and a 
third pattern between China and Taiwan (who have separate matters of conflict 
between them). This suggests that the social dilemma of trust is indirectly 
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influenced by the social context provided by the history of international relations. 
The collective remembering and social representations of WW II can therefore 
indirectly influence social context by infusing everyday social interactions with 
implicit forms of (cultural) meaning that shape and guide behaviour (e.g. Hong & 
Chiu, 2001; Hong, Morris, Chiu & Martínez, 2000; Wertsch, 2002). 
 History further provides raw materials to refine public discourses that 
provide content through explicitly guiding people in their behaviours and their 
opinions (e.g. Marková, 2008; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, & 
Khan, 2008). For example, Sibley et al. (2008) showed in three studies that 
historical narratives can furnish ideologies that negate or recognize historical 
claims for reparation by indigenous peoples for past injustices in New Zealand. 
They provided empirical evidence that history is an important symbolic resource 
that can be used to mobilize support for public policies, and to justify political 
views and actions.  
 In sum, there are several arguments to support the assumption that 
differences in how the occurrence and consequences of WW II is interpreted may 
lead to substantial differences in intergroup forgiveness. Historians have already 
recounted that the handling of the past in Germany and Japan is qualitatively 
different and has led to different consequences in interrelations between former 
perpetrator and victim (e.g. Conrad, 2003; Olick & Levy, 1997; Shimazu, 2003; 
von Borries, 2003).  
The public confrontation with the past has varied largely between these two 
contexts (e.g. Oliner, 2008). The confrontation with and the general burden of the 
past are a vivid part of German identity (Buruma, 1994). In contrast, Japan‘s post-
war representations of the past are more focused on the victim role of Japan 
allowing ―Japanese to shy away from the unpleasant truth that they were also 
  43 
aggressors, whose victims in East Asia and elsewhere still demand an apology‖ 
(Shimazu, 2003, p. 116). There may be implications in the form of a reluctance to 
forgive by people who identify that their nation has been victimized by Japan.  
However, there are polemical representations present within Japan. The 
opinions that are communicated outside Japan do not necessarily represent Japan as 
a whole (Ogawa, 2000). Although there is considerable international debate about 
some of the textbooks that have been endorsed by the Japanese Ministry of 
Education that downplay Japan‘s atrocities during WW II, there is also an 
opposition present that does not approve of these textbooks (e.g. mostly teachers or 
grassroots movements, Ogawa, 2000). There is an ongoing cultural and political 
struggle within Japan due to the textbook controversies and Japan‘s dealing with 
the past in general (Nozaki, 2003). This struggle within Japan can have 
consequences on Japanese opinions about compensation and guilt feelings today. 
Conclusion 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from this literature review. 
Previous research treated forgiveness between groups as relatively independent 
from its historical context. There has been a high emphasis on consequences of 
identification processes, but less or no emphasis on the cultural and historical 
context, which forms a particular content (e.g. for group identity) that may be more 
helpful in predicting consequences. Therefore, main concerns can be narrowed 
down to the elaboration of the outcome of the social identification process that 
leads to ingroup bias in form of more forgiving attitudes toward ingroup members 
and more harsh judgment of outgroup members. Furthermore, group-based 
emotions such as guilt and shame have been found to be strong associates of 
forgiveness. Although all research has been embedded within a specific conflict 
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setting, most studies do not draw on how the historical context shapes the 
identification or forgiveness process.  
Moreover, the majority of research has been conducted in mono-cultural 
settings driven by mostly Western scholars coming from traditional social identity 
and self-categorization theory. The examinations‘ foci were on two (religious or 
political) groups that have been either a victim or perpetrator at some stage and 
who live within the same geographical boundaries. In these within-society 
contexts, it seems adequate to apply the contact hypothesis to counter prejudices 
and stereotypes under optimal conditions. However, this process may not function 
between societies in which contact is very difficult to establish. Furthermore, how 
can these assumptions work when atrocities are in the past and ―closed‖ (like the 
Holocaust)? There are reasons to consider the historical context and how history is 
interpreted, since we will only find one piece of the complex intergroup 
forgiveness puzzle if the focus remains solely on identity. Hence, social 
representations of history offer a complementary approach to accommodate social 
identity processes and consider the historical context in intergroup forgiveness 
research. 
To address the first research gap, I will employ a cross-national meta-
analytical procedure in Study 1 (Chapter 3). Context in previous research was 
usually represented through varying the situation or the severity of the harm done 
experimentally. These contextual variables are very proximal to the harm done. 
This does not do justice to the complexity of the process. It is possible that the 
social and the historical context within which individuals are nested affects even 
variations in interpersonal forgiveness. A meta-analysis can shed light on how 
variations in the context affect variations in forgiveness. Hence, Study 1 aimed to 
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explore the impact of contextual variables and the possibility of explaining 
differences in forgiveness at the individual level.  
In a subsequent step, the social constructions and the perceptions of the 
differences between individual-level and group-level forgiveness of individuals 
across three countries (Philippines, Japan, and Germany) are explored through a 
qualitative approach in Study 2 (Chapter 4). The main objective of Study 2 is the 
exploration how people from different cultural backgrounds articulate the meanings 
of forgiveness at the individual and group levels, and to understand the contexts in 
which forgiveness is granted or withheld. 
Study 3 (Chapter 5) and Study 4 (Chapter 6) build on the insights gained in 
Study 2 with a focus on formerly victimized societies in a post World War II 
context. In Study 3, findings from three formerly victimized societies in Europe 
(France, Poland, and Russia) will be compared to findings from three formerly 
victimized societies in East Asia (China, Taiwan, and the Philippines) in relation to 
their willingness to forgive Germans and Japanese respectively. Study 3 and 4 are 
based on a theoretical framework outlined in this chapter, which will be elaborated 
in detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively. Study 4 examines the former 
perpetrators Germany and Japan regarding how they deal with the past in assessing 
their attitudes towards compensation and past related constructs.  
In Chapter 7 all results are integrated and discussed, future research is 
suggested and the chapter closes with a concluding remark. 
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Chapter 3 
Study 1: Socio-economical and socio-political contextual 
correlates of interpersonal forgiveness - A meta-analytical 
approach across 13 societies 
Introduction and outline of Study 1 
The present study summarizes statistically previous research using the 
Enright Forgiveness Inventory (EFI) and explores the relationships of society-level 
means of interpersonal forgiveness as measured by the EFI with other constructs 
(e.g. psychological and contextual variables) using meta–analytical procedures. 
The guiding research questions were (1) whether there are differences between the 
societies and (2) whether contextual variables provide explanations for differences 
in interpersonal forgiveness between the societies. The main interest is the role of 
contextual variables and their influence on interpersonal forgiveness. Another 
interest is also the replication of relationships found at the individual level in 
studies at the country level
1
. Therefore, the focus of Study 1 is to investigate the 
impact of contextual variables and the possibility of explaining differences in 
forgiveness at the individual level. First, I will describe the EFI, followed by a 
discussion of potential society-level correlates. Subsequently, I will formulate the 
guiding research hypotheses based on this analysis, and discuss the usefulness of a 
meta-analytical procedure to assess and examine differences between societies. 
The Enright Forgiveness Inventory (EFI)  
The Enright Forgiveness Inventory (EFI; Enright & Rique, 2000; 
Subkoviak, Enright, Wu, Gassin, Freedman, Olson, & Sarinoapoulos, 1995) is the 
most - arguably the only - widely used self-report instrument that captures 
forgiveness as a moral response to a specific transgression at the interpersonal 
                                                 
1
 Country and society are used interchangeably.  
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level. The EFI is based on the following definition of interpersonal forgiveness: 
―Forgiveness is a willingness to abandon one‘s right to resentment, negative 
judgment, and indifferent behavior toward one who unjustly injured us, while 
fostering the undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity and even love toward 
him or her‖ (Eniright & Rique, 2000, p. 1). The EFI attempts to objectively assess 
the degree to which one person forgives another person for an unfair and hurtful 
deed inflicted on her- or himself. In general, the EFI consists of a set of 60 items 
with three subscales (affect, cognition, behaviour) with 20 items each. Each 
subscale is divided into 10 positive and 10 negative items. Every item is assessed 
on a 6-point Likert scale of agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree). 
A sum score ranges from 60 (lowest) to 360 (highest) indicating and capturing key 
ideas about forgiveness: ―the reduction in negative feelings, thoughts, and behavior 
and the development of positive feelings, thoughts and behaviors toward an 
offending person‖ (Enright & Rique, 2000, p. 9). According to Enright and Rique 
(2000), forgiveness is a homogenous concept and therefore, the sum score over all 
60 items assessing affect, cognition and behaviour should be used.  
The EFI is self-administered and assesses current feelings, current thoughts 
and current behaviours toward someone who has inflicted harm on them and hurt 
them deeply and unfairly. Before the actual scale (labelled as an attitude scale for 
the participants) starts, participants are asked to recall a hurtful experience that 
recently occurred and to indicate the degree of hurt, who hurt them and whether 
this person is still alive, how much time passed since the injury and a description of 
the offense. Although these aspects are assessed, they are usually not reported. 
Then the participants are instructed to indicate to what degree they currently 
experience feelings, how they would act and what they think about the person who 
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inflicted harm on them. Sample items
2
 for positive and negative feelings are: warm, 
kindness, happy, friendly, bitter, disgust, angry, cold. Sample items for positive and 
negative behaviours are: show friendship, help, treat gently, avoid, ignore, act 
negatively. Sample items for positive and negative cognitions are: nice, loving, 
wish the person well, evil, horrible, dreadful, condemn the person. The EFI has 
been used to assess the efficacy of therapeutic interventions and relationships to 
other psychological constructs (Coyle & Enright, 1997; Subkoviak et al., 1995).  
The benefits of forgiveness have been now documented (Toussaint & 
Webb, 2005). According to previous research, the relationship between forgiveness 
and psychological well being, life satisfaction and happiness is positive 
(Karremann, van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Kluwer, 2003; Krause & Ellison, 2003; 
Maltby, Day, & Barber, 2005; Poloma & Gallup, 1991; Rye, Folck, Heim, 
Olszewski, & Traina, 2004; Toussaint, Williams, Musick, & Everson, 2001). Yet, 
there is a lot of room for exploration. It is expected that a meta-analytical approach 
can provide further understanding of these relationships, since they will be 
investigated at the country level. The country-level is particularly interesting, since 
it can reveal context effects influencing interpersonal forgiveness. Building on 
previous results, I propose that interpersonal forgiveness is positively related to 
well being, life satisfaction and happiness at the country level (Hypothesis 1). 
Enright and Rique (2000) claim that forgiveness is contextual, which means 
in their terminology that forgiveness is related to a specific unfair event. It is 
reasonable to argue that the context within which individuals interact and live can 
also contribute to an explanation of interpersonal forgiveness. It is argued that 
forgiveness contributes to successful reconciliation processes and may add to 
sustainable peace building in the long run (see Roe, 2007). Furthermore, 
                                                 
2
 I can only show some sample items, since the EFI is under copyright. Therefore, I am not allowed 
to reproduce the full scale.  
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individuals do not exist in a vacuum; they are influenced by the social context and 
by the culture that they live in (Power, 2004). Therefore, the investigation of 
macro-level context variables in relation to forgiveness promises to be an 
interesting endeavor. Berry‘s ecocultural framework3 is useful for this task since it 
links socio-political contextual variables to individual-level variables (Berry, 1976, 
cited in Georgas, van de Vijver, & Berry, 2004). Furthermore, Inglehart‘s (1997) 
proposition about post-materialism claims that newer generations are more socially 
and economically secure than older generations leading to a shift from materialistic 
to post-materialistic values (affluence of a society). The contextual environment 
may let forgiveness flourish as a more prosocial response to an interpersonal 
transgression.  
The peacefulness of a society, economic and political indicators are referred 
to as socio-political context variables in the present analysis. Researchers who 
developed the Global Peace Index argued that ―if ‗charity begins at home‘- so 
might peace‖ (Vision of Humanity, 2007), meaning that when there is internal 
stability within a society it will contribute to the level of peacefulness. Therefore, 
one may argue that practising forgiveness in response to interpersonal 
transgressions may be one of these ‗charities that start at home‘. However, it is also 
arguable that practicing forgiveness requires a safe environment where there are no 
worries about survival due to conflicts. Recent research (Fischer & Hanke, 2009) 
established robust links between the peacefulness of a society, values and country 
development. The value-peace link depended on the level of country development 
in this study, indicating that country development is a boundary condition (Fischer 
                                                 
3
 Berry‘s theoretical framework includes ecological factors, I tested the relationship between 
forgiveness and population density, low and high temperature, yielding a marginal significant 
correlation between forgiveness and population density (rs (9) = -.62, p = .07), a non-significant 
association between forgiveness and high temperature (rs (9) = -.03, p = .93), and a significant 
relationship between forgiveness and low temperature (rs (9) = -.66, p = .05). However, I will only 
focus on specific variables that are of interest for social scientists. Ecological factors are of less 
interest.  
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& Hanke, 2009). With the thought that forgiveness is often linked to reconciliation 
and peace-building (e.g. Staub et al., 2005), one can argue that if a society is able to 
provide a peaceful environment, it should increase the general tendency for people 
to show interpersonal forgiveness. Furthermore, it has already been argued that it is 
reasonable to associate the level and stability of democracy and human rights with 
an increase in expressions of positive emotions; and to associate instability with a 
decrease in expressions of positive feelings (van Hemert, Poortinga, & van de 
Vijver, 2007). Based on these arguments I hypothesize that countries with strong 
and stable democracies, human rights, country development and peacefulness will 
show higher levels of interpersonal forgiveness (Hypothesis 2).  
In a novel approach, Liu, Páez, Hanke, Rosa, Hilton, Sibley, et al. (2009) 
introduced a new inventory at the country level that predicted willingness to fight 
for one‘s country in the future at the individual level. This inventory was called 
Historical Calamities, and was based on the evaluations of events in world history 
across 30 countries. It included man-made and natural disasters (e.g. warfare, 
genocide, global warming). The inventory was based on the theoretical framework 
of social representations of history and identity, arguing that history provides raw 
materials that can function as a symbolic reserve. These materials are worked-up in 
communication processes guided by the political elites to define group boundaries 
and to legitimize ideologies (Hilton & Liu, 2008; Liu & Hilton, 2005).  
Liu and colleagues argued that Historical Calamities is such a symbolic 
reserve that is used in political debates and influences the public (Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001). This research provided evidence that evaluations of historical 
calamities predicted the willingness to fight for one‘s country (countries with more 
negative evaluations were less willing to fight for their country). Liu‘s and 
colleagues‘ (2009) research was consistent with previous findings on perspectives 
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towards politically approved violence and war (e.g. countries with more 
materialistic, collectivistic, and hierarchical values had less negative perspectives 
towards war; Basabe & Valencia, 2007). Inglehart and Baker (2000) proposed a 
shift from traditional to materialistic and eventually to post-materialistic values. 
This shift is generally linked to a shift in the focus of the representation of war and 
its consequences with the emphasis on human suffering and the pointlessness of 
war (Rosoux, 2001). The negative representations of war and catastrophes and the 
consequences are captured by the evaluation of historical calamities. Furthermore, 
Liu and colleagues (2009) demonstrated that members of societies were willing to 
fight in order to achieve development. In line with this, it is reasonable to propose 
that the more negatively historical calamities are evaluated in a society, the higher 
should be interpersonal forgiveness levels among its citizens, (Hypothesis 3) since 
forgiveness can be cautiously thought of as the opposite of the willingness to fight.  
In sum, two research questions will be addressed: 
Research question 1: Are there differences in interpersonal forgiveness between 
societies? 
Research question 2: What contextual variables account for differences in 
interpersonal forgiveness between the societies? 
Furthermore, the following hypotheses will be tested: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Interpersonal forgiveness should be positively related to well 
being, life satisfaction and happiness at the country level.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Countries with strong and stable democracies, human rights, 
human development and peacefulness will show higher levels of interpersonal 
forgiveness. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Societies that evaluate historical calamities more negatively 
should be higher on interpersonal forgiveness. 
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I will now further describe the meta-analytical approach that I employed to answer 
the questions and to test the hypotheses.  
A cross-national meta-analytical approach  
A meta-analysis is a useful statistical technique that aims to answer an 
overall research question by systematically summarizing previous studies (Hunter 
& Schmidt, 2003; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; van Hemert, 2003). A ―meta analysis 
refers to the analysis of analyses … the statistical analysis of a large collection of 
analysis results from individual studies for the purpose of integrating the findings‖ 
(Glass, 1976, p. 3). A meta-analysis has the advantage that results are summarized 
in a more refined manner, and at the same time helps prevent researchers from 
over-interpreting findings across studies (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). 
Traditional meta-analytical approaches usually examine group mean 
differences and correlations between concepts. Dekker and Fischer (2008) outlined 
three arguments why these conventional approaches are problematic for the kind of 
studies my study falls into. Firstly, they argue that using these meta-analytical 
procedures limit the use of available information as only studies that actually made 
comparisons can be included. Secondly, they discussed the problematic use of 
group mean differences limiting the scope of understanding why there are 
differences and what these differences mean. Finally, they concluded that meta-
analytical approaches in this form highly depend on prefixed comparisons of 
samples. Consequently, any further information about the context (e.g. 
peacefulness of a society, economic development) cannot be included in the 
analyses and direct testing of context effects is not possible (Dekker & Fischer, 
2008).  
Dekker and Fischer (2008) suggested that these limitations can be 
overcome through using means directly (as demonstrated in Dekker & Fischer, 
  53 
2008; Fischer & Chalmers, 2008; Fischer & Mansell, 2007). The main advantage 
with this approach is that it can handle the introduction of country as a level of 
analysis. I will follow the outlined suggestions, including using the means directly 
which allows evaluation of the differences more precisely, and employing the 
instrument-based approach outlined by van Hemert (2003). Using the means as the 
effect size is possible for meta-analytical approaches, since a mean would also 
apply to be converted into a standardized index making it comparable across 
studies and across societies (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). 
According to van Hemert (2003) there are two options for conducting a 
cross-country meta-analysis: an instrument-based and domain-based approach. The 
domain-based approach focuses on one domain (e.g. intelligence) and gathers 
studies from a range of different instruments assessing the same domain or concept 
of interest allowing for a broader scope. An instrument-based approach focuses on 
a specific instrument, which is considered as a standard procedure. This approach 
is suitable for this study since the focus is on a specific instrument that captures 
interpersonal forgiveness.  
Please note that meta-analyses of means are rarely reported, since it is not a 
meta-analysis in its traditional sense (Fischer & Chalmers, 2008). However, a 
meta-analysis of means is feasible since it uses information from published studies. 
Furthermore, a meta-analysis of means employs the same statistical meta-analytical 
techniques used in conventional meta-analyses of correlations or group mean 
differences. The conventional term ―effect size‖ referring to a meta-analysis with 
means can be misleading, but it can be argued since the effect size is the mean that 
the mean level is caused by the society people are residing in. In meta-analyzing 
the societal-level means obtained from published studies, it is possible to reveal 
society effects impacting on the means by examining societal characteristics (such 
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as socio-political variables) that help explaining differences between societies 
which is in the scope of this study.    
Method 
Literature search 
A PsycINFO search was conducted covering the period 1995 (year of the 
first EFI publication) to June 2007, searching for the keywords Enright 
Forgiveness Inventory and forgiveness. The search resulted in 54 references. 
Inclusion criteria were that (1) participants were older than 16 years of age, (2) 
were neither delinquent nor mentally disabled, (3) the studies were not clinical 
trials, and (4) that sufficient statistical information was reported (e.g. sum scores or 
mean scores).  
Twenty articles that reported 26 independent samples met these criteria. 
Two articles included unpublished studies and another two were dissertations. 
Overall, the meta-analysis contained data from 6110 participants coming from 13 
different societies. The majority of studies (42.3%) were conducted in the USA 
(number of independent samples k = 11; N = 2,010). For each sample, the reported 
EFI sum scores or EFI mean scores were coded, what country, and (if reported) the 
Cronbach‘s alpha and demographic information (e.g. gender, age).  
Sample characteristics 
Participants were university students (26.9%), college students and their 
same-sex parents (38.5%), or the general population (34.6%). Mean age for the 
overall sample was 32.9 years of age. Mean age for the student sample was 22.35 
years, for the college students and their same sex parents the mean age was 35 
years, the general population sample had a mean age of 38.24 years. The 
percentage of males in the overall sample was 44.34%. 
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Psychological variables, socio-economical and socio-political context variables 
Psychological variables, such as subjective well being (Diener, Diener, & 
Diener, 1995), happiness (Veenhoven, 1999; World Value Survey, Inglehart, 
1997), and life satisfaction (World Value Survey, Inglehart, 1997) at the country 
level were used to replicate the findings from previous research at the individual 
level (Karremans et al., 2003; Maltby et al., 2005; Rye et al., 2004). All country 
scores are taken from studies conducted at the country level (Diener et al., 1995; 
Veenhoven, 1999; World Value Survey, Inglehart, 1997). First, these indicators 
were factor analyzed revealing a single factor (Eigenvalue = 3.30) which explained 
82.45% of the variance. Therefore, after the indicators were z-transformed I used 
mean scores to represent a well being factor.     
A peace index was calculated consisting of the Global Peace Index (GPI) 
from 2007, 2008 and 2009 (Vision of Humanity, 2007, 2008, 2009) and Domestic 
Political Violence (DPV, van de Vliert, 1999) as context variable reflecting the 
peacefulness of a society. The GPI is based on 24 indicators from three categories: 
(a) ongoing domestic and international conflict, (b) country safety and security, and 
(c) militarization. Since the DPV is reflected in category (a), it was included in the 
overall Peace indicator. Therefore, the four indicators (GPI 2007 – 2009 and DPV) 
were factor analyzed yielding a strong single factor solution (Eigenvalue = 3.33), 
which explained 83.15% of the variance. A mean score was devised which was 
based on z-transformed indicator scores.  
I calculated a socio-economic indicator by factor analyzing the Human 
Development Index (HDI) scores from 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2004, Gross 
National Income (GNI) per Capita scores from 1990, 1995, 2000, 2004, 2005 and 
2006 and Gross Domestic per capita (GDP) scores from 1990, 1995, 2000, 2004, 
2005 and 2006. The principal components factor analysis revealed a strong single 
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factor solution which explained 94.9 % of the variance (Eigenvalue = 14.24). I 
calculated a mean score that represents socio-economic development based on z-
transformed indicator scores.   
A democracy indicator was used consisting of the Human Rights index for 
rights and freedoms by Humana (1986), by Freedom House (n.d., index of political 
rights and civil liberties), levels of democracy (Inglehart, 1997) in 1990 and in 
1995, stability of democracy (Inglehart, 1997), and level of democracy as reported 
by van de Vliert et al. (1999), to capture a wider time span. These indicators were 
factor analysed with an oblique rotation and revealed a strong single factor solution 
(Eigenvalue = 6.38) explaining 91.10% of the total variance. Therefore, I recoded 
indicators that loaded negatively on the factors by multiplying the indictor with 
minus 1 and averaged the z-transformed indicators into a single index.  
Furthermore, to represent how societies evaluate the historical past I 
included the historical calamities indicator, which has been validated across 30 
societies (Liu et al., 2009). Overall, these indicators corresponded to the well being 
of a society, and to socio-economical and to socio-political context variables at the 
country level. Table 3.1 provides an overview of included country scores. 
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Table 3.1 













Austria -.19 .59 .83 .41 1.75 
Belgium .78 .76 .70 .43 1.80 
Brazil -.28 -.55 -.42 -1.72 2.12 
Hong Kong  - -.55 .31 .29 2.66 
Israel -.87 .08 -1.70 -.10 - 
Korea, South -1.46 -.96 .18 -.66 2.56 
Norway .68 .74 1.29 .91 1.81 
South Africa -1.15 -1.85 -.98 -1.71 - 
Switzerland .94 .72 .88 .83 1.75 
Taiwan - -1.18 .09 - 2.55 
UK .66 .64 -.31 .35 - 
USA .90 .72 -.79 .97 1.98 
 
Meta-Analytic procedures 
The mean score or sum score for interpersonal forgiveness from the EFI 
were used to calculate the effect sizes for the meta-analysis. Coded sum scores 
were converted into means by dividing the sum score by the number of reported 
items. All means were then standardized by dividing them by the response scale 
range (6-point scales), resulting in scores ranging between 0 and 1. This type of 
standardization is useful in order to obtain a comparable metric of effect sizes 
(means), as one study used a different number of items (Dekker & Fischer, 2008; 
Fischer & Chalmers, 2008; Fischer & Mansell, 2009). Therefore, the standardized 
metric derived from the reported sum scores and means are the effect sizes used for 
this meta-analytical approach. 
Attention was paid to the sample size of each study, as bigger sample sizes, 
allow one to be more confident that the estimation of the population is precise. For 
this reason, a study that has a bigger sample size should carry more weight in a 
meta-analysis (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Lipsey and colleague thus recommend 
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weighing each effect size by the inverse variance. The inverse variance takes the 
standard error into account for it is a direct index of the precision of the effect size 
and it also provides confidence intervals (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). The criterion is 
that the smaller the standard error, the more precise the effect size will be.  
In all analysis at the study level (or the effect size level) the effect sizes 
being used were inverse-variance-weighted, and mixed effects models were used in 
every ANOVA. The analysis focusing on associations between country-level 
indicators and forgiveness were conducted at the country level. For this purpose, I 
aggregated the standardized mean to the country level, in such a way that each 
score represented one country. Therefore, the country level data set had 13 cases in 
which the cases refer to each country.  
Hence, I had two levels of analyses: the first level was the study level or 
effect size level, which evaluated variability and possible moderators to explain 
this variability, using effect sizes weighted by the inverse-variance as outlined 
above; and (2) the country-level in which the aggregated standardized effect size 
(the standardized mean) was used. I followed the recommendation of Fischer and 
Chalmers (2008) and used a mixed effect model since it allows generalizations 
beyond the studies that were included. A mixed effect model uses random-effects 
models, but additionally allows for systematically testing remaining variance to 
investigate study characteristics that go further than plain random variation 
(Fischer & Chalmers, 2008). I used an inverse-variance weighted ANOVA macro 
as provided by Lipsey and Wilson (2001). 
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Results 
Examination of publication bias  
A useful method of detecting whether a publication bias exists is the 
creation of a funnel plot in plotting the effect sizes against the sample sizes (Lipsey 
& Wilson, 2001). Lipsey and Wilson argued that if a collection of effect sizes is 
unbiased there should be large variability between the small samples compared to 
large samples. Although there are relatively few studies in this meta-analysis, the 
scatterplot displays a funnel-shaped distribution indicating that there is more 
variability among the small samples compared to larger samples. Publication bias 
appears unlikely. Therefore, there it is unlikely that a publication bias affects the 


















Figure 3.1 Funnel Plot of the effect sizes (EFI-mean) and sample size (Study 1) 
Interpersonal forgiveness across 13 societies   
An inverse variance-weighted random effects model yielded an average 
mean of .68 (equivalent to an EFI sum score of 244.8) with a 95% confidence 
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interval of .62 - .73. Therefore, on average individuals were quite forgiving after 
interpersonal transgressions. The South African sample had the lowest forgiveness 
score and Switzerland the highest (see Table 3.2).  
The Q-statistics 
The Q-statistic is distributed as a χ2 and can be used for testing the 
assumption whether all effect sizes are similar in their estimation of the population 
mean. Therefore, if the Q-test is significant and the assumption of homogeneity is 
rejected, effect sizes are considered heterogeneous, which means that it allows for 
testing moderators to explain these differences. The calculation of the Q-statistic is 
based on three sums. The sum of the weights, the sum of the product of the weight 
and effect size, and the sum of the weights times the squared effect size.  
A sample-size weighted mixed effects ANOVA revealed significant 
variability between societies (Q (12, 25) = 168.62, p < .001). This finding answered 
the first research question: there were differences between societies on 
interpersonal forgiveness. Therefore, explanations of differences were possible 
through examining potential moderators by analyzing between study effect sizes 
variability and categorical variables, using inverse-variance weighted mixed effects 
ANOVAs.  
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Table 3.2 






EFI SE -95%CI +95%CI 
Austria 1 376 .72 .07   
Belgium 1 731 .65 .07   
Brazil 2 590 .71 .05 .61 .80 
Hong Kong  1 63 .66 .07   
Israel 1 176 .65 .07   
Korea, South 2 392 .61 .05 .52 .71 
Northern Ireland 1 340 .48 .07   
Norway 1 115 .72 .07   
South Africa 1 134 .42 .07   
Switzerland 1 180 .93 .06   
Taiwan 1 339 .62 .07   
United Kingdom 2 664 .59 .05 .50 .68 
United States of America 11 2010 .72 .01 .69 .74 
 K = 26 N = 6110     
Explanation of differences in exploring possible moderators at the study level 
The homogeneity-test indicated that there was variability between the 
societies on interpersonal forgiveness and this justified the examination of potential 
moderators (Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Therefore, I tested 
categorical moderators relevant to the sample and context. Population (coded as 1 
= university students, 2 = college students and their parents, 3 = general 
population), age
4
, gender proportion (median split, coded as 1 = below 50% of 
males, 2 = above 50% of males) were tested as potential moderators for explaining 
differences. 
Contextual moderators included region coded as 1 = Europe, 2 = Asia, 3 = 
South America (Brazil), 4 = USA, potential conflict regions were coded as 1 = yes, 
2 = no (Northern Ireland, Israel, and South Africa were deemed as potential 
conflict regions), religion was coded as 1 = Christian and 2 = non-Christian). The 
moderators were tested using inverse-variance weighted mixed effects ANOVAs. 
                                                 
4
 I used a median split to convert the age into two categories (1 = below 34.5, 2 = above 34.5). I 
tested the same with the categories ―adolescents‖ (under 20) and ―adults‖ (over 20) and yielded a 
similar non-significant result: Q (1, 19) = .88, n.s. 
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There was no significant effect due to the population (Q (2, 25) = .17, n.s.), due to 
age (Q (1, 20) = .04, n.s.), but due to gender (Q (1, 17) = 5.73, p < .05.). There are 
inconsistent findings in the literature regarding gender differences on forgiveness 
(e.g. Hewstone et al., 2004). However, this result indicates that when there were 
fewer males in a sample, the forgiveness scores were slightly higher. Region was 
not significant (Q (3, 25) = 4.7, n.s.), and religion (Q (1, 25) = .36, n.s.) was not 
either. On the other hand conflict was a significant moderator (Q (1, 25) = 12.88, p 
< .05). Those countries categorized as potential conflict regions showed 
significantly lower forgiveness scores than those in non-conflict regions. Therefore, 
in response to research question 2 (What contextual variables account for 
differences in interpersonal forgiveness between the societies?): gender distribution 
in the samples and conflict potential are prospective explanations for differences in 
interpersonal forgiveness scores.  
Correlations at the society level 
The next step was to test the hypothesized associations. For this purpose, I 
aggregated the standardized means and conducted correlations at the country level 
(see Table 3.3). Due to the limited number of societies, nonparametric Spearman 
rank order correlations were used, as suggested by Dekker and Fischer (2008). The 
correlation can further provide explanation as to why countries differed in 
interpersonal forgiveness scores.  
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Table 3.3 
Correlation between EFI means and Well-being Index, Democracy Indicators, 
Peace Indicators, Socio-Economic Indicators, and Historical Calamities at the 
country level 
Indicator 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. EFI  -     
2. Well-being Index .62* -    
3. Democracy Indicators .58* .88** -   
4. Peace Indicators .62* .48 .54
‡
 -  
5. Socio Economic Indicators .55
‡
 .84** .87** 54 - 





  p ≤ .08, *p ≤ .05, **p < .01    
 
The well-being index was significantly positively associated with the EFI 
interpersonal forgiveness score at the country level. If well-being was high in a 
society, the higher was the interpersonal forgiveness score. Therefore, a replication 
of previous findings at the individual level was successful, supporting Hypothesis 
1. This result also points to functional equivalence, as I found a similar pattern to 
the individual level at the country-level (van Hemert, 2003). However, functional 
equivalence can only be cautiously suggested, since no indicators other than well 
being were included.  
A strong and significant correlation between the democracy indicator and 
interpersonal forgiveness at the society level was found. That means the more 
democracy and human rights a society has, the higher forgiveness score. 
Furthermore, a significant correlation between the Peace index and interpersonal 
forgiveness was found. The more peaceful a society was, the more forgiveness was 
shown at the interpersonal level. Moreover, there was a marginal significant 
association between the socio-economic indicator and interpersonal forgiveness. 
That means when a society is able to establish a certain socio-economic 
development, the higher the interpersonal forgiveness score. The results support 
                                                 
5
 Since there is no country-level data available for Northern Ireland, it was excluded from the 
subsequent analyses. 
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Hypothesis 2 that countries with strong and stable democracies, human rights, 
country development and peacefulness are meaningfully linked with higher levels 
of interpersonal forgiveness.  
There was an interesting significant association between the evaluation of 
historical calamities and interpersonal forgiveness. In line with Hypothesis 3, the 
more negatively historical tragedies were evaluated, the higher the interpersonal 
forgiveness score. 
 In sum, I discovered significant variability between the countries. These 
differences can be explained by gender distribution of the samples and conflict 
potential. Furthermore, the well-being of a country was significantly associated 
with interpersonal forgiveness. The same associations were found for the stability 
and level of democracy, state of human rights and socio-economic development of 
a country and the levels of interpersonal forgiveness. An interesting finding is the 
role of the shared representation and evaluation of negative historical events, which 
was negatively associated with forgiveness at the country level. 
Summary and discussion 
The main objectives of this study were to explore differences between the 
countries in interpersonal forgiveness using a cross-country meta-analytical 
approach and the examination of categorical contextual variables (moderators) to 
provide explanations for these differences.  
First, detected variability between the societies can be explained by gender 
distribution and potential conflict regions. Therefore, the analysis at the study level 
suggested that the higher the proportion of male participants in the included 
studies, the lower the report of forgiveness. Furthermore, coded conflict regions 
(South Africa and Northern Ireland) had lower forgiveness scores, which points to 
context relevant factors that affect interpersonal forgiveness. Whether the samples 
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were predominantly Christian did not influence the interpersonal forgiveness 
scores, which is in line with previous research (Worthington, 2005). 
The findings also suggested that interpersonal forgiveness is positively 
associated with well-being at the country level. This result was anticipated, as it 
replicates results found at the individual level. This finding is highly encouraging 
since it shows the potential benefits of forgiveness at the country level. Whereas 
previous research only examined the positive benefits of forgiveness at the 
individual level, this analysis shows that forgiveness is associated with positive 
effects across societal contexts. Of course, the direction of causality in these effects 
cannot be ascertained using correlational methods.  
More insight can be gleaned from the results of the examination of socio-
economic and socio-political context variables. These results suggest that in order 
to encourage forgiveness as a moral response to harm done, there needs to be some 
stability in a society and a certain level of development. In post-conflict societies, 
there is a heightened need for safety (Staub, 2004). Unsafe environments in which 
the emphasis is on survival (Inglehart, 1997) may reduce the likelihood of 
perceiving forgiveness as a response option towards transgressions, since many 
transgressions are also based on group-based struggles over power (e.g. Northern 
Ireland or South Africa). With the notion of forgiveness as a charity starting from 
home within a country, forgiveness could also foster cooperation and increase the 
economic and developmental vitality across societies, which would suggest 
forgiveness as a possible engine for democracy and social stability in a society.  
An intriguing finding was the association between the evaluations of 
historical calamities and forgiveness. The more negative the evaluations were, the 
more likely forgiveness was reported. Why is that interesting? The results are in 
line with assumptions made by of social representations theory in general 
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(Moscovici, 1988), and specifically social representations of history (Hilton & Liu, 
2008; Liu & Hilton, 2005), that shared representations in a society have an 
influence on the individual. Liu and colleagues (2009) argued that a shift to a post-
materialistic society in line with Inglehart (1997) is also associated with a shift to 
more negative representations of war and its consequences. Therefore, the 
relationship between the evaluation of historical calamities and forgiveness adds an 
important component in order to understand how forgiveness is influenced by 
shared beliefs at the country level about the course of history.  
However, all the correlation results should be regarded with some caution, 
since they do not allow causal conclusions. Nevertheless, these results point to a 
linear relationship between general well being, democratic and socio economic 
development and forgiveness. The question is whether this means that the only 
matter we should worry about is that each society has a stable democracy, human 
rights, and high socio-economic development. Is this enough to ensure that 
forgiveness is promoted and encouraged? 
There are several limitations for the current analysis. The country level 
indicators were derived across multiple time points and diverse samples. Therefore, 
the used contextual correlates also captured a particular period; however, by doing 
this it is likely that particular temporal patterns were missed. The restricted number 
of countries is also a limitation. I had only 13 countries and limited number of 
samples (except for USA). This is a limiting factor for this meta-analysis‘ ability to 
explain differences between societies. However, although I had samples from a 
relatively small number of countries (N=13), the reported correlations at the 
country level are relatively large.  
What can be said for sure from the results of the moderator analyses is that 
the gender proportion of participants and the conflict potential in a society seemed 
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to matter. Other context variables, such as the economic vitality (providing a safe 
environment free from survival fears), democratic rules (signifying transparency or 
certainty about processes), have an influence on forgiveness as a practice as 
demonstrated in this study. Furthermore, these results suggest that forgiveness 
might have a relation to modernity and needs a certain level of stability within a 
society in order to grow. 
This study provides some tentative evidence that contextual variables at the 
macro-level need more consideration, as they can potentially influence the 
tendency to forgive in response to an interpersonal transgression. If this meta-
analysis already showed that there are substantial societal variation on 
interpersonal forgiveness; how much more variation will apply for the intergroup 
contexts? In order to facilitate forgiveness, it is important to understand how 
different cultures respond to this concept and how they perceive forgiveness. This 
will be the focus of Study 2. In the following study, I employ a qualitative 
approach to capture the social reality of individuals in different societies in relation 
to forgiveness as a practice at the individual and at the group level. Most 
importantly, it will focus on what distinguishes the two levels from one another and 
whether contextual variables are articulated as a way to draw the line between the 
two concepts.  
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Chapter 4 
Study 2: Qualitative exploration of intergroup forgiveness  
 
Introduction and outline of Study 2  
 The aim of this study is to explore the concept of intergroup forgiveness 
through a qualitative approach. The meta-analysis in Chapter 3 provided empirical 
evidence that interpersonal forgiveness is partly shaped by contextual variables. 
This study focuses on the clarification of similarities and distinctions between 
forgiveness at the interpersonal versus at the intergroup level. It is anticipated that 
the findings will help to determine important concepts within the forgiveness 
process. 
Previous survey-based research (Denton & Martin, 1998; Kanz, 2000; 
Kearns & Fincham, 2004; Mullet, Girard, & Bakhshi, 2004) about how people 
conceptualize interpersonal forgiveness revealed some inconsistent findings 
signalling the need for more qualitative approaches to examine perspectives on 
forgiveness The way people outside the academic world conceptualize forgiveness 
seems for the most part similar to the ways forgiveness researchers conceptualize 
forgiveness (Kanz, 2000): reconciliation is a necessary part of forgiveness and 
forgiveness may be important and effective for therapeutic interventions. Some 
differences were found as well The participants viewed forgiveness as causing 
emotional problems whereas theorists proposed that only pseudoforgiveness
6
 can 
cause such problems and not true forgiveness (Kanz, 2000).   
 Mullet and his colleagues (2004) examined conceptualizations of 
forgiveness by laypeople and whether there is an agreement between accounts in 
the literature and people‘s views on interpersonal forgiveness. Participants viewed 
                                                 
6
 Pseudoforgiveness occurs when individuals think they have forgiven and they actually have not. 
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forgiveness and reconciliation as separate constructs. Moreover, participants did 
not equate forgiveness with an end to resentment. Participants perceived 
forgiveness as being more than a dyadic process which is not consistent with the 
literature (see Worthington, 2005), but with survey-based research conducted with 
clinical psychologists (Denton & Martin, 1998). Mullet and colleagues (2004) 
research showed that offender can be - besides being known by the offended - 
unknown or abstract institutions. Furthermore, the process of forgiveness is 
difficult and after forgiveness is granted it may not change the future behaviour of 
the offender.  
 A prototype analysis
7
 of forgiveness (Kearns & Fincham, 2004) revealed 
initial clusters of descriptions: affect (e.g. kindness, sadness), behaviours (e.g. 
talking, hugging), cognitions (e.g. understanding) and expectations (e.g. 
continuance of relationship). This research revealed that the conceptions of 
forgiveness by laypersons are similar to theoretical considerations of forgiveness. 
However, there were also some differences between laypersons‘ views and expert 
views. The participants disagreed with experts on what forgiveness is not. While 
experts excluded condoning, excusing or forgetting about the offense, the 
participants thought that these attributes belong to forgiveness. Similar to Kanz 
(2000), but inconsistent with Mullet and colleagues (2004), participants in this 
study perceived reconciliation being an important part of forgiveness. 
Reconciliation indicates a coming together of the parties again. The authors argue 
that if laypeople view reconciliation as an integral part of forgiveness, the 
likelihood to forgive is lower than if people view reconciliation as separate from 
forgiveness. Reconciliation indicates a coming together of the two parties and for 
                                                 
7
 In a prototype analysis participants identify features of a concept via free listings. In a subsequent 
step, the identified features are rated in order to determine their relevance or centrality for the 
concept. 
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some people the idea to face the aggressor is threatening. This kind of reasoning 
about forgiveness makes it difficult to implement forgiveness into interventions.  
 Research (e.g. Neto et al., 2007a; Neto, Pinto, & Mullet, 2007b; Kadima 
Kadiangandu & Mullet, 2007; Kadima Kadiangandu, Gauché, Vinsonneau, & 
Mullet, 2007) has been conducted in an attempt to conceptualize intergroup 
forgiveness. This research is scarce and deserves attention. Kadima Kadiangandu 
and colleague (2007) and Neto and colleagues (2007a, 2007b) examined a rarely 
investigated context. They researched African perceptions of intergroup 
forgiveness in the troubled African states of Congo, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and 
Mozambique. Their survey-based approach revealed that the concept of intergroup 
forgiveness made sense to all participants (general population samples). The survey 
was compiled based on accounts in the literature about political forgiveness (e.g. 
Digeser, 2001; Shriver, 1995). The participants agreed that the process needs to be 
a democratic, public one, that intergroup forgiveness does not necessarily depend 
on reparation or compensation and that the aim of the intergroup forgiveness 
process is reconciliation. The authors also conducted the same research in East-
Timor with similar results.   
 Overall, the findings regarding laypersons‘ conceptualizations of 
interpersonal forgiveness overlaps for the most part with accounts in the literature. 
This might be due to the fact that a survey has been constructed on the basis of 
existing conceptualizations of interpersonal forgiveness and the assessment of the 
agreement on them. Therefore, one of the shortfalls of this kind of research was 
that ideas from the literature were imposed in form of surveys onto the participants. 
Except for the prototype analysis, participants got confronted with pre-formulated 
ideas about forgiveness. Nevertheless, the research on conceptualizations of 
intergroup forgiveness revealed that this concept is meaningful for people who 
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suffered during conflicts. Therefore, it was not possible to discover other concepts 
than those in the literature. However, other concepts that might be important for the 
overall forgiveness process could be discovered through using another method. 
Furthermore, the conducted research fell relatively short on differentiating 
interpersonal from intergroup forgiveness.  
The qualitative approach for this study was chosen in order to prevent to 
impose predetermined ideas of forgiveness and to catch the social reality of the 
interviewees. It is expected to find forgiveness related concepts (e.g. apology) 
which have been articulated in the literature before. Furthermore, there is a 
probability that the interviewees talk about concepts that have not been mentioned 
in the literature before, since no concepts are imposed onto the participants. I also 
anticipate discovering how people coming from different cultural backgrounds 
articulate the differences between interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness. The 
expression of the differences may be helpful to determine what intergroup 
forgiveness entails.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited by a contact person who approached them and 
introduced the topic of the interview (the snowballing method). Fifteen people 
from three countries (Germany, Philippines and Japan) were interviewed.  In total, 
there were six female and nine male interviewees. The German, Filipino and 
Japanese interviewees comprised of two female and three male participants. Their 
ages ranged from 25 – 35 years (n=9), to 36-45 years (n=4) and over 46 years 
(n=2). The average age for the German participants was 32.6 years, for the Filipino 
participants 36.2 years and for the Japanese 32.8 years. I had two criteria to decide 
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which population should be included in this study. Participants should be older 
than 25 years of age, but younger than 60 years of age, because I followed the 
rationale of Govier‘s (2002) rationale of conducting research with ‗tertiary 
victims‟, which refers to victims who have not directly experienced the past wrong-
doing. This reduces the risk of evoking traumatic experiences (Kadima 
Kadiangandu & Mullet, 2007). Moreover, interviewing people belonging to former 
perpetrator nations above this age limit could result in overly defensive reasoning 
about forgiveness at the group level due to a direct connection to the past 
(Rensman, 2004). Therefore, participants were the third or second generation after 
World War II (Germany, Philippines, and Japan), to ensure that they spoke about 
forgiveness relating to this topic at the group level, rather than at the individual 
level.  
Germany and Japan were former perpetrator nations and the Philippines 
were a victimized nation. Although it would have been desirable to carry out 
interviews with people from a formerly victimized European nation (e.g. Poland), it 
was not possible to carry these out, since the interviews would have been needed to 
be carried out in a different language other than the researcher‘s language of 
German or English.  
In the beginning of the semi-structured interview, demographic questions 
were asked and all Filipino participants identified themselves with Roman Catholic 
religion, whereas the German participants stated that their belief system was 
influenced by Christian principles, but identified themselves as being atheists or 
agnostic. The Japanese participants did not identify with either a religious or a 
philosophical orientation, but stated that they are influenced by Buddhism 
principles.   
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In extracts to follow, interviewees were identified as P for Philippines, G 
for German and J for Japanese. For indicating short pauses I used ―(.)‖, for long 
pauses ―(…)‖, for unclear passages ―…‖and for omission of irrelevant passages for 
the theme within the speech to shorten the overall passages relevant to the theme. 
Interview schedule 
 Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured interview schedule, 
which gained approval by the School of Psychology, Human Ethics Committee at 
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. At the onset of the research 
process, major questions of interest centred on experiences of forgiveness at the 
individual and intergroup level (e.g. ―Please describe a situation where you felt 
unjustly hurt or harmed‖, or ―Has anything happened in the past to your national or 
ethnic group that might require forgiveness? Please describe what this might be.‖ 
See Appendix A for complete overview of the interview schedule.   
All questions were open-ended, except the demographic questions, which 
were asked at the beginning of each interview. The questions were adjusted during 
the interview and questions were occasionally skipped depending on the extent that 
participants were willing to share their experiences of forgiveness, and depending 
on whether some issues were already addressed in earlier questions. This procedure 
allowed the participants to have control and to direct the interview towards 
unanticipated topics, and for the interviewer to guide the conversation flow in a 
natural manner.  
The interviews in the Philippines and in Japan were conducted in English, 
because English is the official language in the Philippines and because the 
interviews in Japan were conducted in university settings where students and staff 
were capable of communicating in English to an interviewer who was not 
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conversant in Japanese. The German interviews were conducted in German as I am 
German myself.  
Procedure 
When the participants agreed to take part in this interview on a voluntary 
basis, the interviewees chose the venue they felt most comfortable with and a date 
was set for the interview. The nature of the research was explained, and 
participants were given an opportunity to ask questions. Before the interview 
started, participants were asked to sign a consent form if they were willing to 
participate in the study. With the agreement of the participants, the interviews were 
recorded for transcription and analyses. The duration of the interviews ranged from 
25 to 54 minutes, taking an average of about 40 minutes. The German interviews 
were conducted in German, recorded and then transcribed and translated into 
English by me. The English transcripts of the interviews were verified with a 
bilingual German-English speaking postgraduate student in order to ensure a match 
between the English version of the data and the German one. The Filipino and 
Japanese interviews were conducted in English, recorded and transcribed.  
The interviews were recorded using an Olympus WS-200S Digital Voice 
Recorder and a Samsung YP-U2 Digital Audio Player and Voice Recorder.  Sound 
files were transcribed using Adobe Audition software. Transcripts were coded 
using MAXQDA software. 
Analytical strategy: Retroductive thematic analysis  
The corpus of data consisted of 65,000 words. After the interviews were 
transcribed, a form of thematic analysis detailed by Braun and Clarke (2006) was 
used. In general, thematic analysis, according to Braun and Clarke (2006), seeks to 
trace for the most widespread and main themes within the data. The main themes in 
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turn are able to embody a summary of the whole data set in form of some 
phenomenon, process, or consistent ‗narrative‘ (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Grbich, 
2007). Many other data reduction techniques within qualitative research methods 
may also be used (e.g. content analysis or grounded theory). However, thematic 
analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) seemed the most appropriate technique for the 
study because of the flexible nature of thematic analysis, which suited the high 
complexity of the data. This complexity was due on the one hand to the translation 
of the interview transcripts from German (the native language of the participants) 
into English, and on the other hand due to the circumstances that the Japanese 
interviews were conducted in English. Thus, the analysis had to deal with an 
English version of the original interview which was already an interpretation of the 
participants‘ descriptions (in the German case); or with an English version that did 
not necessarily flow as it would have, had it been conducted in participants‘ native 
(Japanese) language. Therefore, techniques more reliant on the exact nature of the 
utterances were not appropriate. Given the breadth of topics examined and the 
relatively small and diverse samples, the data would have been insufficient for 
more systematic and comprehensive techniques. Considering that to address the 
complexity of a corpus, the analysis of the data should always go for the broader 
meanings and concepts (Cronin, 2006); thematic analysis was selected as the most 
appropriate analytical strategy.  
Furthermore, I followed a retroductive analytical strategy (Glynos & 
Howarth, 2007) which combines deductive and inductive analytical strategies. This 
was because although I did not formulate theories a priori, I was guided by my a 
priori knowledge about the topic of ―forgiveness‖, which thus influenced the 
choice of questions for the semi-structured interview schedule and the analysis. 
While inductive approaches formulate generalizations and theories based on 
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multiple observations, and deductive approaches deliver empirical evidence to 
confirm a theory, retroduction is a more open-ended approach that allows 
researchers to make assumptions about what could be the case (Glynos & Howarth, 
2007). This makes it a very flexible approach that suited the flexibility of the 
proposed thematic analysis.  
Following the guidelines of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) the 
material was read and re-read and initial ideas were noted. This allowed initial 
codes to be identified, and for the data to be resorted and collated according to 
these codes. Subsequently, the identified main themes were mapped.  
I acknowledge that I employed an insider‘s perspective regarding the 
interviews conducted with German participants, because I have been socialized in 
Germany. At the same time I had an outsider‘s perspective regarding the other two 
countries. Therefore, I considered my insider-outsider subjectivities on the 
presented perspectives as I conducted the analysis. According to Greenfield (2000) 
it is logically impossible to be truly observer-independent and perfect objectivism 
is not possible. Since from a psychological perspective each participant is an 
expression of culture (Bruner, 1990), it is expected to capture the meaning and 
understanding of forgiveness across participants coming from different cultural 
backgrounds reflecting the cultures respectively.  
Results and Discussion: Contextualized intergroup forgiveness 
In the following section, I describe the overarching themes labelled as 
―Facets of Intergroup Forgiveness‖, ―Antecedents of Forgiveness‖, and ―Outcomes 
of Forgiveness‖. The core themes are the antecedents of forgiveness, which 
contribute to the understanding of the forgiveness process.  
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Facets of Intergroup Forgiveness – distinguishing interpersonal from intergroup 
forgiveness 
How did the participants distinguish between the individual and group 
level? 
Overall, Filipino and German interviewees conceptualised forgiveness at 
the individual level as an everyday practice and perceived it as easier to apply than 
forgiveness at the group level. Japanese interviewees held different views about 
forgiveness and did not consider it as a useful conflict resolution strategy.  
This Filipino participant talked about forgiveness in an interpersonal setting 
as a simple endeavour because only two persons are involved and have to deal with 
it; contrary to forgiveness at the intergroup level: 
“I think it is quite simple for two persons for a relationship 
because it is just a simple relationship it is just one person 
involved but whenever there are more than one person 
involved I think it becomes more and more complicated…the 
more people involved the larger the group I think it is 
harder to achieve forgiveness. Complete forgiveness I think 
or the ideal sense of forgiveness” [P2]. 
 
How can a group forgive completely? This question came up during some 
interviews and interviewees said that the problem at the group level was the variety 
of opinions. Another Filipino interviewee commented on the complexity of group-
level forgiveness, with the majority influence and politics leaving people uncertain 
about when ‗forgiveness‘ towards the perpetrator group is socially acceptable: 
“Well in the personal level there are there aren‟t um there 
are no other people concerned or involved it‟s just you and 
me …you know I hurt you… you forgive me or not so it‟s 
just up to you and what you know where in your group your 
community and your nation there all these other people and 
sometimes your decisions will tend … you know tend to 
move or sway to the decisions of others …you know it‟s like 
it‟s like the elections you know people vote not to forgive 
and okay might as well not so…It can influence other people 
can influence your decision even if you want yourself to 
forgive you know other people can change your mind but at 
a personal level it‟s you and the person involved” [P3]. 
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At the intergroup level, forgiveness can be influenced by public opinion, so there is 
no clear closure. According to Liu and Hilton (2005) a wound can be re-opened as 
a political issue and therefore be used by political leaders to follow and find 
support for their agenda. Consistent with this formulation, with regard to groups 
there is the notion of forgiveness being a bilateral process (if only one side has 
been victimized) or mutual process (if both sides were perpetrators at some stage 
during the conflict). This is rather than forgiveness being a unilateral matter, as can 
be the case in forgiveness at an individual level: 
“Forgiveness on a personal level is … easier, because you 
only speak of your own … you don‟t, it‟s you, if I forgive 
this person important to me, if I decide to forgive another 
person, it‟s my conscious decision … when you talk of 
nations or groups, it‟s harder and as I said it takes a lot of 
effort because you are talking about history, you are talking 
about … yeah, you bring with you history probably of … 
injustice what has been done and I don‟t know perhaps it 
can also be between religions, like Muslims and Christians, 
you are talking about this level, you are talking about really 
values that are engrained already then it‟s a little difficult 
for you to collectively decide to forgive when we already 
been programmed into thinking that this group or this 
nation has done us wrong” [P4]. 
 
 The preceding extract furthermore asserts that intergroup grievances may 
become part of a cultural or religious script that is engrained within people‘s 
consciousness or identity (e.g. Rata, Liu, & Hanke, 2008). Similar opinions were 
reflected among the German interviewees. The major distinction between the two 
levels is the complex and uncertain nature of forgiveness at the group level. 
“Well, I think at the individual level you are able to clearly 
determine whether it is forgiven or not, … whereas in 




“In a group with 50 people it is useless, if only 3 want to 
undergo the forgiveness process while the rest does not 
want to engage in it” [G1].  
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In order to reduce the uncertainty at the group level, it is important to have 
someone who can represent the group in the forgiveness process – especially, if 
one‘s own group (here a Japanese participant) has to carry the burden of the past:  
“Of course a representative can forgive as politician, but if 
people feel as a country, as a kind of common group in 
which each member share psychological traits, it is very 
difficult to forgive. But if people feel as a (…) common goal 
group, maybe it is possible to forgive (…)” [J5]. 
 
 Overall, there was a common understanding among interviewees that 
forgiveness has a certain value, benefits, and is important. However, the Japanese 
interviewees regarded the process of forgiveness as relatively irrelevant for conflict 
resolution. Furthermore, forgiveness seemed to have negative connotations, as the 
concept was mainly associated with potential costs regarding the whole process. 
Nevertheless, forgiveness seemed to have at least a utilitarian value among the 
Japanese interviewees – but no moral connotations as following extract by a 
Japanese participant displays:  
“(...) Basically I try to forgive someone, because forgiveness 
sometimes makes better relationships with him or her so in 
that sense I think forgiveness has some kind of benefits. 
Yeah (…) the situation in which someone hurt me is very 
rare for me so (...) I changed my mind. Sometimes I feel or I 
think the apology is a real one a sincere one (.) then (...) I 
would apologise no no I would forgive him. But even in that 
case I would try to make him or her apologise more and 
then I would forgive them (…)Yeah yeah so I think the 
expression of apology is needed repeatedly and then I would 
forgive” [J5]. 
 
 If forgiveness was considered among the Japanese participants, it was 
surrounded by heavy conditions and obligations. Theoretically, these articulations 
are in line with the development model of forgiveness (Enright, Santos, & Al-
Mabuk, 1989; Enright, Gassin, & Wu, 1992), which is modelled after Kohlberg‘s 
(1976) model of the development of moral reasoning and has six stages. Revengeful 
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and conditional forgiveness are the lowest stages of forgiveness; the middle stages 
are exceptional forgiveness and forgiveness as social harmony: and the highest 
stage is forgiveness as love and is marked by its unconditional character. The 
extract corresponds with the stage of conditional forgiveness in which forgiveness 
is only granted if an apology or other forms of restitutions have been repeatedly 
received (Enright & the Human Development Group, 1991, 1998). Furthermore, 
the extract marks also that forgiveness is an instrumental means, since the 
relationship could be beneficial in the future.  
In sum, most interviewees understood forgiveness as an important and 
meaningful concept that many of them applied as a conflict resolution strategy in 
everyday life. In general, the participants attributed a certain positive value to 
forgiveness at the individual level, which is in concordance with previous research 
(McCullough, 2001; Enright, 2001). The participants were able to relate to 
forgiveness when thinking of individual situations. The Japanese participants 
repeatedly emphasized high conditions that have to be met in order to grant 
forgiveness when dealing with interpersonal conflicts. Avoidance was another 
response to offences (“I avoid them (conflicts) as much as possible” [J2]), and an 
association between shame and being in a conflict were mentioned by the Japanese 
interviewees: 
“I think it is a shame to tell other people I have trouble I 
have conflict with someone. I don‟t want to say to other 
people or complain about that because I think having 
conflict having problem is not smart” [J3]. 
 
This avoidance approach to dealing with conflicts is echoed in the 
literature (e.g. Ohbuchi & Takahashi, 1994). At the intergroup level the Japanese 
interviewees did not personalize the forgiveness process, suggesting that at this 
level it should be institutionalized. Although one should be very cautious about 
inferring group level differences in the articulation of specific aspect of 
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forgiveness with such a small sample, it is still striking to find differences at this 
particular point. Referring to the individual level, the Filipino and German 
interviewees highlighted the benefits of forgiveness and the Japanese interviewees 
emphasized potential costs. These conceptualizations of interpersonal forgiveness 
can have an impact on how intergroup forgiveness is perceived and also how 
important forgiveness is perceived at the intergroup level.  
 Forgiveness in an interpersonal setting is described as something simple 
because only two persons have to resolve the conflict. In a group setting, 
forgiveness is perceived as being very complex because more people are involved.  
Therefore, forgiveness is more complicated and uncertain. The extracts portray the 
difficulties that arise when dealing with groups. One difficulty is that groups are 
perceived as variable and not as a stable entity. For example, one part of a group 
or a representative of a group can offer a sincere apology while another part may 
be sincerely opposed to this. The perceived control over the situation is higher in 
interpersonal settings than in intergroup settings. Strong communication processes 
seem to be necessary to approach and appreciate both parties and to gain an 
understanding of both sides of the story. Furthermore, group-level forgiveness 
requires a balanced process that involves each party approaching each other under 
optimal conditions (Allport, 1954), in order to achieve procedural fairness and 
reduce perceived unfairness and helplessness. The following excerpts portray 
these opinions. 
Antecedents of Forgiveness 
This theme was identified as being crucial, since elements such as 
‗apology‘, ‗collective emotions and memories‘, ‗representations of the past and 
historical closure‘,  ‗severity of offence‘ were identified and partially in line with 
previous research (e.g. Worthington, 2005). The following extracts for this theme 
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are at the individual as well as intergroup level since it was easier for the 
participants to relate to the process of forgiveness at the individual level rather than 
the intergroup level.  
Apology 
 
This subtheme describes how the interviewees‘ perspective on apologies. 
The interviews conveyed how apologies are important for the victimized party, and 
that they are difficult for the perpetrator party to issue, particularly when the 
misdeed has happened in the past. The perceived sincerity of an apology is 
dependent on several other factors, which have a different emphasis at the 
interpersonal and intergroup level. These factors are portrayed by extracts in the 
following sections. 
This following excerpt by a Filipino participant illustrates the dilemma of 
receiving an apology that includes compensation and not being able to take the 
apology as a genuine one:  
“It‟s internal, it is in them, if they think that by offering 
compensation they have solved the problem and then they 
are just offering or making an apology just for the heck of it. 
That‟s the … of the person already, maybe he is not really 
after forgiveness or reconciliation, he just wants to solve the 
problem with the intention of making another one in the 
future. So, it‟s very difficult to determine what‟s going on in 
a person‟s mind, but the we have indication through his 
action, that‟s the only thing, way we can probably at least 
closely guess what he is thinking by looking at what he is 
doing but again it‟s not full prove. I don‟t think that it is 
100% accurate, because it‟s you know I called it band aid 
remedy. So you just force a band aid on the sore part. You 
are not really curing what cause the soreness in the first 
place. So you hide, when you put band aid like when you 
have a cut you hide what‟s hurting. You cover what‟s 
hurting, this is what these people are doing, if they are 
really not after genuine apology, they are just placing band 
aid over trying to cover up their wrong doings” [P5].  
 
The same Filipino participant offers also a solution to this 
dilemma, which is about truth telling:  
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“You expose what you did.  Yeah, tell everything, don‟t omit 
or don‟t add your story, because once everyone knows the 
truth the unedited truth, forgiveness is easy, it‟s very easy to 
forgive, if the person asking for forgiveness. It‟s really (..) 
asking for it (.) if you are going to ask for forgiveness, but 
you are also giving justification for what you did and you 
are not really asking for forgiveness, if you ask for 
forgiveness you must admit and tell everything” [P5]. 
 
The demand for truth and truth telling is discussed within the literature 
about truth commissions (Tutu, 2000) for forgiveness the intergroup level. For 
victims, truth telling is of utmost importance as it reveals the seriousness of the 
apology, is an indicator of trust, and is a substantial part of the healing process 
(Staub, 2000; Tutu, 2000). Truth telling was also perceived as part of the overall 
process of forgiveness by German participants, as the following excerpt referring to 
Bush‘s politics regarding Iraq shows:  
“We admit completely honestly; this war has been a war for 
oil and not to establish uhm democracy on their continent. 
Honesty, absolute honesty” [G1]. 
 
The German participants thought about the apology issue relatively 
unilaterally at the individual level, which is in line with previous psychological 
research on intrapersonal aspects of forgiveness that has been mainly conducted in 
Western settings representing more individualistic cultures (Sandage et al., 2005). 
The salvation of the victim or the self from ill feelings was discussed as the 
predominant outcome of forgiveness, and does not necessarily depend on an 
apology. However, as previous literature suggests, the role of the apology and its 
function within the forgiveness process is dependent on the wish to continue the 
relationship at both sides (Worthington, 2005).   
Among the interviewees there was a common understanding that a 
respected political representative could and should take on responsibility for 
making an apology. This representative has an important role, because he or she is 
promoting trustworthiness to others on behalf of the whole group or even a nation.  
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The public apology or acknowledgment has therefore no value if the representative 
acting as the messenger is not respected, as one German participant describes:  
“The more charismatic, the more respected a politician is, 
the more sense would make a public apology. That‟s really 
important for me. Honestly, if George Bush apologised 
today for what he has done in Iraq, then no one would 
believe him” [G1].  
 
Furthermore, consistent with previous findings (Rata et al., 2008) another 
German participant pointed out that the acts of apology should be in accordance 
with verbal or written statements and subsequent actions:  
“I think an apology is trustworthy, if the things said in the 
apology are implemented (…) if the collective stands behind 
the official statement, if they act accordingly” [G2].  
 
However, some German participants had problems with the concept of an 
apology that precedes the forgiveness process at the intergroup level, and thought 
of it more interpersonally as the following excerpt displays: 
“I mean, the state probably apologised already couple of 
times and I mean how many apologies need to be carried 
out by the state to be accepted (.)I mean what should the 
state do, should it, I don‟t know, should it build a castle for 
everyone or should it apologise to each and everyone via 
handshake?” [G5]. 
 
 This German interviewee had problems with the notion of being held 
responsible for something that happened in the past without being an active agent 
for what had happened (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). They argued against being 
blamed for something that they were not being directly responsible for: 
“Yes, this is really abstract, probably because everything (at 
this level) is related to a sense of that people are held 
collectively responsible, some sort of clan custody, if you 
can say that. A lot of people are judged regardless of their 
responsibility or guilt for the conflict. In regard of a 1 to 1 
conflict situation, you are able to clearly determine, because 
you can exchange faster and really discuss everything, but 
regarding a group, that is, well, yeah, in a group there are 
too many, yeah, in a group there are too many hidden little 
details” [G2]. 
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In this way, the German participants distanced themselves from holding 
collective responsibility for past transgressions. Furthermore, they were inclined to 
transfer responsibility to the governmental level with was also found in previous 
research (Dresler-Hawke & Liu, 2006; Páez et al., 2006). The underlying motive of 
this behaviour could be to preserve a positive social identity (Turner, 1999). 
However, participants had difficulties to apply individual-level concept of 
forgiveness to the group-level.  
Nevertheless, the trustworthiness of the apology source is of vital 
importance (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006) and can be regarded as an antecedent within 
the forgiveness process. These results are in concordance with previous findings 
about the importance of honesty and genuine apologies (Zechmeister, Garcia, 
Romero, & Vas, 2004). According to Nadler and Liviatan (2006) apologies that 
seem to originate from untrustworthy sources are taken as dishonest attempts to 
misuse others and get away without further consequences like retribution. 
 Among the Japanese interviewees the apology was seen as either a formal 
obligation by the offending party which has no further meaning, or as a kind of 
ritual that has to be done repeatedly to be perceived as sincere at the individual 
level. If the apology is a set phrase to indicate politeness, the aim is not to 
ultimately heal a broken relationship, but to have done what is socially expected 
and to make both parties be able to quickly forget what happened. If the apology is 
perceived as sincere, the offender will be forgiven, which means the offender is 
given a last chance to make amendments.  If the offender fails, the offended will 
withdraw, avoid further confrontations or break-up the relationship.  
Furthermore, at the intergroup level the Japanese participants were reluctant 
about the procedure of offering a public apology. They mostly stated that an 
apology will not help and is not necessary. They isolated the attitudes towards the 
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wrong doing from the need for an apology. The improvement of relationships 
between countries or groups was perceived as a self-governing process where an 
apology has no place as following excerpts from two Japanese participants portray:  
“I think apology itself is not so important, but to show 




“I think it‟s not necessary, because if Japanese government 
express their apology, even if they express their apologies, 
the situation will not change, but as the relationships in 
other domains change, the attitude between countries will 
change, so apologies are not necessary anymore” [J5]. 
 
Furthermore, among the Japanese interviewees there were strong objections 
regarding a demand for an apology that is issued by people who were not directly 
affected by the past harm done. From their point of view they have no right for 
such a demand:  
“National or ethnic (…) first of all (.) if it is a past event, I 
have no right to ask for it (apology) (.) it happened and it‟s 
not (.) against me (.) …why does it matter to me?” [J1]. 
 
One reason for this objection is that among the Japanese participants the 
demand for an apology for past atrocities was confused with a demand for an 
apology issued by an ordinary Japanese citizen and not by the government. 
“… (.) the point is … I am not the one (.) who are, who was 
hurt. So I just I have no right to (.) ask for I mean eh (.) I 
don‟t have any right to ask for (.) apology or I don‟t have 
the right to forgive” [J1].  
 
The same Japanese respondent pointed out that there seems to be a 
misunderstanding among Japanese people of what is expected from them:  
“The problem I see between ah Korea and Japan is that 
Koreans ah (.) ah asking for apology (.) and it, it makes 
sense to me but ah I mean also Chinese … but ah I mean 
ordinary Japanese (.) think that they … are asking apology 
from themselves (from Japanese people)… and not from the 
government…and ah I think …  that why should I (.) I mean 
  87 
apologise? I haven‟t, I don‟t even know any Koreans or 
Chinese” [J1]. 
 
 Here again, similar to the German sample, the need to be positively distinct 
from the former perpetrators was very high and any act that would induce some 
sort of guilt feelings were rejected. This is echoed in the literature investigating the 
phenomena of group-based or collective guilt (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; 
Montada, Schmitt, & Dalbert, 1986; Schmitt, Behner, Montada, Müller, & Müller-
Fohrbrodt, 2000). Even among theorists, the idea that a person can be guilty for 
something they have not done themselves is controversial. Therefore, for protective 
reasons and to maintain a positive self-image, this Japanese participant placed the 
responsibility at the governmental level, clearly separated from the individual:  
“Probably Japanese government not directly but indirectly 
involved, so government is a kind of incorporated person, so 
there is continuity. The government is responsible. And am I 
responsible? No, I don‟t think so…and I am responsible in 
the sense that I am not affecting the Japanese government as 
a voter or as citizen to make it behave in a more responsible 
manner” [J1]. 
 
Germans are often reminded of the atrocities during the Third Reich due to 
educational syllabi at school, memorials, museums, and through the media (Oliner, 
2008; Shriver, 2005). Therefore, it is quite likely that today‘s Germans want to 
separate themselves from the atrocities committed during World War II, since the 
seeking of forgiveness would also imply an admission of collective guilt:  
“But I am always torn (...) to apply the term „forgiveness‟ in 
this context. For me it is more important to be on the qui 
vive, because nowadays there are generations living that 
eventually don‟t get the large scale adversity of the 
Holocaust and I just don‟t know whether a 18 year old 
Israeli has to forgive me as a German … (…) this forgiving 
suggests collective guilt (…) that I don‟t want to take on, I 
have to honestly admit. I do not feel collectively guilty” 
[G1].  
 
All participants, however, agreed that the offender should be the initiator of 
the issue of an apology, regardless of at which level (individual vs. group) the harm 
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done occurred. The offer of a public apology, which goes beyond the typical claims 
for financial compensation, is perceived to be a prerequisite before the forgiveness 
process at the broader level can even start: 
“It must be in sync with the efforts. It doesn‟t make sense 
when you apologise and (…) let systems continue that are 
unfair” [P4]. 
 
Among the Filipino interviewees the concern was also raised that a public apology 
can be a strategy to get approval for and follow-up a different agenda: 
“Public apologies sometimes are used in making 
government policies in crafting laws and the real objective 
is not met. The same our understanding but a public 
apology sometimes the sincerity is not that (...) The process 
includes a different agenda and it is not only asking 
forgiveness but it involves politics, policies” [P1]. 
 
Having been maltreated during war, colonisation periods and so forth, one Filipino 
participant simply put it like this: 
“That they (Japanese) are sincere in their apology they are 
also sincere in helping us … not necessarily financially, but 
you know in times of crisis, not just financially, just for 
support, moral support. That would do …showing that they 
care” [P3]. 
 
Therefore, receiving signs of care and moral support can help victimised 
groups feel acknowledged as human beings, capable of the same sufferings as the 
perpetrator group. This can be explained through the notion of infrahumanization, 
or simply recognizing the human being in the other group again (Tam et al., 2007). 
These acts may reduce the perception of the outgroup as inhumane.  
This Filipino participant points out that not seeking forgiveness and 
acknowledging the harm done is a denial of the past misdeed: 
“ (.) not seeking forgiveness on the one hand is not 
recognizing that this person exists and that you have 
actually done something wrong to this person or to this 
group” [P4]. 
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In sum, among the interviewees, an apology alone was not considered 
enough; the offender was also expected to make amendments in form of 
compensations. This is echoed in the literature (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). All 
participants from the three countries agreed that an apology is of the utmost 
importance, if a continuance of the relationship is desired or even thought of.  
It seems that the desire for a continuance of the relationship is more 
complicated to determine at the intergroup level compared to the interpersonal 
level. At the group level, the continuance of the relationship may be desired if the 
formerly conflicting groups share physical space or political and economic 
interests. Therefore, particularly at the intergroup level the prerequisite of a public 
apology helps to re-build fractured relationships after conflicts. The obligation to 
acknowledge past harm lies in the hands of the former perpetrators. This gets 
difficult at the intergroup level for large-scale conflicts where direct perpetrators 
may not be alive anymore, or where one group were at some stage victims and at 
another stage perpetrators (for example the Northern Ireland conflict). Furthermore, 
at the individual as well as the intergroup level the participants indicated that an 
apology has to be in sync with the perpetrators‘ efforts to make amendments. In 
other words, an apology is worthless, if, for example, the offences continue or no 
changes follow. Additionally, participants suggested that the forgiveness process 
requires a dialogue, in which each party can have a say. 
Even though among the Japanese interviewees an apology was perceived as 
something instrumental, it was still a means to amend relationships. At the 
intergroup level, the issue of an official statement that acknowledges a past harm 
done was simply considered to be not sufficient to engender forgiveness. These 
perspectives are echoed in the literature (Digeser, 2001; Minow, 1998; Tavuchis, 
1991).  
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Collective emotions and memories 
 
The interviews supported previous research, which has identified emotions 
and memories as antecedents of the forgiveness process (e.g., Tam, et al., 2007; 
Cairns & Roe, 2003). In the interpersonal conflict literature forgiveness clearly 
differentiated from forgetting (Enright & Rique, 2000). However, in the interviews 
forgetting equalled selectively forgetting ill feelings connected to the incident, as 
following excerpt portrays: 
“You forget what happened, but you remember the lesson. 
You learn from that experience … selective forgetting, 
maybe you forget the feeling of hatred, because when you 
say forgiveness that, it, it, (.) cannot that you are either mad 
or angry or maybe disappointed or perhaps not satisfied. So 
if you take that out, those negative things, (.) you will 
remember the lesson that you learnt. That get rid of negative 
feelings and forgiveness would be easier for me (…)” [P5]. 
 
Statements from other participants also suggested that ‗forgetting‘ in the 
forgiveness process referred to selectively forgetting negative feelings attached to 
the conflict. This, however, has not been differentiated in the literature yet. 
Nevertheless, the Filipino participants also agreed on that it is hard to forget when 
something bad happened in the past and that similar situations will trigger 
memories:   
“Something that life‟s altering cannot easily be forgotten 
and it‟s the truth that you do not forget these things because 
I don‟t know … you wouldn‟t want to find yourself again 
similarly situated, you become aware of your company and 
things that are happening to you (…) and then (…) it‟s 
difficult to forget about something, when you forgive an 
offence (.) sometimes you do have forgiven that person and 
yet when you have similar encounter then it starts teasing 
back again, then you remember all of it (.) that‟s like 
keeping a score card (…) they just get logged there, this 
happened at this time, this happened at this time you might 
temporarily not think about it, but I am sure that a similar 
situation will bring back memories” [P4]. 
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The German participants generally expressed similar views about forgetting, but 
they put it on the intergroup level. The following excerpt by one German 
interviewee highlights these perceptions:  
“Uhm (…) you cannot basically forget such things, I have a 
hard time to believe this (.) … there are so many different 
historical examples. Uhm, they will never forget this. Even 
every generation will never forget this ... basically I think, 
because (.) how would you be able to prevent things from 
happening again … like with the Nazis in Germany or in 
other countries. There was this one wonderful example for 
this and you better not forget this and should do anything to 
keep it in your memory and that‟s why it is stupid to forget 
such things” [G2]. 
 
For the German participants who were perpetrators in the past, forgiveness at the 
group level had something to with not being confronted or reminded of the past 
misdeeds all the time. There is a tendency among the current public opinion in 
Germany to reject collective guilt (Dresler-Hawke & Liu, 2006; Páez et al., 2006). 
The following excerpt describes this opinion:  
“… Germany, National Socialism or anti-Semitism, 
xenophobia (…) there is nothing to excuse really, uhm, you 
cannot really; first of all you cannot really forget it.  You 
are able to forgive insofar by saying in principle the new 
generation in this country should not be linked to this 
anymore … this happens to you again and again when 
travelling to a foreign country (…) … (…) well, in principle 
(.) if I travel to a foreign country or when foreigners travel 
here to Germany, that these people do not permanently 
confront me with these things, for example, permanently 
being asked these questions or having to deal with my 
nation‟s past, because I belong to a different generation, but 
I deal with it for all I care, if in any discussions or in any 
conversations this topic is dropped, because it is a global 
topic by now. It is not restricted to Germany only… (...) but 
predominantly I think it is the thing that you are not 
permanently confronted with it.  This the thing people 
forgive, I think,  but also that it is no longer a topic in 
people‟s minds (.) and that are openly received and with 
complete distance(…)“ [G2]. 
 
Generally speaking, memories are important in order to respect the victims 
and acknowledge how they were affected by the harm committed (Minow, 1998). 
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However, among the German participants and Japanese participants, younger 
generations found it unpleasant to be linked with atrocities committed in the past 
and being confronted with it (Shriver, 2005). Memories, especially on a broader, 
collective scale that denote shared meaning systems within a country or specific 
group, help ensure that history does not repeat itself and give victims an avenue to 
commemorate and grieve appropriately (Páez & Liu, in press).  
However, the Japanese participants preferred the strategy to forget, if there 
was a conflict or argument at the individual level: 
“Shoo (…) I can‟t remember (.) probably I (.) don‟t (.) want 
to remember those occasions. There is no use of 




“For Japanese young people…I am not sure … it‟s not only 
young … we see, keeping in mind the original conflict or 
tiny problems is not smart, so we try to forget that …not 
forgive that, we don‟t need to forgive, because we forget 
about the things about the conflict” [J2].   
 
However, all these remarks refer to the interpersonal level of forgiveness. If 
the Japanese participants referred to the intergroup level, they isolated Japanese 
individuals from the governmental body, giving the government the responsibility 
to resolve outstanding disputes in a similar manner to the German participants. The 
reluctance of the Japanese participants to feel personally responsible for something 
that happened in the past is similar to the German participants‘ reluctance that is in 
line with previous research (e.g. Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). The following 
extract from a Japanese participant displays this: 
“(...) It‟s hard to say but I think everyone cannot be 
responsible for past things from very long ago because if 
one try to take responsibility for past things I don‟t know 
what extent we go back from so … But government can take 
responsibility for example a formal investment or (…) it‟s 
not responsibility but cooperation … … I think 
compensation is not possible but we can create another 
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relationship so once a good relationship is created the past 
is not a problem I think” [J3]. 
 
There were some similarities among the Japanese and German interviewees 
in terms of the rejection of being held collectively responsible and being 
condemned as collectively guilty as perpetrators of past misdeeds. However, there 
were also some differences regarding the connotations of apologies at the 
intergroup level related to World War II. Previous research (Conrad, 2003; Hein & 
Selden, 2000; Shriver, 2005) has indicated that Germans are generally more aware 
of the past misdeeds during World War II than Japanese.  
Representation and historical closure with the past 
 
How the past is constructed and passed on to the younger generations is a 
subject of research in sociology, political science and philosophy (e.g. Ignatieff, 
1996; Ricoeur, 2004). It is hardly researched in psychology with some exceptions 
(e.g. Liu & Hilton, 2005; Páez & Liu, in press; Pennebaker et al., 1997). It is 
noteworthy that the past indeed can shape the future and promote a particular 
agenda (Liu et al., 2005) and Ignatieff (1996) concurred that the tragic matter about 
the past is that it does not belong to the past, making it ‗poisonous‘, since it can 
fuel conflicts. 
In the interviews, it was especially interesting how the past was represented 
by the German and Japanese participants, as these nations perpetrated crimes 
against humanity during World War II. When these participants spoke about the 
past, they mostly saw the whole matter from a very distant position due to the 
absence of guilt feelings related to past misdeeds. This is a common response for 
perpetrators (Páez, Marques, Valencia, & Vincze, 2006) that probably had 
protective reasons as following extract shows: 
“I mean, grandchildren and great-grandchildren and great-
great-grandchildren, I think, they have never gotten this, 
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they have hardly read something about this, all of them read 
somehow comics from the USA or some other fancy 
magazines (.), but they don‟t learn this anymore nowadays, 
but you don‟t (.) I believe a 14 year old or 10 year old child 
today don‟t need to repent (.), because people in the Third 
Reich did …” [G5]. 
 
Furthermore, another German interviewee expressed it like the following 
extract shows: 
“I am a disputatious person. I would assess myself as 
moderately left-wing and I am someone who always tries to 
do something against any form of racism, if it occurs, but 
this forgiveness related to the Holocaust is a discussion that 
I don‟t find contemporary anymore”  [G1]. 
 
This extract also blends in what I would refer to as some kind of historical 
or psychological closure with past, since there seems to be no need any more to 
discuss it. There is probably this kind of ―departure from the past‖ which Staub and 
Bar-Tal (2003) are referring to as symbolic means of healing also being 
symbolically related to forgiveness.  
In order to maintain a positive image the Japanese participants portrayed 
the protest from other East Asian countries regarding Japan‘s handling of the past 
deeds during World War II as propaganda driven by the foreign government, 
questioning the trustworthiness of the sources. The extract by a Japanese 
participant portrays this opinion: 
“(...) Regarding …  the … problem I guess I don‟t know but 
I guess most of the Japanese people think the anger from 
China and Korea is a political one so maybe most of the 
Japanese people think most of the people in China and 
Korea (...) … (...). Yeah as for China most of Japanese 
people don‟t think Chinese people is (are) feeling anger 
about (…) problem. Maybe it‟s a kind of political 
manipulation of information” [J4]. 
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 Similar to the German participants, this Japanese participant explained the 
matter as a problem for the older generation and not as problematic for the younger 
generations.  
“(...) It depends on the generation. Maybe old people feel 
angry to us but young people not (…) so many young people 
don‟t feel angry to us. But in Korea maybe even young 
people feel angry but it‟s related to the current situation and 
including football so it‟s not about World War II” [J5]. 
 
It was noteworthy that the Japanese participants did not seem to care about 
any acknowledgements of any harm committed in the past to them (e.g. the 
Hiroshima bombing). This could be because a large-scale apology directed to them 
could have implications for being obligated to do the same: 
“Some people said American governments have to 
apologise to Nagasaki or Hiroshima people … I agree for 
most of it but if American government have to apologise to 
Japanese we Japanese have to apologise to more and more 
other Chinese and .…” [J2]. 
 
The concept losing face to one‘s people is a well-known phenomenon in East 
Asian cultures, since it signifies that the ancestors are respected. Japanese thus 
experience a dilemma about how they can be respectful towards their ancestors 
while at the same time not offending people whose ancestors suffered from Japanese 
in the past. However, things at the political level are perceived to be more strategic. 
A Japanese interviewee indicated that the actions – such as paying respect to 
Japanese soldiers who died during the war by visiting a shrine – carried out by the 
Japanese Prime Minister are offensive acts towards other East Asian nations, but 
strategic in order to gain approval from the Japanese people and win elections:  
“Abe‟s8 grandfather is I don‟t know how to say (.) crime 
(war criminal) … yeah and Abe maybe is proud of his 
grandfather … But Koizumi is more strategical (…) he 
wants to win election so he wants to make the relatives of 
                                                 
8
 Abe Koizumi was the prime minister in Japan from 2001-2006. 
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those people vote for him … I can only imagine but if I was 
a relative of that people I am very proud of my grandfather I 
hear Koizumi has respect for my relatives (.) so it‟s (.) but 
I‟m not sure I can only imagine” [J2]. 
  
Furthermore, among the Japanese participants there was a common understanding 
that Japanese government initiatives to resolve the past are potentially misused: 
“Japanese initiative would be taken advantage of politically 
by Korean and Chinese government so that is at the core of 
the problem“ [J5]. 
 
How the past is transmitted to the next generations plays a vital role to foster 
understanding of the roots of a conflict (Staub, 2000). Participants suggested that it 
should be a part of the educational syllabi, because otherwise the younger 
generations who continue to argue about a conflict that originated long time ago do 
not have an understanding about the causes, as following Filipino participant 
highlights: 
“… if you are going to move in the, on the international 
scale and think about conflict, each old conflict before we 
were born, I mean this younger generations they do not even 
know how this conflict started and yet they are continuing it 
and I think that is how their children would do it also and 
how can you end it? (…) So somebody, someone has to 
make the conscious decision to really get to the bottom of 
things, what started it, how can we stop this thing. If those 
kind of mentality will not be introduced and I don‟t think 
that you can introduce that to the adults, you have to start 
with the children to solve this regional or ethnic conflict that 
we have right now in the world (…) …before you forgive 
you must first be able to understand what‟s happening, 
what‟s caused it (…)” [P5]. 
 
Severity of harm done  
 
The severity of the harm done has an influence on whether the victim will 
be ready to engage in a process of forgiveness and how an apology may be 
interpreted (Zechmeister et al, 2004). The more severe the harm done, the less 
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likely the victim will be willing or will be ready to forgive (McCullough et al., 
2000) as following extract by a Filipino interviewee describes: 
“Sometimes it depends on the gravity if you want to just 
forgive … but there is always this feeling afterwards that 
there is not always 100% in some instances especially when 
the gravity has cost you in your person. If it is too much 
usually I will forgive you, but sometimes it takes some time 
to heal” [P1]. 
 
The interviewees used every day experiences to describe how they felt 
about forgiveness. Due to the interview context it is understandable that the 
participants did not disclose very severe or painful experiences. However, they 
pointed out that many conditions they described only apply to minor conflicts as 
this Filipino participant explains: 
“I am talking only about minor things, but I can imagine 
that for people who must have gone through very difficult 
experiences find it really hard to forgive” [P4]. 
 
Another Filipino participant pointed out that it also depends on the intentionality of 
the harm committed. If the transgression was committed accidentally, it is easier to 
engage in a process of forgiveness. 
“I think that would influence my feelings also knowing that 
somebody did something bad to me on purpose (.) but if I 
know that it wasn‟t done on purpose it was accidental or 
without any fault then I think it would be easier also for me 
to forgive” [P1]. 
 
These perspectives are echoed among the German participants. The time 
factor was also mentioned, supporting previous research (e.g. McCullough, 
Fincham, & Tsang, 2003) indicating that healing wounds takes time and healing 
deep wounds even more. Deep wounds inflicted at the group level and inherited in 
form of narratives to the younger generations probably will not fade with time. The 
following excerpt from this German participant portrays the time factor in relation 
to the severity of an offence: 
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“Well, when something really bad happened that you want 
to forgive, then you definitely need more time. I can 
imagine, the more severe the offence is that you want to 
forgive, the longer it can take” [G4].  
 
The extract below shows that a very severe incident can result in the rejection of 
any apologies from the perpetrator and in a break-up of the relationship:   
“When something really, really rough happened, then I 
believe even an apology won‟t help anymore, well, when it 
was too severe (…) then there won‟t be forgiveness (…) 
thus, an apology won‟t make any sense, then it will be only a 
flowery phrase” [G5].  
 
Therefore, willingness to engage in the forgiveness process depends on the 
context of the transgression and on the level of the perceived sincerity of an 
apology. This perspective is along the lines of the moral development model of 
forgiveness proposed by Enright and the Human Development Group (1998). 
Enright and the Human Development Group call this stage ‗conditional 
forgiveness‘, because granting forgiveness is dependent on conditions or 
prerequisites the perpetrator has to meet.   
However, this matter gets very complicated at the intergroup level. At the 
intergroup level the severity of the offence is likely to be already high due to the 
nature of the offence (e.g. ranging from social exclusion and denial of human rights 
to mass killings or the most severe form of genocide). Therefore, it may be 
understandable that forgiveness at this level is bound to specific conditions and 
prerequisites that have to be met in order to protect the victims. Furthermore, for 
neighbouring countries or groups within a country, the interpersonal-level option of 
breaking up the relationship may be impossible.  
In summary, three themes that influenced forgiveness beyond the apology 
dealt with collective emotions, memories and how participants handled their own 
interpretation and perception of the past. An apology signals an acknowledgement 
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that harm was done (Lazare, 2004). It also signifies to the victims that the 
perpetrators have a sense of guilt and an awareness of the effects on the victims. At 
the intergroup level, this theme was further explored through additional questions. 
According to the interviewees an apology seemed to be quite important to foster 
forgiveness and to heal a broken relationship. Representations of the past in 
particular allowed participants to distance themselves from a heavily burdened past 
in which their ancestors were perpetrators. The interviews highlighted that the 
perception of the past and historical closure may play a vital role in the forgiveness 
process, especially at the intergroup level. This however has not been well 
researched in relation to forgiveness. Hamber and Wilson (2003) dealt with 
symbolic closure in the context of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions, but focused more on how this institution tried to force closure upon 
victims. In general, apology, collective emotions, memories, and severity of the 
harm done have been investigated in the literature at the individual level and at the 
group level (e.g. Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Cairns & Roe, 2003; Worthington, 
2005). 
Outcomes of Forgiveness  
What comes after forgiveness is achieved? This question was not a question 
on the interview schedule, but the participants did talk about potential outcomes of 
forgiveness.  Outcomes of the forgiveness process at the intergroup are hardly 
discussed in the literature, but the literature that does exist argues for reconciliation 
as an outcome (see Noor et al., 2008). The literature on outcomes at the 
interpersonal level is related to intrapersonal variables like well-being due to the 
application of forgiveness within therapeutic settings (see Chapter 2). These 
intrapersonal outcomes of forgiveness were especially mentioned among the 
Filipino and German interviewees.  
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Nevertheless, the consequences of the forgiveness process the participants 
talked about may have different implications at different levels of observation 
(interpersonal vs. intergroup). If forgiveness is achieved, the most typically 
mentioned positive outcome at both levels was reconciliation, which is in line with 
the few studies focusing on outcomes (Noor et al., 2008). In general, reconciliation 
was regarded as the end and forgiveness as the means. This, however, applied only 
for the participants from the Philippines and Germany. As the concept of 
forgiveness had somewhat negative connotations within the Japanese sample, 
reconciliation as an outcome (or any other outcomes) were not mentioned at all.  
In line with previous research (e.g. Staub et al., 2003), participants 
suggested that forgiveness enables reconciliation through facilitating 
communication between the two parties, which may break the cycles of conflict. 
One Filipino participant describes it as follows:  
“If there is forgiveness it would open up communications 
from both sides. If you don‟t forgive there will be a 
continuous cycle of violence and they will always retaliate 
for everything that is done and the hate will increase” [P1]. 
 
Breaking the cycle of violence was also mentioned by this Filipino 
participant as an outcome of forgiveness. It was noted that forgiveness allows the 
parties to move forward without getting into a vicious cycle of getting even:  
“I think it‟s important. Also I think for me it‟s important 
because it‟s like breaking a cycle of violence. It has to stop 
someday and if that cycle isn‟t broken I don‟t think we 
would be able to move forward. … without forgiving I think 
people would always think about revenge or getting back at 
someone (...)” [P1]. 
 
This Filipino participant also described the driving force of forgiveness as 
leading towards reconciliation; and considered the destructive role of anger that 
originated in the past and is carried on into the present: 
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“I mean looking at what‟s happening right now I mean just 
right now in our country, I mean there are a lot of um 
bombings I mean and you know you think about it and you 
think why the this is happening, why they keep killing, I 
mean, they are also Filipinos why do they kill Filipinos, too. 
It‟s because they don‟t have reconciliation, they don‟t have 
forgiveness, they don‟t forgive you know the people who 
have [ ] have hurt them in the past and now they‟re doing it 
to those innocent people now I mean because they are still 
angry (…)” [P3]. 
 
The achievement of forgiveness was described as the starting point from which 
reconciliation is possible and can endure, such as by this German participant: 
“… my opinion is that a lasting reconciliation process, an 
honest reconciliation process can only function, if 
forgiveness takes place first (.) I know historically viewed 
there are a lot of reconciliation processes, but I don‟t see 
them as lasting and I view them as half-hearted (…)” [G1].   
 
Therefore, forgiveness is seen at least among the interviewees from the Philippines 
and Germany as a necessary step towards reconciliation. Therefore, reconciliation 
is seen as a function of seeking and granting forgiveness. This finding is not in 
accordance with findings about indigenous conceptions of forgiveness, where 
forgiveness was seen as an outcome which is preceded by a reconciliation process 
(Rata et al., 2008).  
Conclusion  
The ―facets of intergroup forgiveness‖ theme captures the distinctions 
between interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness, the perspectives, understanding, 
meaning and associated benefits as well as costs of forgiveness in general. The core 
of the process is the ―antecedents of forgiveness‖, which includes apologies, 
collective emotions, memories, the historical closure and representation of the past 
and severity of the harm. The ―outcomes of forgiveness‖ theme displays what 
outcome is desired or anticipated. Outcomes were not mentioned as frequently as 
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the elements of the other two themes, since outcome questions were not asked and 
were not part of the interview schedule. However, since outcomes were mentioned, 
the low frequency may be due to the intricacy of the concept ―forgiveness‖ that is 
already complex at the interpersonal level, but has even more degrees of 
complexity at the intergroup level. Therefore, participants for the most part 
focussed on the antecedents and what forgiveness is at all. These themes are 
mapped in Figure 4.1.    
  
 
 Figure 4.1 Summary of identified themes (Study 2) 
Among the German and Filipino interviewees‘ general perception of 
forgiveness was positive. Therefore, at the onset of the forgiveness process, 
forgiveness was perceived as a meaningful and an important means for conflict 
resolution at both levels (interpersonal and intergroup). Perceived hindrances in the 
forgiveness process were different representation of the past, closure or lack of 
closure with the past, the level of guilt feelings (perpetrators), and the level of guilt 
assignment (victims). It seems that this process might be circular, meaning that it 
can go through cycles in order to achieve sustainable reconciliation. However, this 

















of the past and 
historical closure  
 Severity of harm 
 reconciliation 
 dialogue 
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Among the Japanese forgiveness was perceived as marginal for conflict 
resolution and was only considered if it was perceived as useful for a particular 
purpose. Therefore, for the Japanese participants forgiveness was not about letting 
go of anger or release from ill feelings attached to the conflict, but rather as a 
process which could offer a utilitarian benefit such as a more committed 
relationship or repetitive apologies to stress relational sincerity. It seems that this 
view on conflict resolution at the intergroup level is highly related to how the 
Japanese participants perceive the past and consequently the relevance of 
forgiveness. As they considered apologies at the intergroup level irrelevant, 
whereas the German and Filipino participants perceived apologies to be a crucial 
conditional component, it is understandable that attempts of rapprochement, if 
made, between former victimized East Asian nations and Japan are working from a 
different set of meanings fraught with greater difficulty.  
Compared to the ease of discussing forgiveness at the individual level, the 
participants seemed to struggle with what intergroup forgiveness is and how 
forgiveness can be applied at this level. The participants argued that forgiveness at 
the individual level is not as complex as at the group level. Moreover, the 
participants mentioned that forgiveness between two people is easier to achieve 
than between groups which is echoed in the literature (e.g. Hewstone et al., 2004).  
However, the qualitative data suggested a distinction between interpersonal 
and intergroup forgiveness where different processes might occur. Interpersonal 
forgiveness seems to exist as a distinct and concrete concept whereas intergroup 
forgiveness does not. Therefore, the interviewees had difficulties in articulating 
what intergroup forgiveness is. Nevertheless, the interviewees were able to talk 
about the differences between interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness. 
Participants identified several discrete processes involved in intergroup 
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forgiveness. These discrete processes belonging to the intergroup forgiveness 
process were for instance how a public apology should be issued (in line with the 
democratic process deemed as important by Kadima Kadiangandu & Mullet, 2007; 
Kadima Kadiangandu, Gauché, Vinsonneau, & Mullet, 2007) and whether the 
historical past is shared and seen as relevant or irrelevant for the future. The 
mentioned process elements are different from interpersonal forgiveness. 
Therefore, the extracts portray a whole forgiveness process, with 
overlapping perceptions about aspects of this process across the different cultural 
backgrounds. Overall, the findings suggest a clear distinction between interpersonal 
and intergroup forgiveness. Forgiveness at the individual level was for most 
participants limited to two people involved directly in a conflict. Consistent with 
the literature (Enright & the Human Development Group, 1991, 1998), for most 
Filipinos and German interviewees being forgiving at the individual level is 
beneficial for the self (e.g. ―stress reliever‖), whereas being unforgiving is 
associated with costs (e.g. ―energy consuming, unfair to yourself‖). However, for 
the Japanese participants forgiveness as such only seemed to have a utilitarian 
value if it allowed them to receive something in exchange.  
I may cautiously suggest a cross-cultural difference between the Japanese 
and the other interviewees (Filipino and German) with respect to their conceptions 
about forgiveness. The Japanese participants mostly talked about conflict 
avoidance as a means of handling conflicts. Most of the Japanese participants 
favoured the option of suppressing their memories about offences against them. In 
addition, when they talked about forgiveness, they mostly spoke about conditional 
aspects like an apology being a necessity in order to be able to forgive. As they 
discussed forgetting about an offence, they also mentioned that they were 
suppressing their emotions, because it was shameful to express emotions linked to 
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conflicts. This is consistent with the model of maintaining superficial harmony in 
more collectivistic cultures such as Japan or among Chinese (Brew, 2007; Huang, 
Jone, & Peng, 2007), and preferences for conflict resolution strategies such as 
withdrawal and avoidance over forgiveness (Ohbuchi et al., 1994).  
Furthermore, forgiveness at the intergroup level has to go through stages 
and therefore, can be described as a process. When the participants spoke about 
intergroup forgiveness, they often made reference to the constitution of a group, 
which seemed to complicate the whole matter of forgiving. The findings suggest a 
specific way to draw the line between interpersonal and intergroup forgiveness. 
Whilst forgiveness at the individual level is perceived as a unilateral decision, 
which benefits the self for the most part, more external factors come into play at 
the group level, and the benefits to an individual are less obvious. External factors 
are contextual factors, such as the representation of the past and the dealing with 
past by governmental or representative institutions. 
Participants talked about leaders and group representatives bearing 
responsibility to open up communication between the group they represent and the 
other party. This implies that intergroup forgiveness is a based on an interactive 
exchange between the victim and perpetrator. The participants talked about 
institutional factors that might have an impact on forgiveness at the intergroup 
level (such as representatives apologizing on behalf). This suggests that a lot more 
external factors have an impact on forgiveness at the intergroup level, so that an 
individual would find it hard to unilaterally forgive an intergroup level grievance. 
Furthermore, cultural context may have an impact on views of forgiveness as this 
perspective was clearly articulated in the German and Filipino interviews compared 
to a weak expression in the Japanese interviews where forgiveness was neither 
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considered to be a powerful means to resolve interpersonal conflicts nor in 
intergroup conflicts.   
The representation of the past transmitted through public and politicized 
opinions may have an impact on the reasoning about forgiveness at the intergroup 
level which is in line with social representations theory (Moscovici, 1984) and 
social representation of history (Liu & Hilton, 2005). The historical background 
plays a vital role for the perception of the need of forgiveness – especially with 
regards to whether history is perceived as still having an influence on current 
relationships, rather than as part of the past. Since this discovery has not been 
explored elsewhere in the literature, I will pay particular attention to this aspect in 
the subsequent studies, and attempt to investigate ‗closure with the past‘ by 
assessing it.  
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Chapter 5 
Study 3: Victim perspectives - Intergroup forgiveness 
across European and East Asian contexts  
 
Study 3 is divided into two parts. The first part (Study 3a) deals with 
differences between six societies and how the new concepts (historical closure, 
costs of granting forgiveness) relate to established concepts (such as collective guilt 
assignment). The second part (Study 3b) focuses on the unique contribution of the 
new concepts over and above established concepts to predict intergroup 
forgiveness across two contexts (Europe vs. East Asia). Furthermore, it examines 
to what extent context relevant variables explain variance in intergroup forgiveness 
using a cross-level operator analysis. 
Introduction and outline of Study 3a 
As Cairns and colleagues (2005) noted, more research is needed that taps 
into different stages of a conflict in order to determine where forgiveness processes 
are most helpful and to foster reconciliation processes. Manzi and Gonzáles (2007) 
additionally noted that the intergroup forgiveness process is still poorly understood. 
Therefore, the main objective of this study is to extend the research conducted in 
this area and to shed more light on the process in the post WW II context. I 
gathered data from two post WW II contexts that included six formerly victimized 
societies; three from Europe (France, Poland, and Russia) and three from East Asia 
(China, Philippines, and Taiwan).  
Central aims of this study were to investigate the psychological correlates 
(collective guilt assignment, group-based anger, outgroup trust, and the new 
variables historical closure and perceived costs of granting forgiveness) of and 
differences in intergroup forgiveness across these six societies. As already 
  108 
described in Chapter 2, the post WW II context is a very meaningful natural 
laboratory, for Germany and Japan have adopted different strategies over the 
course of the past half-century for handling their WW II past. This should have 
definite consequences in terms of their neighbours‘ willingness to forgive them for 
past misdeeds.  
Due to the different social representations of WW II and its aftermath 
facilitated through political elites, it is likely that the willingness to forgive will be 
different across our six participating societies. Specifically, it is quite likely that 
Chinese participants will be less forgiving compared to Taiwanese and Filipino 
participants due to the political and historical context (see Liu & Atsumi, 2008), 
and that the French participants will be most forgiving due to early and sustained 
Franco-German rapprochement politics after WW II compared to Polish and 
Russian participants (Feldman, 1999). Therefore, I hypothesize that due to the 
societal context: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1 societal context hypothesis): Intergroup forgiveness will differ 
significantly across the six societies. Chinese participants should score lower on 
forgiveness compared to Taiwanese and Filipino participants, whereas French 
participants should score higher on forgiveness compared to Polish and Russian 
participants.   
Relationships between variables 
Historical closure and costs of forgiveness  
Historical closure is conceptualized as an attitudinal content drawn from the 
historical context. It influences the extent that the past is perceived to still affect the 
present and future, and implications it has for present-day relationships between 
  109 
groups. Therefore, historical closure can be understood as an attitude towards the 
past and its relevance to the present and future.  
 It is plausible that non-closure with respect to the past will affect the 
propensity to forgive the other group. If past misdeeds are perceived as a vivid part 
of the present, there is no closure, and this lack of closure may prevent forgiveness. 
If the past is perceived as a closed book, people do not have to worry about 
whether it can or will have further negative influences. Therefore, in such cases it 
may be easier to show forgiveness to the former perpetrator. Having closure with 
respect to the past is also related to a ―psychological departure from the past‖ 
(Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003, p. 733), which can become a symbol for forgiveness and 
for new peaceful relations (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). Thus, there should be a 
positive association between historical closure and intergroup forgiveness. 
Additionally, one topic that has been largely neglected in interpersonal and 
intergroup forgiveness research is the investigation of the potential costs of 
granting forgiveness (see McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000). To the best 
of my knowledge, qualitative work by Rata, Liu, and Hanke (2009) is the first 
research addressing this variable at the intergroup level. A lot of research has 
emphasized the potential benefits of interpersonal forgiveness for mental and 
physical health (for an overview see McCullough et al., 2000; Worthington, 2005), 
but perceived costs of forgiveness are especially important in unresolved disputes 
between groups (see Rata et al., 2009), where forgiveness might be construed as 
condoning injustice. Potential costs of forgiveness have been theorized 
(Baumeister, Exline, & Sommer, 1998), but empirical investigation has remained at 
the interpersonal level and is sparse (Exline, Worthington, Hill, & McCullough, 
2003).  
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Costs of forgiveness discourage people to engage in forgiveness. Especially 
in unresolved disputes, potential costs associated with granting forgiveness include 
the possibility that forgiveness leaves victims feeling powerless. How can 
forgiveness proceed if the perceived costs outweigh the potential benefits—for 
instance in a ―post‖-colonial context where the victimizers retain the benefits of 
their colonial era actions, and the victims still bear the costs (see Rata et al., 2009)? 
I attempt to address a general gap in the literature by investigating the perceived 
costs of granting forgiveness and its influences on the forgiveness process at the 
intergroup level. McCullough (2008) noted that when costs overshadow the 
benefits of forgiveness, the likelihood is quite high that an alternative is favoured 
that is negatively related to forgiveness (e.g. revenge, withdrawal or staying 
resentful). Moreover, he noted that forgiveness and its alternatives are context-
sensitive. Hence, the costs of granting forgiveness should be negatively associated 
with intergroup forgiveness. Historical closure and costs of forgiveness should be 
negatively associated.  
Collective guilt and anger 
As outlined in Chapter 2, collective guilt assignment (see Wohl & 
Branscombe, 2005) and anger (Mackie & Smith, 2002) are potentially linked to 
non-closure with the past since the degree of assignment of guilt and anger are 
probably based on ―open accounts‖ and open disputes. That is, the likelihood of 
assigning guilt to and feeling anger towards the perpetrator party is quite high and a 
departure from the past is difficult, if there are more unresolved disputes in post 
conflict settings.  
For example, each Wednesday former Korean Comfort Women protest in 
front of the Japanese embassy in their quest for an official apology and 
compensation. Their lack of success elicits more group-based anger among many 
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Koreans, not just the former comfort women (Chai, 1993; Coday, 1998; Cohen, 
2006; Hicks, 1999). Similar protests are also organized in the Philippines due to the 
Comfort Women issues (Mendoza, 2003) and in China due to unresolved issues 
regarding the Nanjing massacre (Chan & Bridges, 2006; Cody, 2005; Kim, 2001). 
Collective guilt assignment and feelings of anger are more likely in the context of 
an unresolved conflict, so these should be less pronounced where the Franco-
German relationship is concerned (Feldman, 1999). In accordance with previous 
research, collective guilt assignment and forgiveness should be negatively related. 
Furthermore, collective guilt assignment and group-based anger should be 
negatively related to historical closure and positively related to costs of 
forgiveness. In general, it has been argued that forgiveness is predominately an 
emotional construct (see Tam et al., 2007) and it can be argued that its relationship 
to group-based emotions such as guilt and anger should be close to forgiveness.  
Trust  
Lack of trust is one of the key issues in long-lasting conflicts. According to 
Nadler and Liviatan (2006) lack of trust is a typical response to unresolved 
conflicts and one of the key obstacles to reconciliation. It usually entails the belief 
that the outgroup has bad intentions regarding the ingroup (Mitchell, 2000; Noor et 
al., 2008). Previous research has demonstrated that trust positively contributes to 
the process of forgiveness at the intergroup level (e.g. Noor et al., 2008). The 
degree of trust, however, may vary according to the context. Formerly victimized 
groups are likely to be suspicious of the agendas that drive the actions of former 
perpetrator groups, even if ostensibly harmless, when past conflict is unresolved. 
The restoration of trust is crucial, for it advances benevolence towards and reduces 
mistrust of the outgroup (Lewicki & Wiehoff, 2000). As a positive link between 
trust and forgiveness has already been established by previous research (e.g. Noor 
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et al., 2008), outgroup trust should be positively linked to historical closure and 
negatively to costs of forgiveness. 
The role of identification with one‟s national group.  
Previous intergroup forgiveness research applied a social identity/social 
categorization framework (see Chapter 2, SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; SCT; 
Turner, 1987). It established links in line with SIT/SCT research where identity 
was examined as either a mediating variable (e.g. Noor et al., 2008) or a direct 
predictor (e.g. Cairns, Hewstone, Niens, & Tam, 2005; Noor, Brown, González, 
Manzi, & Lewis, 2008) of intergroup forgiveness. Noor and colleagues (2008) 
argue that intergroup forgiveness relates to concerns entailing identity. Drawing 
from SIT, Noor and colleagues further argue that this distinguishes interpersonal 
from intergroup forgiveness. They propose that strength of group identification is 
an underlying force driving the relationships between other variables and 
intergroup forgiveness. It can be argued along the same lines that the perception of 
the costs related to granting forgiveness and the attitudes towards the past 
(historical closure) have an impact on one‘s self-perception. That is, the perception 
of costs for granting forgiveness and lack of historical closure may be connected to 
a stronger identification with the victimized group.  
National identity should be negatively related to historical closure and 
positively to costs of forgiveness. Furthermore, following SIT/SCT, national 
identity should mediate the relationship between (a) costs of granting forgiveness 
and intergroup forgiveness, and between (b) historical closure and intergroup 
forgiveness.  
In summary, the hypotheses for this study can be divided into four sets of 
predictions. The first one is about societal context:  
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Hypothesis 1 (H1 – societal context hypothesis): Intergroup forgiveness will differ 
significantly across the six societies. Chinese participants should score lower on 
forgiveness compared to Taiwanese and Filipino participants, whereas French 
participants should score higher on forgiveness compared to Polish and Russian 
participants.   
The second set is about positive relationships between variables: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2 – positive relationships): Historical closure should be positively 
associated with trust and intergroup forgiveness. Costs of granting forgiveness 
should be positively related to collective guilt assignment, group-based anger and 
national identity. 
The third set concerns negative associations between variables: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3 – negative relationships): Historical closure should be negatively 
associated with costs of granting forgiveness, collective guilt assignment, group-
based anger and national identity. Costs of granting forgiveness should be 
negatively related to outgroup trust and intergroup forgiveness.  
The last hypothesis deals with the role of social identification: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4 – mediation): Identification with one‟s national group should 
mediate the relationship between historical closure and intergroup forgiveness and 
between costs of granting of forgiveness and intergroup forgiveness.   
In sum, I will examine the differences in intergroup forgiveness across the 
six societies (H1) and will investigate the relationships between historical closure, 
the costs of forgiveness and established psychological variables (H2 and H3) in 
order to investigate the nomological net of the two new concepts, and shed light on 
intergroup forgiveness in the setting of post WW II relations.  H4 will test the role 
of identification with one‘s national group. 
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Method 
Participants 
An anonymous questionnaire was administered to 1197 university students 
(mean age = 20.42, SD = 3.28, female = 62.2%, 0.2 % did not disclose their 
gender) in the Philippines (N=200, Manila), China (N=202, Zhuhai and 
Guangzhou), Taiwan (N=222, Taipei), France (N=206, Toulouse), Russia (N=200, 
Saratov) and Poland (N=167, Warsaw) (for an overview of sample characteristics 
see Table 5.1). All questionnaires were administered in the native language of each 
participating country, except for the Filipino sample where the questionnaire was 
administered in English, which is an official language in the Philippines. In most 
cases a translation-back-translation method was used to ensure correct translation 
of the questionnaire. For the Polish version of the questionnaire, a bilingual 
committee approach was employed (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997).   
Table 5.1  
Sample description (N=1197, Study 3a) 
Society N 
Gender Age 
M (SD) Female Male 
Taiwan  222 49.5% 50.5% 20.94 (2.39) 
Philippines 200 47% 53% 20.48 (5.2) 
China 200 29.7% 69.3% 19.42 (2.08) 
France 206 82.5% 17.5% 21.81 (4.24) 
Poland 167 85% 15% 20.78 (1.28) 
Russia 200 78% 22% 19.06 (1.07) 
Total 1197 62.3% 37.7% 20.42 (3.27) 
 
Instruments 
Participants completed a questionnaire assessing demographic information 
(e.g. age gender, birth country) at the end following self-report measures of interest 
(see Table 5.2 for descriptive statistics). Please see Appendices B1 and B2 for 
information sheet, questionnaires, and debriefing form for both contexts. 
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Intergroup forgiveness. Intergroup forgiveness was assessed using three 
items based on Moeschberger and colleagues‘ scale (2005) and four items from 
Wohl and colleagues‘ scale (2005). The items were adapted to the World War II 
context regarding Japan and Germany. Sample item are ―It is important that [your 
country] never forgives the past harm done during the occupation of Asia, the Sino-
Japanese War and World War II by Japan/ It is important that [your country] never 
forgives the past harm done during Hitler‘s rule and World War II by Germany‖ 
(reverse-scored) ― and ―Today‘s Japanese should be forgiven for what their group 
did to members your country] during Japan‘s period of colonisation and warfare/ 
Today‘s Germans should be forgiven for what their group did [members of your 
country] during Hitler‘s rule and World War II‖.  
The overall scale proved to be reliable (overall alpha .80, Cronbach‘s alphas 
ranged from .66 to .84 across societies). Inter-item correlations indicated that the 
items are homogenous (mean inter-item correlation = .37, ranging from .22 to .44 
across societies). Higher values denote greater forgiveness.  
Historical closure. This scale was constructed for the study using items 
derived from qualitative interviews (see Chapter 4; Hanke, Liu, & Fischer, 2008). 
The historical closure scale with six items assesses the degree to which the 
participants perceive the past as a part of the present and future, as opposed to 
being unconnected to the present/future.  
Items were, for example, ―Discussions about apologizing and forgiving 
related to Japan‘s harmful past actions against [members of participating society] 
are not important anymore/ Discussions about apologizing and forgiving related to 
Germany‘s past war crimes are not important any more‖ and ―[Members of 
participating society] stories of surviving Japan‘s past harmful actions make me 
feel like the wounds are still open today/[Members of participating society] stories 
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of surviving Germany‘s past war crimes make me feel like the wounds are still 
open today‖ (reversed-scored).  
The overall alpha coefficient for the scale was .70; internal consistencies 
ranged from .60 to .75 across societies. The mean inter-item correlation was .27, 
ranging from .19 to .33 across societies proving homogeneity of items. A higher 
value indicates greater closure with the past.   
Perceived costs of granting forgiveness. A five item scale constructed for 
this study measured the perceived costs of granting forgiveness. Items were derived 
from qualitative work (Hanke, Liu, Fischer, & Vauclair, 2007; Rata, Liu, & Hanke, 
2009) and the literature (Obuchi, 2007). Items were ―Granting forgiveness will put 
the victimized group into an even more vulnerable position than before‖, ―Granting 
forgiveness without empowering the victimized group can lead to a loss of identity 
for the victimized group‖, ―Granting forgiveness is an invitation for crimes to be 
repeated‖, Granting forgiveness means losing sympathy as victims‖ and ―Granting 
forgiveness will make the perpetrator believe that now everything is alright 
although nothing is really settled‖. The overall internal consistency was .75; 
Cronbach‘s alphas ranged from .68 to .80. A higher value denotes greater 
perceptions of potential costs of forgiveness. Mean inter-item correlation was .37 
ranging from .30 to .44 across societies indicating homogenous items. A higher 
value denotes more perceived costs of granting forgiveness in general.  
 Collective guilt assignment. Collective guilt assignment was assessed using 
a scale adapted from Branscombe and Doosje (2004). The five items measured the 
degree to which participants believe collective guilt should be designated to 
contemporary Germans and Japanese, in Europe and East Asia respectively. A 
sample item is ―Today‘s Germans/Japanese people should feel regret for some 
things their ancestors did to [members of participating society] in the past.‖ The 
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overall internal consistency for this scale was .86; Cronbach‘s alphas ranged from 
.79 to .91 with a mean inter-item correlation of .56 (range: .43 to .66 across 
societies). High values indicate high assignment of collective guilt.    
Group-based anger. Group-based anger was measured with four items 
adapted for this study from Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000). Participants were 
asked to rate how much they felt each emotion (angry, displeased, furious, irritated) 
when thinking of the dealing with the past misdeeds by Germans or Japanese 
respectively on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Overall 
Cronbach‘s alpha was .89; internal consistencies ranged from .82 to .89; mean 
inter-item correlation = .67 ranging from .55 to .67. A higher value captures greater 
anger towards Germans or Japanese due to their government‘s handling of the past 
misdeeds. 
Outgroup trust. Outgroup trust was measured with a three item scale based 
on Brehm and Rahn (1997). I modified the scale to suit the European and Asian 
contexts (items: ―Do you think today‘s Japanese people/Germans would try to be 
fair to [members of your society]?‖, ―Would you say that most of the time today‘s 
Japanese people/Germans try to be helpful to [members of your society]?‖, 
―Generally speaking, would you say that most today‘s Japanese people/Germans 
can be trusted?‖). A 7-point Likert scale was used (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
The overall alpha was .77, Cronbach‘s alphas ranged from .56 to .84 across the six 
societies with a mean inter-item correlation of .52 ranging from .32 to 64. A higher 
value indicates greater outgroup trust. 
 Identification with national group. National Identity was assessed using a 
shortened version of Leach and colleagues‘ (2008) scale. Twelve items were 
included to this measure. Participants stated their agreement on a 7-point Likert 
Scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Example items are 
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―I feel a bond with [members of participating society]‖ and ―[Members of 
participating society] have a lot in common with each other‖. The original alphas 
ranged from .80 to .93 (Leach et al, 2008). In this study, the overall alpha was .92; 
the internal consistencies ranged from .85 to .94 across the six societies; mean 
inter-item correlation was .48 (range from .32 to .58 across the societies). A higher 
value indicates greater identification with one‘s national group. 
Analytical Strategy  
Hypothesis 1 was tested using an ANOVA to assess the differences 
between societies. The relationship hypotheses (H2 and H3) were examined through 
Pearson-Product-Moment correlations and multidimensional scaling (MDS) 
procedure. The correlations of predicted associations from each sample were then 
compared using similarity of correlation coefficients (Chi-square test of r-to-z 
transformed correlation coefficients). Hypothesis 4 was tested using the software 
MedGraph (Jose, 2003). 
Results  
Descriptive statistics and reliabilities  
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics and reliabilities for the instruments used 
for Study 3. 
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Table 5.2 
Means, Standard Deviation, Cronbach‟s alpha, F-values (society as fixed factor) (Study 3a) 
Society Taiwan Philippines China France Poland Russia 



















































































































































Note. *** p < .001 
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Distributional Normality 
According to Tabachnik and Fidell (2007) skewness and kurtosis indicate 
whether the data deviates from normality. Skew values larger than 2.0 and 
Kurtosis values greater than 7.0 point to problems with normality. There were no 
serious deviations from normality as the skew values were below 2.0 and the 
kurtosis values were below 7.0 for each item in each society.  
Structural Equivalence  
Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to assess the 
measurement model for the newly devised scales historical closure and costs of 
forgiveness in order to test for structural equivalence. Structural equivalence was 
tested since these scales are new and the underlying structure should be equivalent 
across all societies in order to justify comparisons. The other scales are 
established measure of well known constructs that have been widely used. 
Therefore, equivalence was not tested for these measures and I relied on the 
reliability of these measures. First, a single-group CFA was performed for each 
society separately as a prerequisite for testing factorial invariance (see fit indices 
for single group analyses in Appendix B3). Subsequently, the multi-group CFA 
was conducted yielding acceptable fit indices, indicating structural equivalence of 
these constructs across all six societies (see Table 5.3.). Because of the good fit 
indices, it is valid to assume that the content of all scales had the same underlying 
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Table 5.3 
Multi-group CFA fit indices for historical closure and costs of forgiveness (Study 
3a) 
Scale χ2 χ2/df RMSEA SRMR GFI CFI 
1. Historical closure 89.93 2.99 .04 .02 .98 .94 
2. Costs of Forgiveness 24.40 1.02 .004 .02 .99 1.00 
 
Between society differences on intergroup forgiveness 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to assess the impact of society 
on intergroup forgiveness, testing Hypothesis 1. There was a significant difference 
in the intergroup forgiveness score between the six societies (main effect for 
society: F(5, 1191) = 44.81, p < .001, 2 = .16). As expected the Chinese 
participants were least willing to forgive the atrocities committed by Japan during 
WW II (M = 3.99, SD = .89), and the French participants were the most willing to 
forgive Germans for their wartime atrocities (M = 5.45, SD = 1.12). Furthermore, 
the Chinese participants were significantly lower on forgiveness than the 
Taiwanese (M = 4.62, SD = .86) and Filipino participants (M = 4.72, SD = 1.04). 
Additionally, the French participants were significantly more forgiving than the 
Russian (M = 4.75, SD = 1.27) and Polish (M = 5.10, SD = 1.04) participants. 
Whereas the Taiwanese and Filipino participants did not differ on forgiveness, the 
Russian and Polish participants did differ significantly. These findings confirm 
the first context effects hypothesis (H1) that intergroup forgiveness for historical 
atrocities is significantly different between the six societies.  
Summary of between society differences on other variables 
See Table 5.2 for significant differences on other variables. Chinese 
participants had less closure with the past, assigned more guilt, were angrier, and 
had less trust towards Japanese than Taiwanese or Filipino participants. However, 
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Chinese participants perceived less costs of granting forgiveness than Taiwanese 
or Filipino participants, which is a surprising finding. 
French participants perceived less costs of granting forgiveness, assigned 
less guilt, were less angry, and had more trust towards Germans than Russian or 
Polish participants had. There was no difference between French and Russian 
participants on historical closure, but Polish participants were different from 
Russian participants. Russian participants reported slightly higher historical 
closure than French participants. Chinese participants reported stronger 
identification with their national group than Taiwanese or Filipino participants. 
French participants identified less strongly with their national group than Russian 
and Polish participants. Therefore, there were significant context effects on these 
variables as well. In conclusion, the findings show a significant amount of 
variance between the societies.  
Relationships among concepts  
 I tested the relationships between the new variables ―historical closure‖ 
and ―costs of forgiveness‖ with the dependent variable (intergroup forgiveness) 
and established psychological variables (see Table 5.4 for correlation matrix). I 
calculated Pearson-Product-Moment correlations. Hypothesis 2 proposed positive 
links between historical closure, trust and intergroup forgiveness, with the costs of 
granting forgiveness, collective guilt assignment, group-based anger and national 
identity. As expected historical closure was significantly positively associated 
with intergroup forgiveness and outgroup trust. Costs of granting of forgiveness 
were significantly positively related to collective guilt assignment, group-based 
anger and national identity. Overall, participants who perceived the past as being a 
historical event that does not have an impact on the future (i.e. they had high 
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historical closure), were also higher on intergroup forgiveness and higher on trust. 
Participants who perceived low costs of forgiveness assigned less guilt, were less 
angry and had a lower identification with their national group.  
Moreover, hypothesis 3 tested negative links between historical closure 
and costs of granting forgiveness, collective guilt assignment, group-based anger 
and national identity. Costs of granting forgiveness were proposed to be 
negatively related to outgroup trust and intergroup forgiveness. Overall, historical 
closure was significantly negatively associated with the costs of granting 
forgiveness, collective guilt assignment, group-based anger and national identity. 
Furthermore, costs of granting forgiveness were significantly negatively related to 
intergroup forgiveness and outgroup trust. These results confirm H2 and H3 and 
provide empirical evidence that the new concepts assessed have convergent 
validity.  
Table 5.4  
Intercorrelations between Scales for overall Sample (N=1197, Study 3a)
9
 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Intergroup forgiveness -      
2. Historical closure .40*** -     
3. Costs of Forgiveness -.43*** -.10*** -    
4. Guilt -.50*** -.41*** .23*** -   
5. Anger -.52*** -.31*** .33*** .52*** -  
6. Trust .43*** .25*** -.25*** -.36*** -.35*** - 
7. Identity -.23*** -.17*** .14*** .34*** .35*** .15*** 
Note. *** p < .001, two-tailed 
 
                                                 
9
 Due to a possible content overlap of some historical closure and forgiveness items, I tested 
whether the measurements historical closure and intergroup forgiveness are distinct measurements. 
I conducted a PCA with oblique rotation. I received three factors explaining 55.18% of the 
variance. The forgiveness items loaded on two factors (representing the subscales ―forgiving‖ and 
―non-forgiving‖ functioning as one overall forgiveness scale) and the historical closure items 
loaded on the other factor.  Furthermore, when I forced a two-factor solution, all forgiveness items 
loaded on one factor and the historical closure items loaded on the other. Therefore, intergroup 
forgiveness and historical closure as measured in this study are empirically distinct constructs.  
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Multidimensional Scaling (MDS): Depicting underlying dimension of meaning 
The above analysis showed that the concepts were meaningfully related. 
However, it is difficult to get a more holistic perspective based on correlations 
alone. Therefore, a multidimensional scaling (MDS) procedure seemed 
appropriate to explore these relationships at a more holistic level. I subjected the 
scales
10
 from the overall data set to an interval-level MDS procedure between 
variables with proximity transformations using Proxscal in SPSS 14. I calculated 
Euclidean distances from z-transformed mean scores of the seven concepts 
considering 1 up to 4-dimensional solutions. A representation in one dimension 
accounted for .86 of the dispersion (normalized raw stress .13, Tucker‘s 
coefficient of congruence = .93), for two dimensions.99 of the dispersion 
(normalized raw stress .01, Tucker‘s coefficient of congruence = .99), for three 
dimensions .99 of the dispersion (normalized raw stress .002, Tucker‘s coefficient 
of congruence = .99), and for four .99 of the dispersion (normalized raw stress 
.003, Tucker‘s coefficient of congruence = .99). The scree-plot of the normalized 
raw stress suggested a 2-dimensional solution. Therefore, a two-dimensional 
representation of the concepts was deemed as most appropriate and best 
interpretable.    
According to Borg and Groenen (1997), MDS configurations can be 
interpreted in three ways. A MDS space can be partitioned by parallel and straight 
lines (axial way), by concentric circles (modular way) or by rays originating from 
a common starting point (polar way). As can be seen in Figure 5.1 the modular 
way of partitioning the two-dimensional space seemed the most interpretable. The 
                                                 
10
 Before employing the MDS, I reversed the mean scores of the scales with a negative correlation 
with intergroup forgiveness (identity, guilt, anger and costs) so that the multidimensional space 
would not be distorted by the distinction between negative versus positive dimensions.  
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construct Forgiveness is positioned in the middle of this configuration, 
highlighting its central relationship to the other constructs.  
The emotional constructs guilt assignment and anger surround forgiveness 
in Figure 5.1. This is in line with previous research that argues that group-based 
emotions such as anger are related and proximal to forgiveness. The next circle 
includes Trust and Historical Closure. It has been labelled as ―bridging elements‖ 
because it incorporates intermediate elements that bridge the inner emotion (or 
affect) construct circle with the cognitive constructs that sit in the ‗cognitive‘ 
outer circle (e.g. perceived costs of forgiveness and identification with one‘s 
national group). The exploration of the MDS space is insightful as it shows 
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Similarity of correlation coefficients 
In the following analysis, a χ2 test of r-to-z transformed correlation 
coefficients examined the similarity of correlation coefficients across societies. 
There were no differences across the six societies for the correlations between 
historical closure and intergroup forgiveness (χ2 = 6.61, p = .25), between group-
based anger and historical closure (χ
2
 = 7.90, p = .16), and between outgroup trust 
and costs of granting forgiveness (χ2 = 6.78, p = .24).  
There were significant differences across the six societies for the following 
associations: costs of granting forgiveness and intergroup forgiveness (χ2 = 18.18, 
p < .01), collective guilt assignment and historical closure (χ2 = 12.99, p < .05), 
collective guilt assignment and costs of forgiveness (χ2 = 17.08, p < .01), group-
based anger and costs of forgiveness (χ2 = 28.29, p < .001), and outgroup trust and 
historical closure (χ2 = 12.97, p < .05). This means that the strength of these 
associations varied significantly across the samples. The direction of the 
associations, however, was the same. The differences are as follows.  
The associations between the new concept historical closure and 
intergroup forgiveness and group-based anger were stable across the six societies; 
whereas the relationships varied between historical closure and collective guilt 
assignment, and outgroup trust. Furthermore, the association between costs of 
granting forgiveness and outgroup trust was similar across the societies. In 
contrast, the relationships between costs of granting forgiveness and collective 
guilt assignment (not existent in Taiwan and China), anger and intergroup 
forgiveness (very strong in France r = -.57, p < .001) differed between the 
societies.  
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While the overall correlational analyses confirmed predictions about the 
general associations between these variables, the MDS space showed an 
interpretable depiction of their relationships. The χ2 test showed that some of these 
associations differ significantly in their strength across the societies. The question 
is how the differences across societies can be explained. To resolve this question, 
I aim to employ a cross-level analysis as outlined in Study 3b to investigate the 
impact of contextual variables on the patterns revealed.  
Identity 
Overall, identification with one‘s national group partially mediated the 
relationship between historical closure and forgiveness (Sobel z-value = 4.42, p < 
.001); and between costs of granting forgiveness and forgiveness (Sobel z-value = 
-3.94, p < .001). I also tested the mediation within each society and found that 
Poland drives the overall mediation for identity between historical closure (Sobel 
z-value = -1.90, p = .06), costs of forgiveness (Sobel z-value = 1.99, p < .05) and 
intergroup forgiveness. In all other societies, identity was not a significant 
mediator. In the context of post WW II relations in this study, national identity 
does not contribute significantly to a better understanding of intergroup 
forgiveness process. H4 was only partially confirmed. 
Summary and Conclusion 
A remarkable amount of between society differences were found on 
intergroup forgiveness and almost all other concepts assessed in this study. The 
differences found can be explained by the societal context. The low intergroup 
forgiveness score for the Chinese participants and the high intergroup forgiveness 
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score for the French participants indicate that the social representation of the past 
influences how forgiveness varies.  
The new variables historical closure and perceived costs of granting 
forgiveness have meaningful associations with established psychological variables 
and provide convergent validity for these concepts overall. However, the strength 
of association differs between societies. The MDS shows that historical closure in 
particular can have a bridging function between emotions very close to intergroup 
forgiveness, and cognitions that are more distal from intergroup forgiveness.  
When tested as a mediator, identity did not significantly explain variance in 
intergroup forgiveness. Several reasons may account for this finding. Identity as 
assessed in this study might have measured a qualitatively different construct in 
each society and therefore was associated with different outcomes of the 
identification process. The aim of the next section is to explain why there were 
differences across the six societies by employing (a) multiple hierarchical 
regressions and (b) cross-level operator analysis (CLOP). 
Study 3b: Intergroup forgiveness and the historical context: Multiple 
hierarchical regressions and cross-level operator analysis (CLOP) 
The central aims of this study were two-fold. First, I investigated both 
contexts separately with hierarchical multiple regressions in order to examine 
differences and similarities across these two contexts. The new variables 
―historical closure‖ and ―costs of granting forgiveness‖ were tested for their 
contribution to explain variance on intergroup forgiveness above and beyond 
established predictors across the two contexts. 
The second aim was to explore the contribution of societal context 
variables related to the historical background to explain variations at the 
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individual level on intergroup forgiveness, using a cross-level operator analysis 
(CLOP; James & Williams, 2000). Ideally, hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) 
would be best to address this research objective, as this is a multi-level problem. 
HLM is a relatively new statistical technique that partitions the variance into 
within (individual level data – level 1) and between units (context/society level 
data – level 2) to explain variations at level 1. However, HLM has some 
requirements that need to be met in order to perform it: HLM requires at least 30 
individuals (level 1) nested within at least 20 (if possible 30) units at level 2 (for 
example the need of individual-level data from 20 societies to gain 20 data points 
at level 2) (see Bassiri, 1988). Hence, HLM is not appropriate for this data. 
Fischer (2008) employed an alternative and older statistical technique that 
is the ―cross-level operator analysis‖ which is a version of regression analysis 
(CLOP; James & Williams, 2000). They argued that CLOP is conceptually the 
same as hierarchical lineal modeling (HLM) and can be conducted if the number 
of level 2 units are too limited and therefore prevent the application of HLM 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The only difference between a usual regression 
procedure and CLOP is that each member of a given society is assigned the same 
contextual-level score (equivalent to level 2 in HLM) for the concepts of interest 
(e.g. number of apologies). However, there are some disadvantages using this 
approach and the results need to be treated with caution. In CLOP the confidence 
interval is very small due to the low degrees of freedom, which restricts the 
number of predictors that can be investigated at the same time. The small 
confidence interval can lead to an increase in Type-I error. CLOP is, nevertheless, 
a useful tool to explore the meaningfulness of context-level predictors, when 
HLM cannot be used. 
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Therefore, a CLOP was applied to take societal context into account and to 
explore how it influences the intergroup forgiveness process. After establishing 
propositions about the relationships between the concepts of interest and 
identifying differences between the 6 societies (ANOVA revealed 16% of 
between society differences on intergroup forgiveness in Study 3a), the next step 
was to find explanations for these differences. Previous research has been 
conducted at one level, primarily the individual level. However, contextual 
variables may have a crucial influence on the differences at the individual level.  
The ‗context‘ of interest in this study was the historical background of the 
society within which participants were nested. Context reflecting the historical 
background of a society can be represented by objective variables like the number 
of official apologies issued from 1990, the salience of WW II in collective 
remembering (see Páez et al., 2008) and evaluation ratings of WW II.  
In the current study, the number of issued apologies during the last 20 
years was used as an objective society-level indicator for the level of unresolved 
issues due to WW II. That is, the more apologies that were needed to address past 
harm done during the last two decades, the less likely forgiveness will be 
reported. Arguably, resolutions and compensations for harm done during WW II 
were more successful in the European context than in the East Asian context 
(Hein & Selden, 2000; Oliner, 2008). Therefore, it could be speculated that the 
more official apologies were issued, the less likely it seems that disputes over the 
past harm done have been resolved and the less likely forgiveness will be 
reported. Additionally, it can be assumed that the less WW II is recalled in a 
society, the more likely its citizens will be willing to forgive, since there probably 
was a departure from the past. Finally, the evaluation ratings of WW II may affect 
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the level of forgiveness. It could be assumed that perceptions that WW II is 
negative will be associated with more willingness to forgive. These assumptions 
are treated as guiding research questions. 
Method 
Participants 
The same sample was the same as reported in Study 3a  
Instruments 




Number of apologies. The number of apologies from 1990 until 2003 was 
used for the analysis. Dodds (2003) compiled a comprehensive chronological list 
of political apologies. Only apologies were counted that were addressed to 
societies in this study. In the last 20 years, Japan issued 29 apologies addressed to 
either China or all East Asian nations that suffered during Japan‘s war of 
aggression. During the same period, Germany issued one apology addressed to 
Poland. The absolute numbers of apologies were used. 
Recall of WW II. The salience of WW II was determined by using the 
percentage participants from each sampled country who free recalled WW II when 
asked to list the most important events in world history, taken from a study 
conducted based on sample of 3,322 university students across 22 societies (Páez 
et al, 2008). The percentages were standardised to z-scores.  
                                                 
11
 A preliminary analysis at the country level revealed significant correlations between the 
contextual variables and intergroup forgiveness. Intergroup forgiveness was negatively linked to 
the number of apologies (r = -.29, p < .001), negatively associated with evaluation ratings of WW 
II (r = -.14, p < .001) and the recall of WW II (r = -.09, p < .01).  
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Evaluation ratings of WW II. The evaluation ratings of WW II were taken 
from the study conducted by Páez et al. (2008). 
A cross-level operator analysis was conducted with these society-level 
context variables in order to evaluate the contribution of these cross-level 
operators in explaining between society variance.   
Analytical Strategy  
Multiple hierarchical regressions  
First, multiple hierarchical regressions were used in order to compare the 
East Asian and European context. Dummy codes were created for each society to 
analyze society-level effects. Two dummy codes were created (1 for the specific 
society, 0 for the other societies) for calculations with the three East Asian and 
three European societies (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).  
I controlled for gender and age effects and entered the demographic 
information first into the regression (Step 1). The second block were the dummy 
codes for the societies, the third block were the established predictors collective 
guilt assignment, anger, national identity, and outgroup trust (Step 2). The 
variables costs of granting forgiveness and historical closure were entered last in 
order to evaluate their unique contribution (Step 3). The variance inflation factor 
(VIF) was below 3, indicating no problems with multicollinearity.  
Cross-level operator analysis (CLOP) 
Second, one objective was to explore the contribution of societal context 
variables to explain differences on intergroup forgiveness using CLOP. In this 
analysis level 1 units are the individuals and the level 2 units are the six societies. 
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The variables representing level 2 are societal context variables (such as number 
of apologies). 
The impact of the society-level context variables was tested using CLOP. In 
this type of hierarchical regression individual demographics (gender: 1 = female, 
age) were entered first (Step 1, level 1) as control variables. At Step 2 (level 1) 
established intergroup-level predictors (collective guilt assignment, anger, trust) 
were entered, and the new variables (historical closure, and costs of forgiveness). 
In Step 3 (level 2) predictors representing the historical context were entered.  
Results 
Multiple Hierarchical Regressions 
Multiple hierarchical regressions tested the contribution of the new 
variables to explain variance in intergroup forgiveness separately for the East 
Asian (see Table 5.5) and European context (see Table 5.6). The separate 
regressions were conducted in order to investigate differences between the two 
contexts. 
East Asian context  
Please see Table 5.5 for detailed overview of the regression. The first model 
revealed neither gender nor age effects in the East Asian context. Gender effects 
appeared in the second step when society-level effects were controlled for, but this 
could be a suppressor effect since the zero-order correlation between gender and 
forgiveness was non-significant (r = -.02, n.s.). The same effect may have driven 
the age differences that emerged in the third step. Nevertheless, I examined the 
differences on intergroup forgiveness in gender through simple independent 
samples t-tests. This analysis only revealed significant differences between male 
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and female participants in China (t(198) = 2.88, p < .01) and marginally 
significant differences in the Philippines (t(198) = 1.71, p = .09). No age 
differences were found. Interestingly, in China and the Philippines male 
participants were more forgiving than female participants, which is an unusual 
finding. This difference can be potentially explained by the disputes over the 
comfort women issues in which mostly women from China and the Philippines 
were affected.  
All dummy codes in Step 2 were significant, indicating that there were 
differences between the Philippines, Taiwan and China on intergroup forgiveness 
(ΔR2 = .11, p < .001). The society-level effects remained stable and mostly 
significant even after all variables were entered, meaning that there were context 
effects for these societies even after controlling for all psychological predictors. 
The established predictors were significant contributors to the explanation of 
variance in intergroup forgiveness in Step 3, except for national identity. In Step 4 
when the new concepts were entered the ß-weights for the established predictors 
decreased, but were still significant. Historical closure was a positive predictor 
and costs for granting forgiveness a negative predictor of intergroup forgiveness. 
Historical closure and costs of forgiveness explained additional 9% of the 
variance in intergroup forgiveness (ΔR2 = .09), which is a significant increase in 
explained variance (Fchange (2, 610) = 45.25, p < .001).  
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Table 5.5  
Multiple Hierarchical Regression, East Asian context (N=624, Study 3b) 












2. society (dummy codes) 
Philippines vs. rest 










3. collective guilt assignment 
 anger 
 national identity 
 outgroup trust 








4. historical closure 
costs of forgiveness 
   .30*** 
-.20*** 
Note. R² = .00 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .00 (p = .90), Adjusted R² = .11 for Step 2, ΔR2 = .11 (p < .001),  
Adjusted R² = .33 for Step 3, ΔR2 = .22 (p < .001); Adjusted R² = .42 for Step 4, ΔR2 = .09 (p < 
.001); ‡ p = .07; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
European context  
In the European context (see Table 5.6), I found significant gender and age 
effects in the first step. In contrast to the East Asian context, older participants 
were more willing to forgive than younger participants, and female participants 
were more willing to forgive than male participants. These findings are consistent 
with previous research in this area (e.g. Hewstone et al, 2004). However, these 
effects disappeared in the second step when society-level effects were controlled 
for.  
All dummy codes in Step 2 were significant, indicating society-level 
effects on intergroup forgiveness (ΔR2 = .06, p < .001). The society-level effects 
disappeared after the last step, indicating that the variability between the societies 
in the European context could be explained by the psychological variables 
entered. This contrasts with the findings in the East Asian context. The last step 
which tested the unique contribution of the new variables of historical closure and 
the costs for granting forgiveness explained variance in intergroup forgiveness 
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was significant (Fchange (2, 559) = 52.11, p < .001), explaining 10% of the variance 
in intergroup forgiveness (ΔR2 = .10). 
Table 5.6  
Multiple Hierarchical Regression, European context (N=573, Study 3b) 













2. society (dummy codes) 
Russia vs. rest 










3. collective guilt assignment 
 anger 
 national identity 
 outgroup trust 








4. historical closure 
costs of forgiveness 
   .13*** 
-.33*** 
Note. R² = .02 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .02 (p < .001), Adjusted R² = .06 for Step 2, ΔR2 = .04 (p < .001),  
Adjusted R² = .37 for Step 3, ΔR2 = .31 (p < .001); Adjusted R² = .47 for Step 4, ΔR2 = .10 (p < .001); 
‡ p = .06; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
The next section will discuss the differences between the two contexts and the 
sampled societies identified in the cross level operator analysis (CLOP).  
Cross level operator analysis (CLOP) 
The number of apologies, evaluations of WW II and salience of WW II 
represented the ‗historical context‘ in this analysis. Overall, the results indicated 
that the numbers of apologies issued during the last 20 years was the only 
significant contributor that explained significant variance in intergroup 
forgiveness (see Table 5.7). Forgiveness was more frequently reported in societies 
in which there were fewer apologies issued during the last two decades. The 
salience of WW II and the evaluations of WW II remained non-significant.  
The number of apologies as a contextual variable alone explained 0.5% of 
the variance in intergroup forgiveness. This seems low; however, this amount of 
explained variance was significant (Fchange (3, 1180) = 3.46, p < .05), and still 
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noteworthy. A reason that it seems so low is that there was no variance partition 
within and between units with CLOP, as both levels (individual and unit-level), 
explained variance at the individual level (Fischer, 2008; Klein, Bliese, 
Kozlowski, Dansereau, Gavin, Griffin, et al., 2000).  
Consequently, CLOP reveals between-units effects that look smaller than 
they would with HLM, since higher-level variables explain the total variance in 
the dependent variable and not only between-unit variance, as it would be the case 
in HLM (Fischer, 2008). It is also important to regard the unique contribution of 
the contextual variable in view of the variation between the societies that needed 
explanation (ANOVA in Study 3a revealed 16% of between society variation). 
The context-level variable number of apologies did explain significant variance. 
However, a large amount of this variance can be explained by the intergroup 
variables (ΔR2 = .45, p < .001). This partially explains why the European context 
between-society effects disappeared after the established psychological predictors 
were entered into the hierarchical regression equation.  
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Table 5.7  
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis of variables predicting intergroup 























Step 2: social-psychological variables  
collective guilt assignment 
anger 
outgroup trust  
historical closure 


















Step 3: Historical Context  
apologies  
WW II Evaluation 











Note. ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
Discussion 
The aim of the study was to investigate intergroup forgiveness and its 
psychological antecedents in the social contexts of post-WW II Europe and East 
Asia. The results revealed significant variations between the six societies on 
intergroup forgiveness. French participants were significantly more willing to 
forgive Germans for their war crimes during WW II than Chinese participants 
were willing to forgive Japanese for their war crimes. Russian and Polish 
participants differed significantly in their willingness to forgive with Russian 
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participants being less willing to forgive than Polish participants. The Filipino and 
Taiwanese participants did not differ, but were more willing to forgive than 
Chinese participants were. Russian, Polish, Filipino, and Taiwanese participants 
were in between France and China. Similar results apply for the differences found 
on collective guilt assignment, anger, outgroup trust and historical closure. These 
findings underlined Germany‘s success in making reparations and restoring 
relations after WW II, thus making it the more resolved context in terms of 
dealing with the past compared to East Asia. In East Asia and especially in China 
there are still historical tensions due to perceived lack of acknowledgment of past 
misdeeds on the part of Japan (Liu & Atsumi, 2008), making Chinese participants 
significantly less forgiving.  
This study contributes to the literature on intergroup forgiveness by 
providing empirical evidence from six formerly victimized nations that the 
forgiveness process is affected by shared representations of past (Hilton & Liu, 
2008; Liu & Hilton, 2005). The post WW II context provides an interpretative 
frame for situations in which individuals from formerly conflicting nations 
interact, exchange and relate to one another. The social context in which these 
interactions happen shape the content of how WW II is remembered and 
interpreted (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Páez & Liu, in press). This ‗content‘ is reflected 
in the measures of historical closure (attitudes towards the past), which triggered 
collective memory of victimization in WW II by Germany and Japan, 
respectively, and historical symbols of victimization (Nanjing Massacre in China, 
Comfort Women in the Philippines, the Holocaust in Europe).  
Thus, this study showed that people held different opinions and attitudes 
towards another group when (a) an objective situation is set into the post WW II 
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context, which has implicit meanings; (b) this context is subject to interpretation 
and is associated with specific psychological content tailored to the situation. 
Consequently, Chinese were less forgiving than French. The interpretation of the 
past and its social representation is triggered by the context. This can also be 
consciously induced by political discourse to create ideologies based on the social 
representation of the past that serve to mobilize people (see Sibley et al., 2008), or 
are unconsciously included in decisions about whether or not to trust people from 
the perpetrator group (Takahashi et al., 2008; Liu et al., under review).  
The MDS gave insight into how intergroup forgiveness may function with 
other constructs. Consistent with the literature, emotional laden constructs such as 
guilt and anger were positioned close to intergroup forgiveness followed by 
historical closure and trust. (see Tam et al., 2007). National identity and the 
perceived costs of granting forgiveness were most distant from intergroup 
forgiveness. Intergroup forgiveness has specific psychological antecedents. 
However, the empirical data showed that the social context of the historical 
tensions exacerbated by more unresolved issues in the Chinese context crucially 
affected the forgiveness process.  
In sum, the importance of context was illustrated by the significant 
differences in intergroup forgiveness, collective guilt assignment, outgroup trust, 
anger and historical closure between the six societies. Additionally, the CLOP 
analysis showed that the number of apologies during the last two decades was a 
negative predictor for intergroup forgiveness. Staub and Bar-Tal (2003) noted that 
shared understanding of the past helps to open a dialogue, which is part of the 
definition of contextualized intergroup forgiveness. The requirement for repeated 
apologies about unresolved issues due to WW II in the East Asian context may 
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indicate that there is minimal shared understanding between the affected nations – 
especially when considering the low historical closure scores generated in this 
context compared to the European context. Future research could investigate 
whether this is the case, and the role that shared understanding plays in historical 
closure and intergroup forgiveness in this context and in Europe.   
These findings indicate that context is more than just a description. It can 
contribute to the understanding of what can influence the process of forgiveness in 
the aftermath of historical atrocities, such as in WW II. Two new concepts were 
introduced: historical closure and perceived costs of granting forgiveness. Study 
3a demonstrated the predictive power of both new variables. Furthermore, through 
examining the relationships between established concepts and intergroup 
forgiveness, there was an indication of convergent validity for these new 
concepts. Moreover, it can be argued that historical closure is not a political 
orientation, because it was unrelated to political orientation
12
 in both contexts 
(rAsian = .03, n.s.; rEuropean = -.003, n.s.). However, historical closure was related to 
national identity in general. Participants who were identifying more with their 
national group, showed less closure with past. Nevertheless, this association was 
not robust and did not hold in each society since it was unrelated in Taiwan and 
France. Thus, it is possible that historical closure is different from historical 
negation (Sibely et al., 2007) as it embodies attitudes about the past being 
confined to the past or having a role in the present without giving implications for 
actions (e.g. a duty to compensate) or guilt, which is the case with historical 
negation. The meditation analysis also revealed that identity did not seem to affect 
                                                 
12
 Political orientation was assessed, but not reported for this study. 
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the forgiveness process in this study, as SIT/SCT would have predicted, 
weakening the overall impact of identity.  
The investigation of the effects of perceived costs of forgiveness yielded 
intriguing findings to contribute to the understanding of intergroup forgiveness. 
This is the first empirical study that took the costs of forgiveness into account 
quantitatively. Most previous research focused predominantly on benefits and the 
costs of not being forgiving. The perception of the costs of forgiveness is 
important in the forgiveness process. It can be an obstacle to engage in a 
forgiveness process because of fear of the risk of injustices being continued, or the 
strategic misuse of political statements by the perpetrator (Rata et al., 2009). The 
formulations of the scale to assess perceived costs of granting forgiveness are 
quite general in their formulations. However, it is fair to argue that the social 
context drives the interpretation of the content provided. Consequently, low 
perceived costs of forgiveness in the East Asian context resulted in lower 
forgiveness than in the European context. It seems not to matter that the 
perceptions of costs are low, because this perception did not alter the lack of 
historical closure. The perceived costs may be low, but the conflict is still there.  
It seems plausible that there are shared understandings and widely accepted 
interpretation of WW II in the European context. Consequently, especially French 
participants showed comparatively high intergroup forgiveness, low guilt 
assignment, low anger, relatively high outgroup trust and relatively high historical 
closure and less perceived costs of forgiveness. Franco-German relationships were 
among the first after WW II to become friendly or at least less unfriendly again 
which is evident in textbook commissions starting in 1951 involving French and 
German historians to gain a shared understanding of the past with the aim to 
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reduce negative stereotypes of the former enemy (Ruchniewiecz, 2005; Viedt, 
1993).  
In contrast, it seems evident that there are different understandings and 
interpretations of the atrocities during WW II in East Asia present. Chinese 
participants showed relatively low historical closure, high guilt assignment, high 
anger, low outgroup trust, and low intergroup forgiveness, which can be 
interpreted that there are group boundaries between China and Japan created due 
to a lack of shared or conflicting representation of the past (Liu & Atsumi, 2008; 
Brewer, 2001; Raudsepp, 2005). The question remains: how can this dilemma be 
resolved? 
A limiting factor is the cross-sectional nature of the study, which does not 
allow drawing causal conclusions. However, the findings are very strong and the 
explained variance by the predictors is reasonably high (adjusted R
2
 = .49). 
Furthermore, the study was short of another independent measure of resolved 
versus unresolved conflict settings. This would be certainly helpful to provide a 
separate set of indicators that could independently represent the context besides 
the inferences about historical representations. 
History is an important symbolic resource and defines the sources of a 
conflict, and the lessons learnt from the past (Liu & Hilton, 2005). The 
investigation also showed that understanding forgiveness is dependent on various 
antecedents and contextual variables. The historical context and its interpretation 
is a part of this complex relationship. The consideration of the social context can 
help to better understand forgiveness between societies. Future research in this 
area is important as it can shed light on historically rooted tensions between 
societies and help to further our understanding about how historical narratives can 
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be challenged in order to promote a shared understanding about history and to 
promote intergroup forgiveness.  
Study 4 will focus on the perpetrator perspective, since an intergroup 
conflict or a conflict in general rooted in the past is only relevant when the 
perpetrating part is existent. The whole intergroup forgiveness process includes 
the perpetrator, as it is argued that forgiveness at this level is a bilateral process 
rather than only residing in one party.  
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Chapter 6 
Study 4: Perpetrator perspectives – German and 
Japanese willingness to make amends 
Introduction and Outline of Study 4 
This study investigates perpetrator perspectives in the context of post WW 
II. Studies looking at the perspectives of perpetrators who do not inhabit the same 
region as the former victims are rare. The majority of research has investigated 
within-nation situations where one group has at some stage been the victim and at 
another stage been the perpetrator (most prominent example: Northern Ireland, see 
also Chapter 2), or where there was a clear past victimized party in an on-going 
conflict (e.g. the right-wing regime of Pinochet versus the left-wing conflicts in 
Chile).  
It is equally important to examine a conflict where there is a clear 
perpetrator from the perpetrators‘ perspective to fully comprehend the forgiveness 
process. As previously elaborated, WW II is a key event in human history (Liu et 
al., 2005). WW II is also long enough in the past so that it ensures a certain 
temporal distance between the atrocities committed during this gruesome war and 
the present. Therefore, it allows for investigating whether time indeed heals all 
wounds and whether we have learnt a lesson from the past.  
I have already given a historical overview of how Germany and Japan 
have dealt with their past in Chapter 1. Germany has dealt with her past 
differently compared to Japan and official outlets or governmental bodies 
communicated this knowledge accordingly (Hein & Selden, 2000; Liu & Atsumi, 
2008; Oliner, 2008). The differences in the public handling of the past are mostly 
due to the different way that WW II ended for Germany and for Japan, and 
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different interpretations of the consequences of WW II. Whereas in Germany WW 
II ended in a ground-zero, in which everything had to be rebuilt under the 
guidance of the allies. Japan ―never experienced any clear break with the pre-war 
regime‖ and leading politicians and the Emperor remained in high political 
positions and in power long after WW II ended (Thelle, 2007, p. 83).  
This research is embedded within the post World War II context. As 
already demonstrated in the victim perspectives discussed in Chapter 5, the 
historical context helps in explaining the way in which specific constructs are 
expressed (high guilt assignment and low forgiveness in China, low guilt 
assignment and high forgiveness in France). For the perpetrator perspective 
similar effects are anticipated with respect to the impact of historical context. 
Therefore, I expect significant differences in the outcome variable willingness to 
make amends. Furthermore, I expect differences in collective guilt and shame 
feelings between Germany and Japan. It is arguable that German participants will 
express less guilt and shame feelings than Japanese participants will, since the 
resolution of the historical past has progressed further in Germany than in Japan 
(Hein & Selden, 2000). Although it is often reported that Japan is in denial or at 
least reluctant to admit any wrong-doing during WW II (Hein & Selden, 2000; 
Oliner, 2008). I would like to point out that this is usually what is publicly 
reported, and may not convey private sentiment.  
As outlined in Chapter 2, Japan is faced with polemical representations of 
her past deeds vis-à-vis her neighbours. What is known outside Japan or what 
people perceive constitutes Japan, does not necessarily represent Japan as a whole 
(Ogawa, 2000). There is substantial international debate about some of the 
textbooks endorsed by the Japanese Ministry of Education, which downplays 
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Japan‘s atrocities during WW II. However, what is usually not reported is that 
there are opinions within Japan arguing against these historical representations in 
form of textbooks (e.g. mostly teachers or grassroots movements, Ogawa, 2000). 
In the era of fast exchange of information via the internet, it is highly likely that 
Japanese people have come across different opinions on the role of Japan as an 
aggressor during WW II. Nozaki (2003) argued that it is evident that an ongoing 
cultural and political struggle due to the textbook controversies and Japan‘s 
dealing with the past in general is present within Japan. This struggle within Japan 
can have consequences for Japanese opinions about compensation, closure with 
past and guilt feelings today.  
As generally reviewed in Chapter 2, collective guilt feelings arise when 
someone senses that what the ingroup did in the past was wrong. These guilt 
feelings especially arise when there is a feeling of controllability over the past 
events. In other words, people will feel guiltier when they think harm done could 
have been prevented and was under the control of the ingroup. On the other hand, 
collective shame focuses on factors that are not controllable, like the 
characteristics of the group being exposed as weak or even disgusting 
(Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Brown et al., 2008). Furthermore, according to 
Páez, Marques, Valencia, and Vincze (2006) collective guilt and shame reflect the 
emotional side of collective responsibility and are related to actual or symbolic 
reparation efforts. 
Representative samples of public opinions in Germany as reported in Páez 
and colleagues (2006) showed that only 32% of Germans surveyed in 1951 
thought that Germany was guilty for the war compared to 62% in 1967. Although 
contradictory, people directly involved in collective harm done as perpetrators or 
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passive bystanders, do not feel either guilty or ashamed (Páez et al., 2006). 
Therefore, since collective guilt and shame feelings are related to collective rather 
than personal actions, it is more likely that new generations which were not 
involved in or not connected to historical crimes experiences these group-based 
emotions (Rensman, 2004, cited in Páez et al., 2006). 
Brown and colleagues (2008) established links between collective guilt 
and shame feeling and the willingness to repair damage in their longitudinal 
study. They demonstrated that collective guilt promotes the willingness to make 
amends longitudinally whereas collective shame only predicted willingness to 
repair cross-sectionally. Thus, since I operate with cross-sectional data collective 
guilt and shame should predict willingness to make amends. Furthermore, there 
should be differences in the willingness to make amends between Japanese and 
German context. Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998) argued that it 
is more likely to show amending cognitive responses than actual behaviour, since 
the past injustices and harm done cannot be changed. Hence, I expect the 
expression of cognitive component of the willingness to make amends to be 
higher than the behavioural one.  
The anthropological literature suggests that Japan is a so-called ―shame‖ 
culture and Germany a ―guilt‖ culture, but this is also contested (Creighton, 
1990). This distinction, which dates back to Benedict (1946), has been particularly 
applied when distinguishing between the way in which Japan and Germany have 
dealt with the past (Páez et al., 2006). Conrad (2003) argued that the conventional 
picture of Japan as being innately unable to critically handle being the aggressive 
party of historical past is a part of Japan‘s national character. Therefore, one could 
expect that Japanese participants experience more shame rather than feelings of 
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guilt, compared to a ―guilt‖ culture, which Germany is claimed to be. However, 
there is some research showing that shame and guilt feelings are equally exposed 
when social norms are violated in collectivistic and individualistic cultural 
contexts (e.g. Bierbrauer, 1992). Nevertheless, this kind of research is scarce, and 
has been conducted at the interpersonal level without considering implications for 
intergroup research.  
SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and SCT (Turner et al., 1987) have been 
applied to make predictions summarized in the reviewed research on intergroup 
forgiveness in Chapter 2. Conclusive results found that the level of identity was 
the driving force behind feeling guilty for past harm done. Based on SIT/SCT, it is 
expected that people who identify more strongly with their nation, and are 
confronted with the challenge of maintaining a positive social identity, would do 
so by distancing themselves from the harm done in the past and expressing less 
collective guilt feelings than people who report low national identification. The 
reverse effect is expected when people identify with a more inclusive identity 
(here being globally conscious) in line with SCT (Turner, 1999).  
Following up the concept of historical closure that I introduced in Chapter 
5, I will test the relationships with established psychological variables (such as 
collective guilt and shame), new concepts (such as historical closure) and the 
willingness to make amends. Historical closure conceptualized as an attitude 
towards the past is expected to be generally low, since the conflict plays a 
substantial part in controversial political debates in both contexts.  
In summary, I will investigate the following guiding research hypotheses. 
There should be mean differences between Germany and Japan on all assessed 
variables and on the outcome variable willingness to make amends (historical 
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context hypothesis, H1). Due to existing theorizing about Japan being a ―shame‖ 
culture and Germany being a ―guilt‖ culture, I would expect Japanese participants 
to report more shame feelings than German participants (H2). Furthermore, I 
expect higher means for the cognitive component of the willingness to make 
amends (H3) than the behavioural component. Collective guilt and shame should 
predict the willingness to make amends.  
Moreover, participants identifying more with their nation should 
experience less guilt and shame feelings, and participants embracing a more 
inclusive identity should feel more guilty and ashamed of the historical past 
(identity hypothesis, H4). Since this is a novel undertaking in comparing these two 
contexts, the nature of this study is explorative, but guided by following 
hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1 – historical context): There should be mean differences between 
Germany and Japan on all assessed variables and on the outcome variable 
willingness to make amends.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Japanese participants should exhibit more shame feelings than 
German participants.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The expression of the cognitive component of the willingness 
to make amends should be higher than the behavioural one. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Participants identifying more with their nation should feel less 
guilt and shame feelings, and participants embracing a more inclusive identity 
should feel more guilty and ashamed of historical misdeeds. 
In general, I aim to answer following research question:  
What do the new concepts of historical closure, benefits of seeking forgiveness, 
face concerns contribute to the prediction of the willingness to make amends?  




An anonymous questionnaire was administered to 266 university students 
(mean age = 22.26, SD = 3.58, female = 50%, 1.1 % did not disclose their gender) 
in Japan (Osaka, N=132) and Germany (Hamburg, N=134) (for an overview of 
sample characteristics see Table 6.1). All questionnaires were administered in the 
native language of each participating country. A bilingual committee approach 
was employed in order to ensure correct translation of the survey (van de Vijver & 
Leung, 1997). The proportion of males was relatively high in Germany because 
the data was collected from a university of the German Federal Armed Forces. 
 
Table 6.1  
Sample description for Japan (N=132) and Germany (N=134) (Study 4) 
Society N 
Gender Age 
M (SD) Female Male 
Japan 132 69.2% 30.8% 21.09 (3.94) 
Germany 134 32.3% 67.7% 23.39 (2.78) 
Total 266 50.6% 49.4% 22.26 (3.58) 
 
Instruments  
Participants completed an anonymous questionnaire assessing self-report 
measures of interest and demographic information (e.g. age, gender). Please see 
Appendices C1 (German version) and C2 (Japanese version with English 
wording) for all items reported in the following section.  
Willingness to make amends. This 5-item scale was constructed for this 
study in order to capture two components of willingness to make amends: a 
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behavioural and cognitive component. The five items were subjected to an EFA 
with principal component analysis (PCA) and oblique rotation in order to 
investigate the data structure for each country separately. The factor analysis 
showed a clear two-factor solution that explained 81% of the variance in Germany 
and 80% of the variance in Japan. Behavioural items loaded on the first factor 
with loading ranging from .77 to .94 in Japan, and from .76 to .90 in Germany and 
did not load on the second factor (cross-loadings < .30 in both countries). The 
cognitive items loaded on the second factor (loadings .86 and .94 in both 
countries) and had cross-loadings below. 30. This indicates distinct two factors, 
which can be interpreted as a behavioural and cognitive component. 
The behavioural facet of the willingness to make amendments consisted of 
3 items: ―I am willing to show my support for former overseas Asian (non-
Japanese) victims of Japan‘s warfare through wearing badges with political 
statements‖, ―I am willing to be actively involved in an institution that runs 
information stalls to support the demand for an official acknowledgement of 
Japan‘s harmful past actions towards other (non-Japanese) Asians‖ and ―I am 
willing to recruit people to sign petitions that supports compensation claims 
addressed to Japan‘s government‖.  The internal consistencies for this scale were 
.86 in Japan and .83 in Germany. A higher value denotes greater willingness to 
make amends.  
The cognitive aspect of the willingness to make amendments comprised of 
2 items: ―It‘s important to support claims of compensation of former overseas 
Asian (non-Japanese) victims of Japan‘s harmful past actions during the 
occupation of Asia and World War II‖ and ―I think that former overseas Asian 
(non-Japanese) victims of Japan‘s harmful past actions deserve some form of 
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compensation from Japan‖. Cronbach‘s alpha was .78 for Japan and .83 for 
Germany respectively. A higher value indicates greater agreement for the support 
of the claims. These two factors are structurally equivalent (for cognitive amends: 
Tucker‘s Phi=.99; for behavioural amends: Tucker‘s Phi=.97) across Japan and 
Germany. 
Historical closure. This scale is the same as used for the victimized 
societies. However, two items were deleted, because they were inconsistent across 
the two countries. The four item-scale had modest reliability (α Japan = .71 and   
α Germany = .57). The historical closure scale assesses the degree to which the 
participants perceive the past as a part of the present and future, as opposed to 
being unconnected to the present/future. Sample items are (Japanese context): 
―Discussions about apologizing and forgiving related to Japan‘s harmful past 
actions towards other Asians are not important any more‖, ―Grievances and 
resentment related to Japan‘s harmful past actions towards other Asians will be 
carried to the next generation‖ (reversed-scored), ―Today there is no need to talk 
so much about the harm committed by Japan in the past,‖ and ―Other Asians‘ 
stories of surviving Japan‘s harmful past actions make me feel like the wounds are 
still open today‖. A higher value means greater closure with the past.  
Face concerns. Face is an important concept in Asian cultures and may 
influence the way people from different cultures negotiate (see for example Ting-
Toomey, 2005). The concept of concern with losing face was measured with four 
items that were created for this study. The items were ―If Japan‘s government 
acknowledges the harm done during the occupation of Asia and World War II, 
Japanese people will lose face‖, ―If Japan‘s government acknowledges the harm 
done during the occupation of Asia and World War II, the extent of face loss for 
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Japanese people will be irreparable‖, ―It is understandable that Japanese people 
would be concerned about a loss of face, if official apologies to another country 
for Japan‘s war of aggression are issued‖, and ―If the Japanese prime minister 
seeks forgiveness from other Asian countries, he risks a loss of face for the whole 
nation‖. The internal consistency of the scale was adequate, with .65 for Japan and 
.82 for Germany. A higher value indicates higher face concerns due to the 
government‘s handling of the past.  
Perceived benefits of seeking forgiveness. This three-item scale was 
constructed for this study and assessed general benefits of seeking forgiveness. A 
sample item is ―Seeking forgiveness may be the first step towards social harmony 
between groups.‖ Internal consistencies were .70 for Japan and .66 for Germany. 
A higher value denotes the higher the perceptions of benefits.  
Outgroup trust. The same instruments were devised as used in Study 3. 
However, the formulations of the items differed slightly from the items used in 
Study 3. Outgroup trust was assessed with following items: ―Do you think most 
other Asians would try to be fair?‖, ―Would you say that most of the time other 
Asians try to be helpful?‖, and ―Generally speaking, would you say that most 
other Asians can be trusted?‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was good (α Japan = .72 and  
α Germany = .81). A higher value indicates more trust.  
Empathy. Empathy was assessed with these items: ―I try to imagine what other 
Asians have gone through during World War II‖, ―I sometimes think about how 
other Asians might have felt during World War II‖, ―I am trying to look at things 
that happened during World War II from the perspective of other Asians‖, and 
―Usually, I am able to understand the other Asians‘ point of view regarding World 
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War II‖. The internal consistencies for this scale were .88 in Japan and .86 in 
Germany. A higher value denotes higher empathy. 
For the outgroup trust and empathy scale an open-ended question was added 
asking for a specific Asian nation they had in mind while answering. The same 
applied for the German context only adjusted to suit the German setting.  
Collective guilt. Collective guilt was measured with a scale adapted from 
Branscombe and Doosje (2004). The five items measured the degree to which the 
participants felt guilty on behalf of Japan or Germany for the war crimes they 
have committed. A sample item is ―I can easily feel guilty for the bad outcomes 
brought about by Japanese people in the past.‖ Cronbach‘s alphas were .86 in 
Japan and .81 in Germany. A higher value denotes greater feelings of guilt. 
Collective shame. Four items to measure the degree feeling ashamed for the 
misdeeds of Japan and Germany respectively were created: ―I feel ashamed 
because Japan committed so many misdeeds against other Asian nations in the 
past‖,  ―I feel ashamed about what our (great) grandparents did during the 
occupation of Asia, the Sino-Japanese War and World War II‖, ―I feel ashamed 
when foreigners mention the Nanjing massacre and the Comfort Women Issue‖, 
and ―Public discussions about past misdeeds make me feel ashamed of my 
ancestors‘ past actions‖. Internal consistencies were good (α Japan = .86 and  
α Germany = .85). 
Global Consciousness. This 6-item scale was constructed for this study 
and assessed the degree of seeing oneself of a part of a global community as 
opposed to being a part of a specific national group. The items were as follows: 
―I think of myself as a citizen of the world rather than of one particular country‖, 
―Citizens of each country should look after themselves instead of worrying about 
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people from other parts of the world‖ (reverse-scored), ―I think of myself as a 
loyal citizen of my own country rather than as a citizen of the world‖ (reverse-
scored), ―People from each country should mind their own business‖ (reverse-
scored), ―I identify with the human race more than any particular nationality‖, 
and ―Being a good citizen of the world is an important part of how I see myself‖. 
The internal consistencies were moderate for Germany with a Cronbach‘s alpha 
of .51, and good for Japan with a Cronbach‘s alpha of .83. A higher value 
denotes higher global consciousness.  
Identification with one‟s national group. This is the same instrument used in 
Study 3. Cronbach‘s alpha was good (α Japan = .84 and α Germany = .87). 
Results  
Descriptive statistics and reliabilities  
Table 6.2 shows the descriptive statistics, reliabilities and internal consistencies as 
well as t-values indicating significant differences on the assessed constructs. 
 
Table 6.2 
Means, Standard Deviation, Cronbach‟s alpha, t-values (Study 4) 
Society Germany Japan 
t 
Scale M (SD) α M (SD) α 
Amendments (cognitive) 4.72 (1.49) .83 4.68 (1.37) .78 -.14 
Amendments (behaviour) 2.14 (1.17) .83 2.97 (1.54) .86 4.95*** 
Historical Closure  3.43 (1.10) .57 2.96 (1.13) .71 -3.49*** 
Benefits of seeking forgiveness 5.43 (1.11) .66 4.82 (1.17) .70 -4.28*** 
Guilt 3.20 (1.19) .81 4.28 (1.19) .86 7.39*** 
Shame 2.81 (1.41) .85 3.65 (1.40) .86 4.84*** 
Face Concerns 2.73 (1.03) .82 3.15 (.94) .65 3.41*** 
Outgroup Trust 4.52 (1.12) .81 3.12 (1.02) .72 -10.50*** 
Empathy 4.74 (1.23) .86 3.71 (1.29) .88 -6.66*** 
Global Consciousness 4.26 (1.16) .51 4.58 (.79) .83 2.65** 
National Identity 4.75 (.86) .87 4.48 (.94) .84 -2.46** 
Note. ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Distributional normality 
There were no serious deviations from normality since the skew values 
were below 1.0 and the kurtosis values were below 2.0 for each scale in Germany 
and Japan (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). 
Structural equivalence  
I employed procrustean target rotation to test the structural equivalence of 
the newly devised scale ―willingness to make amends‖. This analysis provides an 
estimate of the overall similarity after accounting for arbitrary sample-specific 
rotations (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). I conducted PCA with oblique rotation 
for each society separately to obtain the factor structure for each society. The 
factor loadings were then rotated via procrustean target rotation to make the factor 
structures maximally similar. I used the German factor solution as the norm and 
the factor structure of the Japanese data as the one that was rotated, for it is 
recommended if only two groups are involved (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997).   
The values for the factorial agreement (Tucker‘s Phi) were excellent. I 
received for the first factor (cognitive components of the willingness to make 
amends) a Tucker‘s Phi of .99 and for the second factor (behavioural components 
of the willingness to make amends) a Tucker‘s Phi of .97. Due to the high values 
of Tucker‘s Phi it is valid to assume that the content of the subscales had the same 
meaning for the samples from Germany and Japan.  
I used multi-group CFA
13
 (see also Chapter 5) to test the structural 
equivalence for historical closure. The proposed one-factor structure fit well with 
the data (χ2 = 4.7; χ2/df = 2.33, RMSEA = .70; CFI = .99). Therefore, the two 
                                                 
13
 The confirmatory approach was chosen, because the alternative – exploratory factor analysis and 
subsequent procrustean target rotation – is not applicable for one-factorial constructs.  
 
  158 
newly devised scales have similar underlying meaning across Germany and Japan 
and a comparison is justified.  
Description of differences between Germany and Japan  
Except for the outcome variable willingness to make amendments 
(cognitive component), there were significant differences on almost every scale 
(see Table 6.2), confirming hypothesis 1. In the following section, I will describe 
the differences between Japan and Germany on the observed scales.  
 
Collective guilt, shame and face concerns 
Overall, independent t-tests revealed significant differences between Japan 
and Germany regarding the expression of guilt (t(263) = 7.39, p < .001) and 
shame (t(263) = 4.84, p < .001). Japanese participants expressed significantly 
more collective guilt (M = 4.28, SD = 1.19) and shame (M = 3.64, SD = 1.40) than 
German participants (Mguilt = 3.20, SD = 1.19; Mshame= 2.81, SD = 1.41) for what 
their ancestors had done during WW II. This result does not confirm hypothesis 2. 
Furthermore, face concerns were quite low overall, but Japanese participants had 
significantly more face concerns than German participants had (see Table 6.2).  
 
Historical closure 
Perceiving the past as belonging to the past and not a source of 
interference with current interrelations was generally low (below the midpoint). 
However, German participants reported significantly more closure with the past 
than Japanese participants did. This can be interpreted in light of the current 
relations with former victimized nations for Germany and the burden of WW II as 
a vivid part of German identity (Hein & Selden, 2000). Japan‘s reluctance to 
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come to terms with her past and the ingrained victimhood in Japanese identity due 
to the atomic bombings may have contributed to the same low level of closure 
with the past. Low closure with the past should be associated with collective guilt 
and shame feelings.  
 
Perceived benefits of seeking forgiveness 
If benefits of seeking forgiveness are perceived as high, then this could 
potentially lead to a higher willingness to make amendments. German participants 
perceived significantly more benefits of seeking forgiveness than Japanese 
participants.  
 
Trust and empathy 
Trust in other Europeans was significantly higher among Germans 
compared to Japanese participants and their trust in other Asians. The same was 
the case for empathy or perspective taking: Germans were significantly more 
empathic towards other Europeans‘ feelings during WW II compared to Japanese 
participants and their expression of empathy towards other Asians during WW II. 
One open-ended question for each scale asked about which European nation or 
Asian nation respectively the participants thought of while answering.  
When answering the trust questions Japanese participants thought the most 
of China (57.6%), followed by the Korea (37.1%), then the Philippines (10.6%), 
Taiwan (5.3%) and other Asian nations (18.9%). German participants mentioned 
first France (41%), then Poland (35.8%), United Kingdom (27.6%), followed by 
Russia (11.9%). Other nations were mentioned second most (38.8%) and other 
groups (Jews) were mentioned least (0.7%) by German participants.  
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The open-ended questions followed by the empathy scale were filled in as 
follows. Japanese participants mentioned China (52.3%) the most, then Korea 
(34.1%), followed by the Philippines (7.6%) and Taiwan (5.3%). Other Asian 
nations were mentioned to a proportion of 18.2% by Japanese participants. 
German participants thought of France the most (45.5%), followed by Poland 
(39.6%) and United Kingdom (27.6%). Then other nations were mentioned 
(27.6%) followed by Russia (15%) and other groups (3%). The percentages do not 
add up to a 100% since multiple answers were possible. 
What is notable about the findings on trust, empathy and the corresponding 
open-ended answers is that overall Japanese participants reported a low sense of 
trust. Overall, German participants expressed significantly higher trust than 
Japanese did and most of the German participants mentioned France in the open-
ended question. The same can be observed for empathy. Therefore, one could 
conclude that the trust and empathy ratings were lower in Japan, because the 
participants thought of China of which it is known that the relationships are tense 
due to the historical context of WW II. Consequently, Japanese participants were 
overly pessimistic, since they were thinking China rather than Taiwan or the 
Philippines. 
It is generally accepted that Germany showed remorse for the harm done 
in the past and that Germany‘s relationship with the Allied nations first improved 
with France. France was mentioned the most among this German sample of 
university students in relation to outgroup trust and empathy.  Therefore, German 
participants appeared overly optimistic, since they were thinking of France rather 
than Poland or Russia. 
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Willingness to make amendments 
 As already reported, there were no differences between Germany and 
Japan on the cognitive component of the willingness to make amends (t(262) = -
.14, p = .89), but there were significant differences regarding the behavioural 
component (t(262) = 4.95, p < .001). Japanese participants were more willing to 
make behavioural amends (M = 2.97, SD = 1.54) than Germans expressed (M = 
2.14, SD = 1.17). The cognitive component of the willingness to make amends 
was above the neutral 4 point (M Germany = 4.68, SD = 1.37; M Japan = 4.70, SD = 
1.49) and the behavioural component of the willingness to make amends was 
below the neutral point. In general, the expression of the behavioural component 
was seemingly lower than the cognitive component among both samples 
confirming hypothesis 3.     
 
Identity  
Surprisingly, Germans in this study expressed relatively high levels of 
national identity, which was significantly higher than that of Japanese 
participants. In general, the levels of national identity were quite high among both 
Germans and Japanese participants compared to previous findings (Atsumi, Suwa, 
Kobayahi, Miyamoto, & Seki, in press; Hilton & Liu, 2008). The correlation 
between national identity and assessed other constructs revealed different patterns 
for Japan and Germany. Among the Japanese sample national identification was 
positively associated with collective shame, behavioural components and 
cognitive components of the willingness to make amends whereas among the 
German sample national identification was not associated with either guilt or 
shame feelings, but negatively with behavioural components and cognitive 
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components of the willingness to make amends and positively with historical 
closure (see Table 6.3).  
The finding regarding the willingness to make amends is surprising since it 
is argued in literature that individuals identifying strongly with their nation have a 
strong motivation to maintain a positive social identity (Turner, 1999). This 
motivation leads to a tendency to distance oneself from harm done in the past, 
leading to a reluctance to make amends (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Therefore, 
a quite intriguing finding is this reversed effect in the Japanese sample. The 
results delivered some qualified support for hypothesis 4 in the German sample 
and poor support for the Japanese sample regarding the national identification part 
of the hypothesis. 
 
Global consciousness 
Global consciousness was higher among Japanese participants than among 
German participants. In each sample global consciousness was seemingly lower 
than national identity. The correlations showed similar patterns. Global 
consciousness was positively associated with behavioural components and 
cognitive components of the willingness to make amends, collective guilt, and 
collective shame (not significant in Germany), outgroup trust, empathy and 
negatively with historical closure and face concerns (see Table 6.3). This confirms 
the second part of hypothesis 4. There is a general pattern. Participants who were 
globally more conscious experienced more collective guilt and shame compared 
to those with low global consciousness.   
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Interrelationships between concepts 
 To answer the research question, I first investigated the relationships and 
then the contribution of the concepts to predict the willingness to make amends. 
I explored the interrelationships between assessed concepts and the outcome 
variables willingness to make amends (behavioural and cognitive component), 
and concepts introduced in Chapter 5 (historical closure) and newly devised 
concepts (face concerns, global consciousness and benefits of seeking 
forgiveness). For this purpose, I conducted Pearsons-Product-Moment 
correlations for each sample separately (see Table 6.3). I found similar 
correlational patterns across the two samples, but also some striking differences 
that deserve more attention. 
 
Japan versus Germany  
In Japan, the cognitive component of the willingness to make amends was 
significantly positively associated with benefits of seeking forgiveness, collective 
guilt, collective shame, outgroup trust, empathy, global consciousness and 
national identity and significantly negatively related to historical closure and face 
concerns. In Germany, the associations between willingness to make amends and 
the other concepts were similar, except for national identity, which was negatively 
related to the cognitive component of making amends. Regarding the behavioural 
component of willingness to make amends, there were significant positive 
correlations with benefits of seeking forgiveness, collective guilt, collective 
shame, outgroup trust, empathy, face concerns, global consciousness and face 
concerns, whereas there was a significant positive association with historical 
closure in Japan. I found the same difference in Germany with the cognitive 
  164 
component, whilst national identity was negatively related to the behavioural 
component.  
Historical closure was significantly negatively related to the benefits of 
seeking forgiveness, collective guilt, collective shame, outgroup trust, empathy 
and global consciousness and significant positively related to face concern in the 
Japanese sample. In Germany, the pattern was similar, but additionally national 
identity was positively related to historical closure.  
 Face concerns, an Asian concept, assessed as the fear of losing face caused 
by the responsiveness of the government due to the harm done during WW II by 
Japan was negatively associated with outgroup trust, empathy, collective guilt and 
shame, benefits of seeking forgiveness and global consciousness and positively 
with national identification and historical closure in Japan. In Germany, negative 
correlations were only found for trust, empathy, benefits of seeking forgiveness 
and global consciousness and a positive association with historical closure.  
 In Japan, the perception of the benefits of seeking forgiveness was 
significantly negatively associated with face concerns. Positive associations were 
found between the benefits of seeking forgiveness and guilt, shame, trust and 
empathy. In Germany, the group-based emotions guilt and shame did not correlate 
with the benefits of seeking forgiveness, but trust and empathy as well as global 
consciousness were significantly positively related to this perceived benefit.  
 The identification with a more inclusive level of identity, namely being 
globally conscious, was significantly positively associated with guilt, shame, trust 
and empathy in Japan. Significant negative relationships were found with 
historical closure and face concerns. In Germany, national identity was negatively 
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related to global consciousness. The other correlations were quite similar except 
for shame which had no significant relationship with these variables. 
Similarity of correlation coefficients 
In the following analysis, a z-test of r-to-z transformed correlation 
coefficients examined the similarity of correlation coefficients between Japan and 
Germany. The focus was on the role of identification and the role of historical 
closure, testing the similarity will reveal whether correlations are truly different 
and not due to fluctuation.  
There were significant differences between Japan and Germany for 
following associations: national identity and collective guilt (z = 2.45, p < .01), 
collective shame (z = 1.84, p < .05), the cognitive component of the willingness to 
make amends (z = 4.48, p < .001), the behavioural component (z = 5.97, p < .001), 
historical closure (z = - 3.33, p < .001), and global consciousness (z = 3.20, p < 
.001). There was no significant difference between Japan and Germany for the 
association between national identity and face concerns (z = 1.33, p = .09). 
There was only one significant difference between Japan and Germany for the 
association between historical closure and collective guilt (z = - 2.81, p < .01). All 
other correlation coefficients for historical closure were similar between Japan 
and Germany pointing to a meaningful general pattern of associations.  
 In sum, the most intriguing differences in the correlational pattern across 
these two contexts were the role of national identity and of group-based emotions 
(guilt and shame). These seem to have different functions across the two contexts 
that may be due to the different historical context. The correlation between 
collective guilt and shame were significantly positive, which is in line with 
previous research in both contexts.      
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Table 6.3  
Intercorrelation Matrix for all scales in Japan (N=132) and Germany (N=134) (Study 4)
14
 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Amendments (cognitive) - .39*** -.46*** .29*** .36*** .31*** -.38*** .31*** .46*** .49*** -.21** 
2. Amendments (behaviour) .45*** - -.31*** .10 .56*** .54*** .07 .31*** .28*** .31*** -.25** 
3. Historical Closure  -.44*** -.39*** - -.11 -.29*** -.27*** .32*** -.12 -.33*** -.37*** .33*** 
4. Benefits of seeking forgiveness .31*** .21* -.24** - .11 .06 -.25** .30*** .22** .27** -.07 
5. Guilt .51*** .41*** -.57*** .26** - .69*** -.16 .28*** .41*** .25** -.08 
6. Shame .30*** .30*** -.36*** .26** .62*** - -.04 .21** .34*** .13 -.13 
7. Face Concerns -.18* -.004 .33*** -.28** -.25** -.14 - -.24** -.28*** -.35*** .09 
8. Outgroup Trust .39*** .23** -.20* .29*** .38*** .29*** -.17* - .30*** .35*** -.13 
9. Empathy .41*** .42*** -.41*** .24** .56*** .33*** -.15 -.38*** - .37*** -.05 
10. Global Consciousness .28*** .25** -.25** .15 .29*** .23** -.33*** .22** .35*** - -.46*** 
11. National Identity .33** .18* -.07 .03 .22* .11 .25** .10 .16 -.10 - 
Note. German values are above the diagonal; Japanese values below the diagonal. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, two-tailed  
  
                                                 
14
 There might be similar content in some items measuring guilt and the willingness to make amends items. In order to explore potential conceptual overlap, I conducted PCA 
with oblique rotation. I received a three factor structure (cognitive amends, behavioral amends and guilt) explaining 74.6% of the variance. Only one guilt item (―I feel regret 
for Japan‘s past harmful actions towards other Asian nations‖) had cross-loadings with the cognitive amends factor. All other guilt items formed a distinct factor. I re-analyzed 
the data without the cross-loaded guilt item and the results remained the same. 
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Multiple Hierarchical Regression 
 Multiple hierarchical regressions tested the contribution of established (such as 
collective guilt, empathy and newly devised scales (such as historical closure) to explain 
variance in the willingness to make amends (cognitive and behavioural) separately for 
the German and Japanese contexts (see Table 6.4 – Table 6.5). Separate regressions 
were conducted in order to investigate differences between the two contexts and to 
reveal the unique contribution of new concepts added last in the equation. Since there 
were gender and age differences on some scales, I controlled for gender and age effects 
and entered them first in the equation. Established predictors were entered in Step 2. 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was below 3, indicating no problems with 
multicollinearity. 
Cognitive component of the willingness to make amendments 
The first Step revealed gender differences in both contexts, but this effect only 
explained unique variance in the Japanese sample. In this case, female participants were 
more willing to make amends than male participants were. However, the gender effect 
disappeared in Step 2. Therefore, the gender differences were explained by the other 
entered variables. There were differences in predicting willingness to make amends in 
Step 2 between Germany and Japan. Among the German sample only empathy was a 
positive predictor for the willingness to make amends, whereas among the Japanese 
sample collective guilt, outgroup trust and national identity were positive contributors. 
In Step 3, historical closure was a significant negative and global consciousness a 
significant positive predictor for willingness to make amends in the German sample, 
whereas in the Japanese sample only historical closure predicted significant variance in 
cognitive willingness to make amends. Historical closure significantly contributed to 
  168 
explaining variance in the cognitive component of the willingness to make amends in 
both contexts (see Table 6.4).  
Testing for homogeneity of the regression coefficients for cognitive component 
Furthermore, I tested the homogeneity of the regression weights with each 
predictor using MANOVA as suggested by Tabachnik and Fidell (2007). The test of 
homogeneity of regression coefficients has the purpose to test whether the linear 
relationship between two concepts are similar between the samples. This indicates that 
(theoretically) the underlying process is the same in the samples from different 
countries. If the regression coefficients are homogenous, it can be assumed that the 
process is theoretically similar. If they are heterogeneous, then there are different 
processes taking place. This was the case for national identity. This is evident in the 
opposite effect of national identity to predict the willingness to make amends in the 
regression for the Japanese sample. 
 
Table 6.4  
German versus Japanese context willingness to make amends (cognitive component), 
standardized β-weights (Study 4) 





 Germany Japan Germany Japan 
1. gender 

















   shame 
  trust 
  empathy 





















3. face concerns 
   benefits seeking 
   forgiveness 
   historical closure 
   global consciousness 










Note. a. R² = .02 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .04 (p = .09), Adjusted R² = .26 for Step 2, ΔR2 = .26 (p < .001),  
Adjusted R² = .39 for Step 3, ΔR2 = .14 (p < .001); 
b. 
 
R² = .05 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .07 (p < .05), Adjusted R² = .35 for Step 2, ΔR2 = .32 (p < .001),  
Adjusted R² = .42 for Step 3, ΔR2 = .09 (p < .01);  
* p < .05; ** p < .01;*** p < .001 
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Behavioural component of the willingness to make amends 
Here as well, the first Step showed significant gender differences, but only in the 
German sample, and this step did not explain significant variance. Gender effects 
disappeared in Step 2. There were differences in the prediction of willingness to make 
amends in Step 2 between Germany and Japan. Among the German sample group-based 
emotions (guilt and shame) were the only positive predictor for the willingness to make 
amends at the behavioural level, whereas among the Japanese sample empathy was the 
only positive predictor. In Step 3, only face concerns was a significant positive predictor 
for willingness to make amends in the German sample, whereas in the Japanese sample 
face concerns and historical closure predicted significant variance in the willingness to 
make amends at the behavioural level (see Table 6.5). 
Testing for homogeneity of the regression coefficients for behavioural component 
I used the same procedure as aforementioned and the only heterogeneous 
regression coefficient was national identity. All other tested regression weights were 
homogenous. Therefore, the underlying process is different for national identity.  
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Table 6.5 German versus Japanese context predicting willingness to make amends 
(behavioural component), standardized β-weights (Study 4) 





 Germany Japan Germany Japan 
1. gender 



















  trust 
  empathy 





















3. face concerns 
   benefits seeking 
   forgiveness 
   historical closure 
   global consciousness 










Note. a. R² = .05 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .06 (p < .05), Adjusted R² = .40 for Step 2, ΔR2 = .37 (p < .001),  
Adjusted R² = .45 for Step 3, ΔR2 = .06 (p < .01); 
b. 
 
Adjusted R² = .02 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .04 (p = .13), Adjusted R² = .22 for Step 2, ΔR2 = .22 (p < 
.001), 
 
Adjusted R² = .30 for Step 3, ΔR2 = .10 (p < .01); 
* p < .05; ** p < .01;*** p < .001 
 
In summary, differences were found between the Japanese and German samples 
for the prediction of the cognitive and behavioural components of the willingness to 
make amends. Although gender differences emerged initially, these were explained in 
the subsequent steps of the hierarchical regression and the effect disappeared. 
Apparently, Japanese participants reporting high collective guilt feelings, high outgroup 
trust and high national identification were more willing to make amends on the 
cognitive component, whereas German participants who empathized with Germany‘s 
WW II victims more strongly reported more willingness to make amends on this 
component. However, in both contexts those effects weakened or disappeared 
completely (see Japanese sample, Step 3) when historical closure and other new 
variables were entered. For the cognitive component, historical closure seemed to be a 
key predictor along with global consciousness in the German sample. Benefits of 
seeking forgiveness and face concerns however remained insignificant. The last step 
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explained a significant amount of unique variance in both contexts (Germany: ΔR2 = 
.14, Fchange (4, 121) = 7.77, p < .001; Japan: ΔR
2 
= .09, Fchange (4, 108) = 4.35, p < .01).  
 The behavioural component of willingness to make amends at the individual 
level (getting actively involved in showing support) was governed by feelings of 
collective guilt and shame in the German sample, whereas in the Japanese sample 
empathy was a significant positive predictor. Here as well, the effects in Step 2 became 
weaker when variables were added in Step 3. Face concerns were the only significant 
positive predictor in Step 3 in the German sample. Therefore, the more German 
participants reported concerns about losing face due to government actions due to WW 
II, the more German participant were willing to take personal actions to show support 
(ΔR2 = .06;  Fchange (4, 121) = 3.76, p < .01). In the Japanese sample, historical closure 
and additionally face concerns explained variation in this component of willingness to 
make amendments explaining 10% of unique proportion of the variance (Fchange (4, 108) 
= 4.37,  p < .01).  
Discussion 
The results supported hypothesis 1. There were mean differences on virtually all 
concepts between Germany and Japan. These differences can be potentially explained 
by the historical context. The answers to the open-ended questions for the trust and 
empathy scales were especially revealing. China and Japan have a relationship that is 
heavily burdened by the harm committed by Japan during WW II and the Sino-Japanese 
War. This is evident in recent outbursts of outrage by China for Japan‘s desire to obtain 
a permanent seat for the UN and a strong Chinese historical redress movement (Reilly, 
2006). Although there is movement in Japan called the ―Association for liberal view of 
history‖ which is a revisionist movement, there is also an opposing movement within 
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Japan consisting of teacher‘s unions. Furthermore, the influence of the dissemination of 
information and debates via the internet should not be underestimated (Morris-Suzuki & 
Rimmer, 2002). Therefore, it is arguable that a sample of university students is likely to 
be well aware of the problems between former victimized East Asian nations and Japan. 
Arguably, the fact that nothing or little is done to challenge the revisionist opinions may 
be one reason why Japanese students feel collectively guilty and have low closure with 
the past. 
Hypothesis 2 was not confirmed. Based on the claim made by anthropologists 
(e.g. Benedict, 1946; Creighton, 1990) that Japan is a so-called ―shame‖ culture and 
Germany a so-called ―guilt‖ culture, I expected Japanese participants to experience 
more shame feelings than German participants. This was not the case. Japanese 
participants reported more collective guilt feelings and less shame feelings than German 
participants. Since newer generations of Japanese people have access to diverse 
international debates due to Japan‘s handling of the past misdeeds via multiple media 
outlets (Morris-Suzuki & Rimmer, 2002), the likelihood is quite high that the Japanese 
participants have come across opposing opinions and had to deal with a portrayal as 
aggressors during WW II (Penney, 2008). This could have evoked bad feelings on 
behalf of their nation, since it is contradicting what the Japanese government represents 
regarding their history and what is publicly and internationally debated. Furthermore, 
staunch positions held by some parts of the Japan‘s political elites cause resentment in 
other East Asian countries. This could be prevented and may be controllable by taking 
symbolic actions, such as the visit of a memorial commemorating victims other than 
Japanese by a highly respected representative of Japan. Thus, Japanese participants 
experienced more guilt than shame feelings.   
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Hypothesis 3 was supported. The cognitive component was higher than the 
behavioural component of the willingness to make amends confirming previous 
assumptions about the difficulty to change the past and therefore preferring cognitive 
responses over behavioural ones. Although the behavioural items were phrased in a way 
that the actions described could be done today, they still do not change the past.  
Hypothesis 4 was only partially supported in Germany and poorly supported in 
Japan. National identification was not related to guilt and shame, but to historical 
closure, global consciousness and making amends in Germany. This is partially in line 
with SIT/SCT. The more Germans identified with their nation, the less willingness they 
had to make amends, the less they identified with a global identity, and the more they 
reported closure with the past. National identification did not contribute to the 
prediction of willingness to make amends for both components.  
For the Japanese sample, national identification was related to guilt, face 
concerns and to both components of the willingness to make amends. The correlations 
with guilt and willingness to make amends were not in line with SIT/SCT since the 
relationships were positive: the higher Japanese identified with their nation, the more 
they felt guilty and were more willing to make amends. This is a very surprising result, 
and should be investigated more thoroughly in future research. National identity as a 
form of collective identity was a positive contributor to predict willingness to make 
amends, but only for the cognitive component. In both contexts, the more the 
participants were globally conscious, the more collectively guilty they felt and were less 
concerned about the loss of face; only in Japan, participants also felt collectively 
ashamed. 
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It could be argued that gender effects drove the directions of effects since the 
distribution of males and females was unbalanced. Indeed, females and males differed 
significantly on some of the assessed constructs. For instance, females had less closure 
with the past and experienced more guilt than males did when tested via independent t-
tests in Japan. In Germany, the differences were smaller and for the most part non-
significant. For Japan, the gender differences can be also explained by the historical 
context, since one of the most prominent example of Japan‘s past harm done is the 
Comfort Women issue. Therefore, female participants were more likely to empathise 
with former female victims of Japan‘s war of aggression. However, the gender effects 
disappeared when regression models were tested. Nevertheless, gender effects should be 
taken more into considerations in future research and a balanced gender distribution is 
helpful to rule out gender as driving the effects.  
In order to answer the research question regarding the unique contribution of the 
new concepts, I conducted multiple hierarchical regressions. Historical closure 
significantly contributed to explain variance in willingness to make amends (cognitive). 
The lower closure was, the more willingness to make amends was reported. In 
Germany, global consciousness was also among the significant predictors. In both 
contexts, established predictors (such as collective guilt) got weaker or their 
contribution disappeared completely, pointing to the importance of historical closure for 
the overall process, which was already shown to be an important concept in Study 3. 
Face concerns were a significant contributor in both contexts to predict the behavioural 
component of willingness to make amends. Only in Japan did historical closure also 
explain unique variance. Historical closure or in this study the lack of historical closure 
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showed similar patterns for predicting the cognitive component of the willingness to 
make amends.  
One question is why identity did not explain variation in willingness to make 
amends at all in the German context, even though it has been continuously emphasized 
and empirically demonstrated that intergroup conflict are issues involving identity (e.g. 
Noor et al., 2008). Another question is also why identity is a positive predictor in the 
Japanese context for the willingness to make amends. The role of national identification 
in Japan seems contradictory, since high identification with one‘s nation that has dark 
parts in its history should lead to a distancing process and eventually in a denial of guilt 
to enable a person to maintain a positive social identity. 
However, Gries and Peng (2002) argued that ―Western reasoning tends to focus 
on objects and categories, and is driven by formal logic; in the East, by contrast, 
reasoning embraces contradictions among objects in a yin–yang field of constant 
change‖ (p. 175). Therefore, to be highly identified with one‘s nations and experiencing 
collective guilt for past misdeeds are not necessarily a contradiction in an East Asian 
context. On the contrary, it might be an expression of showing loyalty to care about the 
standing of one‘s nation in being honest about the past. Therefore, the historical context 
seems to be a key factor to explain the differences between Germany and Japan.  
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Chapter 7 
General Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Summary 
This thesis‘ overall aim was to extend existing research on intergroup 
forgiveness and to shed light on the complex process of intergroup forgiveness between 
nations in the post WW II context. In four studies, the role of the societal and historical 
context was taken into consideration from different analytical angles and used as 
sources for predictions and explanations of intergroup forgiveness.  
To reiterate, Study 1 was a cross-national meta-analytical approach that aimed to 
explain differences in interpersonal forgiveness based on contextual variables. This 
study discovered differences in interpersonal forgiveness between the 13 societies that 
were included in the meta-analysis. The inclusion of contextual variables delivered 
opportunities to explain these differences. That is, socio-economic and socio-political 
contextual variables, societal peacefulness, well-being and more negative evaluations of 
historical calamities were significantly associated with interpersonal forgiveness. 
Furthermore, in conflict-prone societies, interpersonal forgiveness was lower than in 
societies in which there was no apparent conflict potential.  
Study 2 revealed insights into the articulation and conceptualisation of 
intergroup forgiveness and crucial contextual factors by giving a qualitative snapshot of 
the social reality of participants coming from three different countries (Germany, Japan, 
the Philippines). This qualitative approach revealed an important context relevant 
concept, which was coined as historical closure and was conceptualized as an attitude 
which content was drawn from the historical context of harm committed during WW II. 
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This concept (among others) was devised as a scale and applied in the subsequent 
Studies 3 and 4.  
Study 3 was devoted to scrutinize the unique contribution of (a) new concepts 
and (b) contextual variables on the willingness to forgive in samples of six formerly 
victimized WW II nations. Furthermore, the study explored the differences in intergroup 
forgiveness and in psychological antecedents of intergroup forgiveness across two post 
WW II contexts: Europe and East Asia. This study revealed insights into the role of 
historical closure and the costs of granting forgiveness. These contextualized variables 
contributed to predict intergroup forgiveness in samples from formerly victimized 
nations, explained unique variance in intergroup forgiveness, and weakened 
contributions of established predictors (such as guilt). Furthermore, identity neither 
predicted intergroup forgiveness directly nor mediated relationships as expected. 
Additionally, a novel approach using a cross-level operator analysis was applied to 
investigate the impact of historical context variables. This analysis showed that the 
number of official apologies contributed to explain variations in intergroup forgiveness.  
The emphasis of Study 4 was on the perpetrator perspective, examining the 
impact of historical closure among other psychological concepts on the willingness to 
make amendments. Here as well, the concept of historical closure contributed 
significantly to predict different components of the willingness to make amends. 
Furthermore, participants identifying more strongly with their nation did not experience 
less guilt or shame feelings compared to those identifying not as strong with their nation. 
Additionally, national identification did not contribute to explain variance in the 
willingness to make amends. On the other hand, participants being more globally 
conscious experienced more collective guilt and shame than those who were low. These 
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results contribute to a more holistic understanding about the overall intergroup 
forgiveness process, since both victim and perpetrator perspectives were taken into 
consideration. 
Contributions of this thesis 
This thesis contributes to the intergroup forgiveness literature in several ways. 
Primarily, this thesis examined the post WW II context and compared participants from 
three formerly victimized European nations (France, Poland, Russia) and from three 
formerly victimized East Asian nations (China, Taiwan, the Philippines). Furthermore, 
the perspectives from formerly perpetrating nations were captured comparing samples 
from Germany and Japan. In the post WW II context, there are clear victim and 
perpetrator roles. As these countries do not share a region and its citizens live in their 
own countries, this thesis examined between-societies situations.  
This thesis goes beyond previous research involving groups sharing one 
geographical region in which the victim and perpetrator roles were interwoven. I 
examined one specific context, that is the post WW II relations between formerly 
victimized and victimizer societies. Furthermore, I investigated within the setting of 
post WW II two distinct contexts: the European and the East Asian. In addition, victim 
and perpetrator perspectives in Europe were compared to those in East Asia. Therefore, 
this thesis allowed gaining insights into the intergroup forgiveness process. It examined 
people‘s experiences of group-based emotions, closure with the past, and intergroup 
forgiveness determined by the historical context. The participants belonged to the third 
generations after WW II. Although the end of WW II is almost 70 years ago and the 
participants neither experienced nor committed directly harm, this thesis demonstrated 
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that specifically in the Sino-Japanese context resentment and grievance can last for 
generations.   
The application of a cross-national meta-analytical approach in Study 1 allowed 
the contribution of contextual variables to explain differences in interpersonal 
forgiveness to be assessed across 13 societies. This analysis revealed that contextual 
variables mattered and influenced variations in interpersonal forgiveness. The role of 
context had previously been under researched and this cross-national meta-analysis 
demonstrated that context should be considered. Additionally, this led to the question to 
what extent contextual variables could explain variation at the intergroup level, 
considering the complexity of context in an intergroup situation as opposed to a conflict 
between two individuals.  
Furthermore, the approach to consider the historical context for further 
predictions and explanations regarding intergroup forgiveness is a novel and important 
contribution to the literature. Since East Asian perspectives have been continuously 
neglected, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of the intergroup forgiveness 
process in East Asian settings. An important discovery is historical closure defined as 
an attitudinal content drawn from the historical context. Historical closure reflects the 
extent that the past is perceived to still affect the present and future, and what 
implications it has for present-day relationships between groups (see Chapter 5).  
It seemed that closure (or lack of) with the past is more important than 
identifying with one‘s nation in the European and East Asian context and for both 
subject positions. It can be speculated that in France closure was achieved signalling a 
departure from the past that allowed promotion of forgiveness. However, the German 
participants had relatively low closure with the past. How does this fit? One reason 
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could be that even today‘s Germans carry the burden of the dark parts of their history. 
Having closure with one‘s past could be misunderstood as ignoring the past. Germany‘s 
post war motto of ―nie wieder Krieg‖ (no more war) indicates that closure can only be 
achieved, if it is balanced with adequate remembrance and acknowledgment. 
Furthermore, a particular lack of closure for former perpetrators seems important in 
order to be supportive in terms of compensation claims. This may apply in similar ways 
to the Japanese context. Additionally, perceived costs of granting forgiveness was 
identified as an obstacle to the willingness to forgive Japan and Germany respectively. 
The application of this new concepts explained variance beyond established 
psychological contributors such as guilt. However, the new concept or the analyses 
posit further questions. 
Theoretical implications of the current thesis  
Does context matter? 
From a theoretical stance, the findings from the cross-national meta-analysis 
support Inglehart‘s (1997) propositions about post-materialism and Fukuyama‘s (1992) 
liberal democracy argument. Inglehart (1997) claimed that socio-economic development 
(affluence of a society) drives the shift from materialistic to post-materialistic values 
which affects newer generations that are more socially and economically secure than 
older generations. Fukuyama (1992) proposed that societies eventually will move 
towards liberal democracies, which may lead to decreased warfare, and less internal and 
external political violence.  
These two theories complement each other, since socio-economic security and 
human development indicating a fulfilment of survival needs have been linked to peace 
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(Fischer & Hanke, 2009). Peace is linked to decreased warfare and according to 
Fukuyama (1992) to liberal democracies. The two theories also complement the meta-
analysis results, since there was a linear relationship between socio-economic and socio-
political correlates, the peacefulness of societies, evaluations of historical calamities and 
interpersonal forgiveness. Does this imply that the more a society is able to provide a 
safe environment, that it will eventually enhance the likelihood of the implementation of 
forgiveness practices? Does this mean that, for example when China gains more 
economic power and becomes more wealthy, this will translate into more civil liberties, 
less internal and external violence and more implementation of forgiveness practices 
which are related to peace building?  
Assuming the multidimensionality of forgiveness (Worthington, 2005), in which 
many factors come into play, it seems fair to argue against this notion. These economic 
and democratic factors play a role, but other factors may be equally important, making 
forgiveness a multidimensional rather than a one-dimensional concept. One hint can be 
gleaned from the association between the evaluations of negative historical events and 
interpersonal forgiveness. Though probably not completely independent from socio-
economic and socio-political factors, evaluations of historical events add another 
dimension to interpersonal forgiveness.  
Since forgiveness is a moral response option after a transgression, evaluating 
human tragedies during the course of history as negative may lead to consider 
alternatives – other than holding grudges or getting even – to resolve conflicts. Hence, if 
a society is aware that calamities are generally negative, (which is not always the case, 
since other societies have benefited from war), it probably helps encouraging the more 
prosocial response of forgiving after transgressions. It may be doubtful that this process 
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is only explainable through socio-economic security. Notwithstanding, correlational 
data should always be interpreted with caution and assurances about their causal 
implications can only be drawn through longitudinal designs. 
The context in the current thesis is post WW II. Social representations of history 
and identity (Hilton & Liu, 2008; Liu & Hilton, 2005) proposes that how history is 
represented and how knowledge about it is transferred can be done purposely in order to 
follow a specific agenda (e.g. to mobilize particular opinions in a context). Especially, 
diversity of social representations of WW II and its aftermath between China and Japan 
may induce intolerance or disregard towards the other‘s accounts and reduce empathic 
positions. Eventually, this may lead to conflicts on a symbolic level and ill feelings 
about how the others portray their ―truth‖ evoking irreconcilable positions and reducing 
the willingness to be forgiving. This is particular evident for the Sino-Japanese case, 
since for Japanese and Chinese participants closure with the past was relatively low and 
Chinese participants were quite unforgiving. 
In support of this assumption were the significant differences between the six 
societies, for the most part carried by differences between China and France. However, 
in many cases Filipinos and Taiwanese were also different from Russians and Poles. 
Filipino and Taiwanese participants assigned more guilt, were angrier and were slightly 
less forgiving than Russians and Poles. Yet, Filipinos and Taiwanese had more closure 
with the past than Russians and Poles. Therefore, in the European context the 
participants were more positive towards Germany, since they expressed less guilt 
assignment, less anger and were more forgiving than in the East Asian context. The 
most opposing samples were from France and China in terms of their expressions of 
guilt assignment, anger, and forgiveness.  
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These findings suggest that there is a greater shared understanding of the past 
between France and Germany, pointing to more shared interpretations of WW II. The 
French data in particular portrays this since French participants were the most forgiving 
and had the highest closure with the past. This appears to reflect the efforts made by 
France and Germany since 1951 for rapprochement and the development of a shared 
representation of WW II in form of textbooks. In contrast, in the East Asian context – 
and especially the Chinese participants – were less forgiving and expressed more anger 
and guilt assignment than France and the other East Asian countries, pointing to more 
polemical representations between Japan and China. 
Since it is no secret that Japan and China have a difficult relationship which can 
be traced back to unresolved issues due to WW II and the Sino-Japanese War, 
controversies and debates over the past are evident (e.g. Raudsepp, 2005). The lack of a 
shared understanding of the past is associated with large mean differences between 
China (high on guilt assignment, high on anger, low on trust, low on closure, low on 
forgiveness) and France (low on guilt assignment, low on anger, high on trust, high on 
closure, high on forgiveness).  
The Filipino and Taiwanese sample were relatively similar in their report of 
historical closure and other variables, and were less negative towards Japan (e.g. less 
guilt assignment and anger than Chinese participants). One explanation can be 
contextual. Taiwan benefited in terms of infrastructure and education from the Japanese 
colonisation period, which is still evident in the display of Japanese culture in Taiwan. 
The Philippines is in a less powerful position than China, making it difficult to speak-up 
against past injustices, since the Philippines are dependent in many ways on other 
countries‘ economic help – including Japan. A complementary or alternative 
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explanation why Chinese participants were quite unforgiving is the fact that there are 
conflicting representations of WW II and the atrocities committed against China by 
Japan that are linked to these ill feelings about the past (Liu & Atsumi, 2008).  
The Polish and Russian participants delivered a different picture. Poles and 
Russians were similar in their degree of guilt assignment and trust. However, Russians 
experienced more anger, perceived more costs associated with forgiveness, were less 
forgiving, but had more closure with the past than Poles. One reason for this result 
could be recent political tensions between Germany and Russia, which may have 
resulted in the mobilisation of the past to encourage resentment towards Germany. 
Another theoretical explanation for the overall pattern may be the reasoning 
behind high versus low-context cultures (Hall, 1976). In high-context cultures like 
China and Japan communication and negotiation processes are based on the physical 
context or internalised meanings (Rosenberg, 2004). In these processes, little or no 
communication is prevalent probably resulting in different expectations (that are not 
met in the context of post WW II relations between China and Japan) based on different 
internalised interpretations of the past. Germany and France are low-context cultures 
meaning that their communication is much more explicit which probably has lead to the 
early explicit exchange evident in textbook commissions.  
Further empirical evidence supports these theoretical explanations, since the 
cross-level analysis revealed that the number of official apologies during the last two 
decades was a negative predictor for intergroup forgiveness. This result points to the 
explicit character of a verbally delivered apology probably not being helpful, since it 
does not change the fact that parts of the Japanese political elites are repeatedly 
downplaying Japan‘s aggressor role during WW II. It seems apologies are issued 
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because it is internationally demanded especially by the US, but these apologies may 
not be perceived as sincere. The idiom ―actions speak louder than words‖ may be taken 
literally. Independent from the reasoning about high versus low-context cultures, in the 
German context this literal meaning of the aforementioned saying was demonstrated by 
Willy Brandt‘s silent kneeling in front of the Warsaw memorial commemorating Jewish 
victims of the Holocaust that opened up the possibility for rapprochements between 
Germany and Eastern Europe. It is possible that Chinese expect something similar from 
Japan. 
Predictors of intergroup forgiveness and willingness to make amends 
Study 2 explored the way that forgiveness is perceived as a means to resolve 
conflict at the individual level and how the differences between interpersonal and 
intergroup forgiveness are articulated. In this qualitative study, interviews revealed that 
forgiveness may not be readily applied in a group setting, since it is not thought of to be 
crucially important among the Japanese interviewees. Additionally, one reason for 
difficulties to apply forgiveness in group settings was that most interviewees seemed to 
be more used to conceiving forgiveness relevant at the individual level. Furthermore, 
among the Japanese interviewees intergroup conflict resolution was related to the 
perception of the past in a way that allowed them to separate the person from the 
government, which was deemed as responsible. Japanese participants perceived an 
apology at the intergroup level to be irrelevant for facing and dealing with conflicts. 
Therefore, it seems understandable that what is expected from Japan internationally and 
from formerly victimized East Asian nations, cannot or is difficult to be fulfilled by 
Japan because Japanese mindsets around forgiveness and apologies seems to be 
qualitatively different compared to those of German participants. Apologies in the East 
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Asian context probably do not matter that much, since symbolic acts (such as the 
exchange of gifts) are more appreciated (Hall, 1976; Tavuchis, 1991).  
In the interviews, representations of the past were articulated when the 
participants talked about forgiveness at the group level. One key term was discovered 
and coined as historical closure that was already defined previously. In general, closure 
seemed to be a crucial component of the forgiveness process which is more easily 
achieved at the individual level than at the group level, since at the individual level there 
are mostly only two persons involved whereas at the group level many other factors 
hinder the development of closure.  
This is in line with Staub‘s and Bar-Tal‘s (2003) reasoning about a 
psychological departure from the past, which Staub and Bar-Tal (2003) refer to as a 
symbol of forgiveness. A sense of historical closure can probably develop if there is no 
competition and controversies over the interpretation of the past, meaning that there is 
shared understanding of the roots and consequences of the conflict (Staub & Bar-Tal, 
2003; Staub, 2005). Controversies over representations of historical issues can be used 
by political leaders to widen division between groups. Consequently, based on Study 2 I 
constructed a scale to capture historical closure. To address a gap in the literature 
(Exline, Worthington, Hill & McCullough, 2003), I also explored perceived costs of 
granting forgiveness in the victim study (Study 3) and potential benefits of seeking 
forgiveness in the perpetrator study (Study 4).  
Theoretically, historical closure should be an associate of forgiveness and an 
antagonist for the willingness to make amends. Historical closure was conceptualized as 
an attitude towards the past. Based on theoretical and practical reasoning (Bar-Tal & 
Teichman, 2005; Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003) about the psychological departure from the 
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past and its relevance for new peaceful relations, having closure with the past is 
important for the propensity to forgive, whereas no closure with past should be 
important for the motivation to make amends.  
While in the European context all remaining country variance was explained by 
historical closure and the costs of forgiveness when these variables were entered into 
the equation last, in the East Asian context significant variance between the countries 
remained unexplained in the last step. It could be argued that the differences still found 
between the countries are a cultural ―residual‖, since the interviews in Study 2 pointed 
to differences in the conceptualization of forgiveness.  
Historical closure was a strong contributor in predicting intergroup forgiveness. 
Furthermore, historical closure was a strong predictor of the cognitive component to the 
willingness to make amendments in Germany and Japan. In Germany the degree to 
which participants were globally conscious contributed to explain variance in the 
cognitive component of the willingness to make amends, besides the contribution of 
historical closure. Historical closure seems important for even third generations victims, 
who have never been directly involved in what has happened during WW II, to move on 
and allow forgiveness to be an option. For the perpetrator part, lack of historical closure 
is potentially driving the motivation towards support of former victims on a cognitive 
level. However, the causality of this assumed underlying mechanism of historical 
closure has yet to be proven.  
In sum, historical closure showed a consistent pattern across the societies and 
across subject-positions. This indicates that closure with the past is an important 
concept. From a theoretical point of view, historical closure comes close to healthy 
commemorations and collective memories (Minow, 1998), since one can argue that 
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historical closure may indicate a balance between just enough memories that are not 
painful anymore, just enough guilt feelings and guilt assignments to be motivated to 
never let history repeat itself.   
What happened to national identification?  
A surprising finding in the German sample was that there was no relationship 
between national identification and collective guilt and shame. This contradicts previous 
findings in German samples (Dresler-Hawke & Liu, 2006) and in general (e.g. 
Hewstone et al., 2004; McLernon et al., 2004). National identification did not contribute 
to explain variations as expected. Neither did national identification explain variance in 
intergroup forgiveness nor was it a mediator between historical closure and forgiveness, 
as posited in SIT/SCT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1999) and previous research on 
intergroup forgiveness advocating a social identity approach (e.g. Hewstone et al., 
2004).  
 Considering that identity did not contribute as much as expected, it can be 
assumed that intergroup forgiveness between societies that are geographical distant, in 
which subject positions are clear, is not only an issue of identification processes. There 
seems much more behind intergroup forgiveness processes than identity evident in a 
consistent pattern of historical closure. However, guilt, anger and trust were also 
important for intergroup forgiveness, but those concepts were not linked to identity. The 
problem with SIT/SCT is that it does not allow drawing conclusions what the 
identification with a social category actually entails in terms of their content. It remains 
an unanswered question what it means to be German or Japanese. 
Another surprising result was the positive relationship between national 
identification and collective guilt in the Japanese sample. However, as already pointed 
  189 
out in the discussion in Study 4, there could be several reasons for this positive 
association. I only can speculate about them, but the positive associations contradict 
theoretical propositions about the role of national identification in social identity theory, 
since it is opposed to the motivation to maintain a positive social identity by keeping 
distance from the dark parts of what one‘s group has committed (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 
Turner et al., 1987; Turner, 1999).  
However, it is not necessarily a contradiction in an East Asian or specifically in 
the Japanese context, since Gries and Peng (2002) argued that Eastern reasoning could 
stand contradictions. Therefore, the positive association that seemed contradictory from 
a Western logic point of view can actually be meaningful in the Japanese context. 
Furthermore, although previous studies suggest that younger generations in Japan are 
apolitical (Liu & Atsumi, 2008), the internet among other means of transmission of 
knowledge may have a crucial impact on young Japanese‘s perceptions of their past 
(Morris-Suzuki & Rimmer, 2002).  
Another explanation comes from political scientists. Historically, Japanese have 
shifted in their opinions about other countries between an inferiority and superiority 
complex (Li, Sabella, & Liu, 2002; Reischauer, 1988). Having been defeated by the US 
and rebuilt under their influence after WW II, many Japanese today tend to maintain an 
inferiority complex vis-à-vis the US, since Japan had to rely on the US for security and 
economic recovery after WW II (Donahue, 1998).  
In contrast, Japanese tend to have a superiority complex towards East Asian 
neighbours. This is because of Japan‘s rise as an economic superpower during the last 
decades, making them feeling more advanced and superior than their East Asian 
neighbours. If Japanese perceive East Asian neighbours as inferior, it can be argued that 
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those are Japanese who identify highly as Japanese. Furthermore, it can be speculated 
that Japanese who feel superior towards East Asian neighbours can easily apologise or 
support amends on a cognitive level. They probably can afford to do so, since they are 
cognitively on a higher ground. Perhaps they feel secure about their identity and 
satisfied by giving a noble, symbolic gesture. Unfortunately, SIT and SCT do not allow 
taking into account how secure Japanese may feel about being Japanese or how secure 
one is feeling about identifying with their nation in general. 
In public, the Japanese government is reluctant to apologise ―appropriately‖ 
which is probably based on a strategy to win votes from more conservative Japanese. 
However, the results suggest that there may be difference between the government and 
how everyday Japanese feel about these issues.  
 “Shame” versus “Guilt” Cultures 
Anthropological theorists (e.g. Benedict, 1946) have argued that Japan is a 
―shame‖ culture. Although this view has been contested (e.g. Creighton, 1990) it has 
been applied in psychological research on intergroup conflict to distinguish between 
Japan as a ―shame‖ culture and Germany as a ―guilt‖ culture (see Páez et al., 2006). 
Based on this distinction, I expected that Japanese participants would experience more 
shame than guilt feelings. The results showed a different pattern, since Japanese 
participants reported more guilt feelings than shame feelings and both collective 
emotions were higher than in the German sample.  
It is argued that collective guilt feelings are experienced when an incident seems 
under the control of the ingroup (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004), whereas collective 
shame feelings are experienced due to certain degrading characteristics of the ingroup 
(Brown et al., 2008). Japan and China are in constant tensions over controversies 
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regarding the ―correct‖ historical representations of past harm done by Japan during 
WW II and the Sino-Japanese War (Reilly, 2006). There is also an international debate 
about the Nanjing Massacre and the Comfort Women, with eyewitnesses delivering 
emotional testimonies. It seems reasonable to argue that this whole debate has an impact 
on young Japanese participants, since they have access to these debates via multiple 
media outlets (Morris-Suzuki & Rimmer, 2002).  
Japanese university students in particular could feel bad on behalf of their 
country, due to the fact that their government is still downplaying past harm done and 
causing grievances and resentment in other East Asian countries, which is something 
that can be prevented and may be controllable. This may have led to the high experience 
of collective guilt by Japanese participants. In the German sample, the experience of 
collective guilt and shame were relatively low compared to the Japanese participants. 
This can be interpreted in light of the issues being more resolved in the European post 
WW II context than in Japan, which supports claims in the literature (Oliner, 2008).  
Therefore, labelling a culture as inherently shame-prone or guilt-prone may be a 
too simplistic approach that does not take the historical context and interpretations of 
the conflict into consideration. As this study has demonstrated, the historical context is a 
rich resource for explanations of the differences between Japanese participants and 
German participants and the European and East Asian context respectively. 
Intergroup forgetting versus intergroup forgiveness 
In Study 2, there were some hints pointing to different cultural 
conceptualizations of forgiveness. The Japanese interviewees did not seem to value 
forgiveness as a response to harm done. This can be a coincidence. On the other hand, 
the alternative preferences over forgiveness could be potentially explained by culture-
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specific factors. The Japanese participants preferred either to downplay the significance 
of the harm done in forgetting about it (“Cause I forget … I don‟t need to forgive” 
[J1]), withdrawal or avoidance, and emphasizing the importance of maintaining 
superficial harmony in line with theoretical propositions specific to Asian cultures 
(Brew, 2007; Huang, Jone, & Peng, 2007). Forgiveness was considered, but only when 
it was useful to benefit the relationships. This is in support of Markus and Kitayama‘s 
(1991) distinction between independent and interdependent selves. The latter is more 
important to Asian cultures in which the interconnectedness of the self with others is 
more relevant.  
Moreover, attaching shame to conflict situations is another culture specific factor 
that deserves attention in the overall process. The notion of feeling ashamed of being 
perceived as not being able to deal with social situations effectively to promote peaceful 
relationships and avoid conflict is tightly related to the Asian concept of face saving. 
This may explain why Japanese participants preferred avoidance and forgetting over 
actually dealing with the conflict, since the purpose of this response might be to avoid 
face-threatening situations (Ting-Toomey, 2005). First, the Japanese participants saw 
only an instrumental value of forgiveness (e.g. a more committed relationship) and not 
as a means to release oneself from the burden of a conflict. Second, a means of 
controlling emotions to save face was articulated as either ending the relationship or 
forgetting about the incident.  
When something is forgotten, it does not necessarily imply that the harm done 
and all ill feelings associated with it vanished (e.g. Enright & North, 1999). 
Furthermore, forgiveness does not ―happen‖ automatically as forgetting does in the first 
place (Margalit, 2005). Forgetting is probably a mere impulse, when something terrible 
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happen, since the first thing that probably happens is not to think about it which is not a 
decision, but happens automatically. Furthermore, it could be argued that, if forgetting 
prevails it seems logical impossible to forgive, since the harm done is not any longer 
cognitively available that can be forgiven. Margalit (2005) argued that forgiveness is 
more based on disregarding the painful acts rather than forgetting them. Since historical 
closure was strongly associated with intergroup forgiveness, it could be speculated that 
it may be different from forgetting and similar to disregarding the harm committed. This 
is only cautiously suggested, since there is no data to prove it.  
The problem with suppressing memories of the harm done is that they can break 
out as soon as people are reminded (e.g. in the media). Therefore, forgetting will 
probably not help to overcome resentment – which is arguably the focus of forgiveness 
– since the necessary processes have not been undergone. In contrast, forgiveness is a 
conscious matter. It will probably not happen automatically, since the perpetrator side 
has to show some kind of remorse, although the past cannot be changed by doing this. 
Based on social representations of history it could be argued that acknowledgment of 
past harm done by a higher level representative may help to re-interpret the past and 
may generate new (non-conflicting) social representations of the past. The form of this 
acknowledgment may be different across cultures as I elaborated earlier. Generally 
speaking, forgetting may have nothing to do with forgiving, but both are linked to each 
other in everyday language (―forgive and forget‖).  
Revisiting the process of intergroup forgiveness 
 To recount, I initially proposed a working definition of intergroup forgiveness in 
Chapter 2 by contrasting interpersonal from intergroup forgiveness. Based on the 
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findings in this thesis, intergroup forgiveness as a process should be described as 
follows.  
Intergroup forgiveness is a contextualized, dynamic process between the 
victimized and perpetrating party that involves negotiation and understanding. 
Historical closure is an integral part of the intergroup forgiveness process. Closure with 
the past is not related to forgetting, but involves strategically moving past ill feelings 
attached to the past atrocity or conflict while disregarding the reasons for the act of 
violence and the act as such. Closure with the past symbolizes social healing that can 
eventuate in reconciliation. It may be an unfolding and continuous process. The 
perpetrator party has to give reasons for the victimized party to consider forgiveness as 
a possible response. The victimized party then has to reconsider their grievances. The 
process entails acknowledgment of harm done and a public apology that includes 
significant and coherent actions, and an acceptance by the victimized party that the 
approach by the perpetrator party is appropriate and genuine, leading to an open 
dialogue. Through the process of the acknowledgment of and remorse for the harm 
done, which should entail symbolic acts, a re-interpretation of the past is possible, that 
can generate more consensual social representations of the past. This shared and 
consensual interpretation of the conflict is necessary in order to be able to empathize 
and gain trust with the other side.  
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 This thesis contributes to a better understanding of intergroup forgiveness. 
However, conclusions drawn from the results deserve further validation and calls for 
future research. Unfortunately, only a limited number of countries were available to 
conduct the cross-national meta-analysis, which was based on one instrument that was 
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widely used. The meta-analysis would have been much more powerful if more countries 
would have been included. However, the context effects revealed are impressive and 
should not be ignored. Future research could broaden the focus, apply a domain-based 
approach and gather studies that assess the construct forgiveness at the individual and at 
the group level in order to evaluate at what level which contextual variables contribute 
to explain variance.  
 Since forgiveness at the group level is still poorly understood, qualitative 
approaches can reveal different factors, such as cultural factors, contributing to our 
understanding of this process. Study 2 could have benefited from expanding the number 
of interviews and also from conducting focus groups in order to be able to draw more 
precise conclusions. The inclusion of participants from a European victim nation would 
have contributed to a more balanced sampling. Therefore, future research could focus 
on a series of interviews that allows for a deeper examination of culture-specific factors.  
Study 2 revealed hints at cross-cultural differences and culture-specific factors 
possibly influencing the conceptualisation of forgiveness. It is important to establish an 
understanding of how (and whether) forgiveness works in a specific cultural context. 
Western forms of forgiveness seem to be anchored in Christianity and the example of 
how Christ responded to people who persecuted him. It is crucial to establish how and 
whether the concept of forgiveness is central to peace and reconciliation in non-
Christian societies in future research. The Asian concept of face, for instance, may 
mitigate against some of the more emotional processes of apology and acceptance of 
apology typical in Western/Christian cycles of forgiveness.  
 The survey studies provided initial evidence that the perception and 
interpretation of the historical past has an impact on forgiveness and willingness to 
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make amends respectively. The survey studies were conducted with university students. 
It would be interesting to conduct similar studies with a general population sample in 
order to reveal whether the effects still hold with a non-university population.  
The instruments used should be refined in future research. Since the 
relationships with identity were weak, alternative instruments to assess collective 
identity should be employed to rule out the possibility that the lack of relationship was 
due to the measurement of identity. Future studies could benefit from using additional 
instrument to assess social representations of history, which was not the case in the 
current thesis. It would also be interesting to focus on different levels of inclusiveness 
of identification (e.g. superordinate identity). Future studies could benefit from using 
additional instrument to assess social representations of history, which was not the case 
in the current thesis. Historical closure was initially tested – although it was not the 
focus of the study – for convergent validity, but not for discriminant validity. Therefore, 
a thorough internal and external validation and refinement of the concept historical 
closure deserves some further attention. The instrument used was based on six items for 
Study 3 and four items for Study 4. Future research could address the functions and 
different levels of historical closure as well as elaborating on how it is distinct from 
forgetting. 
However, all conclusions drawn must be regarded with caution, since these were 
cross-sectional studies not allowing inference of causality. Therefore, future research 
could focus on longitudinal studies or experimental designs, such as scenario-based 
studies, in order to be able to draw causal conclusions. Finally, the literature on 
intergroup forgiveness can benefit from applying what has been learnt in different 
conflict contexts across different cultural contexts.  
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Concluding remarks  
 The current thesis has supported theoretical propositions of social 
representations of history (Hilton & Liu, 2008; Liu & Hilton., 2005) and the 
significance of the historical context for intergroup forgiveness. The emergence of 
consistent patterns of the new concept historical closure seemed to be a key element in 
the intergroup forgiveness process across countries and across subject positions. The 
findings have implications for the practical applications of intergroup forgiveness. Staub 
and Bar-Tal (2003) and Staub (2005) advocated an approach to achieve a shared 
understanding of the roots of a conflict in order to foster social healing which includes 
forgiveness and eventuates in reconciliation. The current thesis provided empirical 
evidence that the intergroup forgiveness process is indeed very different from 
interpersonal forgiveness. The description of the process entails that coherent acts by 
the perpetrator party may allow developing new social representations of the past that 
are shared between victim and perpetrator parties.  
 One way to implement these findings to foster forgiveness and the reconciliation 
of relationships is through education. Textbook commissions after WW II in Europe 
have shown that it seems possible to create a shared account of the past with which 
formerly conflicting parties can agree on. This thesis indicated that education and 
school curricula might have influence and enable the reduction of negative enemy 
stereotypes, which was the aim of the textbook commissions. A shared understanding of 
the origin of the conflict or in this case the war and its consequences may foster 
historical closure – at least for the victim part – and lead towards forgiveness. This 
research suggested that a Japanese sample of university students understood their 
government caused tensions between Japan and her East Asian neighbours. 
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Furthermore, they may not agree on what the current Japanese government is claiming. 
It is a question for future policy makers how to mediate this conflict between 
government and citizens.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Semi-structured interview schedule 
Part 1: Introduction to the study (approx. 10 min) 
Introduction (state objective of the study, procedure of the interview and ground rules, 
questions from the participant regarding the research) 
Part 2: Interview (approx.  60-90min) 
Demographic questions (5-10min) 
1. In which country do you live now? 
2. In which country were you born? 
3. With which religious or philosophical orientation do you most identify?  
4. What is your age? 
Forgiveness (individual level) (15-20min) 
1. Can you describe a situation where you felt unjustly hurt or harmed? 
2. Can you describe a situation or an experience where forgiveness was granted by you?  
3. When thinking of these situations, what does forgiveness mean to you?  
4. What do you think is the value of forgiveness? 
Forgiveness (group level) (20-30min) 
1. Has anything happened in the past to your national or ethnic group that might require 
forgiveness?  Please describe what this might be. 
2. What does forgiveness mean to you in such a context?  
3. Do you think ―intergroup forgiveness‖ is possible?(probe: why or why not) 
4. Do you think ―intergroup forgiveness‖ is important?  (probe: In what ways might it 
be important?) 
5. In your opinion what is the difference between individual forgiveness and forgiveness 
between groups? 
6. What do you think about the relationship between forgiveness and reconciliation 
between groups? 
Experiences (20-30min) 
1. Did you ever experience of any situations where you felt insulted, hurt or harmed on 
behalf of your nation/ethnicity? Please describe such a situation. (group) 
2. In what context did this experience/situation take place? (Probe: For example when 
you read the newspaper? When you listened to a political speech? When you learnt 
about historical wrong doings done by another nation/ethnic group to your 
nation/ethnic group? When you had or listened to a discussion?)  
3. How did you feel? (emotions) 
4. What did you do? (behaviour) 
5. What did you think? (cognitive) 
6. In your opinion, what would have made you feel better?  
7. In your opinion, who should be the one to apologize for past wrong doings? (probe: 
representatives, leaders?) 
8. In your opinion: what makes a public apology sincere? 
Part 3: Post interview/post discussion (saying thank you, reiterating confidentiality 
and debriefing) (approx. 10 min) 
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Appendix B – Additional Information for Chapter 5 





You are invited to participate in an international survey on your views and perceptions of 
current relations between Germany and her European neighbours. 
 
We would appreciate it, if you would be willing to fill out the following questionnaire. Your 
participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any stage before you complete 
and hand back the questionnaire to us. You grant your consent to participate in this research by 
filling in the questionnaire. 
 
On the following pages, you will see some questions about some general and specific statements 
about politics and international relations. Please answer these questions as honestly as possible 
using the provided rating scales. It will take about 30 minutes to fill out the questionnaire.  
 Your answers are completely anonymous and only investigators directly involved in the 
project will have access to the data.  
 You will never be personally identified in this research project or in any presentation or 
publication.  
 The information you provide will be coded by number only. In accordance with the 
requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, your coded data may be 
shared with other competent researchers. 
 Your coded data may be used in other, related studies.  
 A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody of investigators. 
 
Please do not write your name or any identifying information on the questionnaire 
itself. 
 
The data you provide may be used for one or more of the following purposes: 
 The overall findings may be submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or 
presented at scientific conferences. 
 The overall findings may form part of a PhD thesis that will be submitted for 
assessment. 
 
Please remember, there are no right or wrong answers.  
We are interested in your personal opinion on these issues. 
 
Thank you very much for your help and cooperation. 
 
Katja Hanke Assoc. Prof. James H. Liu 
PhD Student Associate Professor 
Victoria University of Wellington Victoria University of Wellington 
School of Psychology School of Psychology 
PO Box 600 PO Box 600 
Wellington Wellington 
New Zealand New Zealand 
Email: katja.hanke@vuw.ac.nz Email: james.liu@vuw.ac.nz 
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Section A: Identity 
Please indicate to which degree you disagree (1) or agree (7) with each of the following 













1. I feel a bond with [members of your country]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I feel solidarity with [members of your country]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I feel committed to [members of your country]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I am glad to be [your nationality]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I think that [members f your country] have a lot to be 
proud of. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. It is pleasant to be [your nationality]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I often think about the fact that I am [your nationality]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. The fact that I am [your nationality] is an important part of 
my identity. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Being [your nationality] is an important part of how I see 
myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I am similar to many other [members of your country]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. [Members of your country] have a lot in common with 
each other. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. [Members of your country] are very similar to each other. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Section B: Perception of history 
We are interested in your perception of the consequences of historical events on current relations 
between Germany and [your country]. On the following pages, you will be asked a number of 
questions about consequences, perceptions, emotions and thoughts about Hitler’s rule in Germany 
and Germany’s war-time past.  
 
Please answer these questions as honestly as possible using the provided rating scales. 
There are no right or wrong answers. The best answer is your own opinion. 
 
PERCEPTION OF HISTORY 
Please indicate to which degree you disagree (1) or agree (7) with each 










1. Discussions about apologizing and forgiving related to 
Germany’s past war crimes are not important any more. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Grievances and resentment related to Germany’s past war 
crimes will be carried to the next generation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Negative feelings due to Germany’s past war crimes have 
faded with time.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Germany’s past war crimes are still influencing the 
relationship between Germany and [your country]. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Today there is no need to talk much about the harm 
committed by Germany in the past. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. [Your nationality] stories of surviving Germany’s past war 
crimes make me feel like the wounds are still open today. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
  225 
 
Section C: Emotions & Thoughts 
The following statements are s about the relation between past misdeeds of Germany and 
Germans today. 
Please indicate the degree to which you disagree (‗1‘) or agree (‗7‘) with each statement. There are no 
right or wrong answers. The best answer is your own opinion. 
 
 









1. Today’s Germans should feel regret for the harm done in the 
past towards other groups.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Today’s Germans should feel guilty about the negative things 
their ancestors did to other groups in the past.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Today’s Germans should feel regret for some of the things their 
ancestors did to other groups in the past.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Today’s Germans should repair damage caused to other groups 
by their ancestors.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Today’s Germans should easily feel guilty for the bad outcomes 
brought about by their ancestors.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
EMOTIONS 
Please indicate to which degree from ‘not at all’ (1) to ‘7’ (extremely) 
you experience these emotions when thinking of Germany’s handling 
of the past misdeeds. 
Not  
at all Somewhat extremely 
How Germany has dealt with its past misdeeds during World War 
II makes me feel... 
       
1. …angry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. …calm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. …anxious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. …cheerful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. …displeased 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. …afraid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. …fearful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. …happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. …furious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. …irritated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. …worried 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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FORGIVENESS 
You may have read in the newspapers, or heard/seen discussions 
in the mass media about apologies and attempts of 
rapprochement between Germany and [your country]. 
Please tell us how you feel about following statements and indicate to 










1. It is important that [your country] never forgives the past harm 
done during Hitler’s rule and World War II by Germany. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. [Your country] has remained strong precisely because they 
have never forgiven past war crimes committed by Germany.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Forgiving Germany for past war crimes would be a betrayal to 
former victims.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Today’s Germans should be forgiven for what their group did 
[members of your country] during Hitler’s rule and World War 
II. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. [Your country] should move past their negative feelings 
towards today’s Germans for the harm their group inflicted 
during Hitler’s rule and World War II. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Today’s Germans should be forgiven for what their ancestors 
did [members of your country] during Hitler’s rule and World 
War II. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. It is possible for me to forgive today’s Germans for Germany’s 
past war crimes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
The following statements are statements about granting 










1. Granting forgiveness will put the victimized group into an even 
more vulnerable position than before. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Granting forgiveness without empowering the victimized group 
can lead to a loss of identity for the victimized group. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Granting forgiveness is an invitation for crimes to be repeated. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Granting forgiveness means losing sympathy as victims. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Granting forgiveness will make the perpetrator believe that now 
everything is alright although nothing is really settled. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
TRUST 
Please tell us how you feel about interactions between Germans 
and [members of your country]. Please indicate to which degree 
from ‘not at all’ (1) to ‘very much’ (7) you think each of these 









1. Do you think today’s Germans would try to be fair to [members 
of your country]? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Would you say that most of the time today’s Germans try to be 
helpful to [members of your country]? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Generally speaking, would you say that most today’s Germans 
can be trusted? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Section D: Demographic Information 
 
1. Are you?               female      male 
2. What is your age? __________years 
3. What is your religion (if any)? Please specify: ___________________________ 
3a. How important is religion in your life? (please circle a number between 1 and 4 to 
describe how you feel) 
 
1=not important at all, 2=somewhat important, 3=fairly important, 4=very important 
4. Do you actively practice a religion (e.g. going to church, temple)?    yes     no 
4a. If yes, how often do you practice your religion? Please circle a number between 1 
(very seldom) and 7 (daily) that best describes you: 
(very seldom) 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 (daily)      
5. What is your highest form of education? 
 Secondary school 
 Apprenticeship 
 Polytechnic 
 University  
6. What is your occupation? ____________________________________________ 
7. What is your Country of Birth? ________________________________________ 
8. What is your Nation of Citizenship(s)?___________________________________ 
9. How long have you lived in countries outside of this one?  _____ years  _____ months 
10. Does your family have a migration background?  yes;  no;  partially 
a. If yes, from which country did your family or parts of your family come from? 
___________________________________________________________________
_ 
b. How long have they been living in [country where participant live 
in]?______years ____months 
11. Often, when people talk about political matters they use terms like "right-wing" or "left-
wing" to describe their views. How would you describe yourself in these terms? Circle a 
number between 1 (left-wing) and 7 (right-wing) that best describes you: 
(left-wing) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (right-wing) 
a) Other political orientation, please specify: _____________________________ 
 
Thanks a lot for your participation and your help in this research! 




Thank you very much for taking the time and effort to complete this questionnaire and 
for participating in this research. 
 
The study examines what promotes and hinders forgiveness between once conflicting 
countries.  
 
Forgiveness between countries may be an alternative means to improve relations 
between countries that used to be in conflicts. Previous studies have shown that feeling 
guilty on behalf of your country influences people‘s willingness to try to repair damage 
that was caused in the past. Furthermore, empathy (the ability to take another 
perspective) and trust (the expectation to be treated fairly by another person or group) 
have an impact on the willingness to forgive. However, forgiveness between countries 
is still poorly understood. More studies are needed that relate to conflicts that actually 
happened in order to discover pragmatic means that can improve relations between 
countries.  
 
In this study we attempted to look at a real post conflict situation between countries and 
examine forgiveness from a cultural comparison perspective. This has been neglected in 
previous research. Thus, this perspective can contribute to our understanding about 
rapprochement between countries after conflict.  
 
Preliminary results of this study will be posted on the website of the Centre for Applied 
Cross-Cultural Research (http://www.vuw.ac.nz/cacr/) by March 2009. If you have any 
additional questions please feel free to contact Katja Hanke at Katja.Hanke@vuw.ac.nz 
 
Thank you very much again for participating in this study.
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You are invited to participate in an international survey on your views and perceptions of 
current relations between Japan and her Asian neighbours. 
 
We would appreciate it, if you would be willing to fill out the following questionnaire. Your 
participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any stage before you complete 
and hand back the questionnaire to us. You grant your consent to participate in this research by 
filling in the questionnaire. 
 
On the following pages, you will see some questions about some general and specific statements 
about politics and international relations. Please answer these questions as honestly as possible 
using the provided rating scales. It will take about 30 minutes to fill out the questionnaire.  
 
 Your answers are completely anonymous and only investigators directly involved in the 
project will have access to the data.  
 You will never be personally identified in this research project or in any presentation or 
publication.  
 The information you provide will be coded by number only. In accordance with the 
requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, your coded data may be 
shared with other competent researchers. 
 Your coded data may be used in other, related studies.  
 A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody of investigators. 
 
Please do not write your name or any identifying information on the questionnaire 
itself. 
 
The data you provide may be used for one or more of the following purposes: 
 The overall findings may be submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or 
presented at scientific conferences. 




Please remember, there are no right or wrong answers.  
We are interested in your personal opinion on these issues. 
 
Thank you very much for your help and cooperation. 
 
Katja Hanke Assoc. Prof. James H. Liu 
PhD Student Associate Professor 
Victoria University of Wellington Victoria University of Wellington 
School of Psychology School of Psychology 
PO Box 600 PO Box 600 
Wellington Wellington 
New Zealand New Zealand 
Email: katja.hanke@vuw.ac.nz Email: james.liu@vuw.ac.nz 
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Section A: Identity  
Please indicate to which degree you disagree (1) or agree (7) with each of the following 
statements.  
There are no right or wrong answers. The best answer is your own opinion. 









1. I feel a bond with [members of your country]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I feel solidarity with [members of your country]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I feel committed to [members of your country]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I am glad to be [your nationality]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I think that [members of your country] have a lot to be proud 
of. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. It is pleasant to be [your nationality]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I often think about the fact that I am [your nationality]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. The fact that I am [your nationality] is an important part of my 
identity. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Being [your nationality] is an important part of how I see 
myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I am similar to many other [members of your country]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. [Members of your country] have a lot in common with each 
other. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. [Members of your country] are very similar to each other. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Section B: Perception of history 
We are interested in your perception of the consequences of historical events on current relations 
between Japan and [your country]. On the following pages, you will be asked a number of questions 
about consequences, perceptions, emotions and thoughts about Japan’s colonial and war-time past. 
 
Please answer these questions as honestly as possible using the provided rating scales. 
There are no right or wrong answers. The best answer is your own opinion. 
 
PERCEPTION OF HISTORY 
Please indicate to which degree you disagree (1) or agree (7) with each 










1. Discussions about apologizing and forgiving related to Japan’s 
harmful past actions towards [members of your country] are not 
important any more. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Grievances and resentment related to Japan’s harmful past 
actions towards [members of your country] will be carried to the 
next generation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Negative feelings due to Japan’s harmful past actions towards 
[members of your country] have faded with time.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Japan’s harmful past actions towards [members of your country] 
are still influencing the relationship between Japan and [your 
country]. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Today there is no need to talk so much about the harm committed 
by Japan in the past. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. [Your nationality] stories of surviving Japan’s harmful past 
actions make me feel like the wounds are still open today. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Section C: Emotions & Thoughts  
The following statements are about the relation between past misdeeds of Japan and 
Japanese people today Please indicate to which degree you disagree (1) or agree (7) with each 













1. Today’s Japanese people should feel regret for the harm done in 
the past towards [members of your country].  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Today’s Japanese people should feel guilty about the negative 
things their ancestors did to [members of your country] in the past.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Today’s Japanese people should feel regret for some of the things 
their ancestors did to [members of your country] in the past.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Today’s Japanese people should repair damage caused to 
[members of your country] by their ancestors.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Today’s Japanese people should easily feel guilty for the bad 
outcomes brought about by their ancestors.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
EMOTIONS 
Please indicate to which degree from ‘not at all’ (1) to ‘extremely’ (7) 
you experience these emotions when thinking of Japan’s handling of the 
past misdeeds. 
Not  
at all Somewhat extremely 
How Japan has dealt with its past misdeeds during the occupation of 
Asia, the Sino-Japanese War and World War II makes me feel... 
       
1. …angry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. …calm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. …anxious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. …cheerful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. …displeased 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. …afraid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. …fearful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. …happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. …furious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. …irritated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. …worried 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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FORGIVENESS 
You may have read in the newspapers, or heard/seen discussions in the 
mass media about apologies and attempts of rapprochement between 
Japan and [your country]. 
Please tell us how you feel about following statements and indicate to 










1. It is important that [your country] never forgives the past harm done 
during the occupation of Asia, the Sino-Japanese War and World War 
II by Japan. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. [Your country] has remained strong precisely because they have 
never forgiven past misdeeds committed by Japan.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Forgiving Japan for past war crimes would be a betrayal to former 
victims.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Today’s Japanese should be forgiven for what their group did to 
members your country] during Japan’s period of colonisation and 
warfare. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. [Your country] should move past their negative feelings towards 
today’s Japanese for the harm their group inflicted during the 
occupation of Asia, the Sino-Japanese War and World War II. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Today’s Japanese should be forgiven for what their ancestors did to 
[members of your country] during the occupation of Asia, the Sino-
Japanese War and World War II. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. It is possible for me to forgive today’s Japanese for Japan’s past 
misdeeds. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 










1. Granting forgiveness will put the victimized group into an even more 
vulnerable position than before. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Granting forgiveness without empowering the victimized group can 
lead to a loss of identity for the victimized group. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Granting forgiveness is an invitation for crimes to be repeated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Granting forgiveness means losing sympathy as victims 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Granting forgiveness will make the perpetrator believe that now 
everything is alright although nothing is really settled. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Please tell us how you feel about interactions between Japanese and 
[members of your country]. Please indicate to which degree from ‘not at 







1. Do you think today’s Japanese people would try to be fair to 
[members of your country]? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Would you say that most of the time today’s Japanese people try to 
be helpful to [members of your country]? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Generally speaking, would you say that most today’s Japanese people 
can be trusted? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
  233 
 
Section D: Demographic Information 
 
1. Are you?               female      male 
2. What is your age? __________years 
3. What is your religion (if any)? Please specify: ___________________________ 
3a. How important is religion in your life? (please circle a number between 1 and 4 to 
describe how you feel) 
 
1=not important at all, 2=somewhat important, 3=fairly important, 4=very important 
4. Do you actively practice a religion (e.g. going to church, temple)?    yes     no 
4a. If yes, how often do you practice your religion? Please circle a number between 1 
(very seldom) and 7 (daily) that best describes you: 
(very seldom) 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 (daily)      
5. What is your highest form of education? 
 Secondary school 
 Apprenticeship 
 Polytechnic 
 University  
6. What is your occupation? ____________________________________________ 
7. What is your Country of Birth? ________________________________________ 
8. What is your Nation of Citizenship(s)?___________________________________ 
9. How long have you lived in countries outside of this one?  _____ years  _____ months 
10. Does your family have a migration background?  yes;  no;  partially 
a. If yes, from which country did your family or parts of your family come from? 
______________________________________________________________ 
b. How long have they been living in [country where participant live 
in]?______years ____months 
11. Often, when people talk about political matters they use terms like "conservative/ right-
wing" or "liberal/ left-wing" to describe their views. How would you describe yourself 
in these terms? Circle a number between 1 (liberal/left-wing) and 7 (conservative/right-
wing) that best describes you: 
(Liberal/left-wing) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (conservative/right-
wing) 
  a. Other political orientation, please specify: ___________________________ 
 
Thanks a lot for your participation and your help in this research! 




Thank you very much for taking the time and effort to complete this questionnaire and 
for participating in this research. 
 
The study examines what promotes and hinders forgiveness between once conflicting 
countries.  
 
Forgiveness between countries may be an alternative means to improve relations 
between countries that used to be in conflicts. Previous studies have shown that feeling 
guilty on behalf of your country influences people‘s willingness to try to repair damage 
that was caused in the past. Furthermore, empathy (the ability to take another 
perspective) and trust (the expectation to be treated fairly by another person or group) 
have an impact on the willingness to forgive. However, forgiveness between countries 
is still poorly understood. More studies are needed that relate to conflicts that actually 
happened in order to discover pragmatic means that can improve relations between 
countries.  
 
In this study we attempted to look at a real post conflict situation between countries and 
examine forgiveness from a cultural comparison perspective. This has been neglected in 
previous research. Thus, this perspective can contribute to our understanding about 
rapprochement between countries after conflict.  
 
Preliminary results of this study will be posted on the website of the Centre for Applied 
Cross-Cultural Research (http://www.vuw.ac.nz/cacr/) by March 2009. If you have any 
additional questions please feel free to contact Katja Hanke at Katja.Hanke@vuw.ac.nz 
 
Thank you very much again for participating in this study. 
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Appendix B3 –Single-Group CFA 
 
Single-group CFA fit indices for historical closure 
Country  χ2 χ2/df SRMR RMSEA GFI CFI 
1. France 4.55 1.52 .03 .05 .99 .98 
2. Poland 7.55 1.89 .04 .07 .99 .97 
3. Russia 5.89 1.18 .03 .03 .99 .99 
4. China 6.97 1.68 .03 .06 .99 .98 
5. Taiwan 7.12 1.43 .03 .04 .99 .88 
6. Philippines 3.55 .70 .02 .00 .99 1.00 
 
Single-group CFA fit indices for costs of granting forgiveness 
Country  χ2 χ2/df SRMR RMSEA GFI CFI 
1. France 8.26 2.07 .03 .070 .98 .97 
2. Poland 1.14 .28 .01 .00 .99 1.00 
3. Russia 4.89 1.22 .03 .03 .99 .99 
4. China 4.12 1.03 .02 .01 .99 .99 
5. Taiwan 1.99 .50 .02 .00 .99 1.00 
6. Philippines 4.00 1.00 .02 .002 .99 1.00 
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Appendix C – Additional Information for Chapter 6 
Appendix C1 – Survey Study 4 German context perpetrator version 
 
Lieber Teilnehmer, liebe Teilnehmerin, 
 
Sie sind eingeladen, an einer internationalen Studie teilzunehmen, in der es um Ihre Meinung und 
Wahrnehmung zu den gegenwärtigen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und seinen direkten und 
indirekten europäischen Nachbarländern geht. 
 
Wir wären Ihnen sehr dankbar, wenn Sie sich bereit erklären den folgenden Fragebogen auszufüllen. Ihre 
Teilnahme ist selbstverständlich vollkommen freiwillig und kann zu jeder Zeit abgebrochen werden. 
Durch das vollständige Ausfüllen des Fragebogens stimmen Sie der Teilnahme an diesem Projekt und der 
Auswertung Ihrer Daten zu. 
 
Auf den folgenden Seiten werden Ihnen einige allgemeine und spezielle Fragen über Politik und 
internationale Beziehungen gestellt. Bitte beantworten Sie diese Fragen so ehrlich wie möglich und 
benutzen die angegebenen Antwortskalen. Das Ausfüllen des Fragebogens wird ungefähr 30 Minuten 
dauern.  
 
 Ihre Antworten bleiben vollständig anonym und nur Wissenschaftler, die direkt in das Projekt 
eingebunden sind, werden Zugang zu den Daten haben.  
 Es wird zu keinem Zeitpunkt möglich sein, Sie in dieser Studie oder in einer Präsentation oder 
Veröffentlichung persönlich zu identifizieren, da Ihre Daten numerisch kodiert werden.  
 Gemäß der Bedingungen einiger wissenschaftlicher Zeitschriften und Organisationen ist es 
möglich, dass Ihre kodierten Daten anderen kompetenten Wissenschaftlern zugänglich gemacht 
werden.  
 Ihre kodierten Daten könnten in anderen relevanten Studien verwendet werden. 
 Eine Kopie Ihrer kodierten Daten wird unter der Obhut von Katja Hanke und Assoc. Prof. James 
H. Liu sowie anderer involvierter Wissenschaftler aufbewahrt. 
 
Ihre Daten könnten für folgende Zwecke verwendet werden: 
 Die Ergebnisse könnten zur Veröffentlichung in einer wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift eingereicht 
werden oder auf einer wissenschaftlichen Konferenz präsentiert werden. 
 Die Ergebnisse bilden einen Teil einer Doktorarbeit, die zur Bewertung eingereicht wird. 
 
Bitte beantworten Sie die Fragen so ehrlich wie möglich; 
es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. 
Wir sind an Ihrer persönlichen Meinung interessiert. 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Hilfe und Kooperation. 
 
Katja Hanke Assoc. Prof. James H. Liu 
Doktorandin Associate Professor 
Victoria University of Wellington Victoria University of Wellington 
School of Psychology School of Psychology 
PO Box 600 PO Box 600 
Wellington Wellington 
New Zealand New Zealand 
Email: katja.hanke@vuw.ac.nz Email: james.liu@vuw.ac.nz 
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Abschnitt A: Identität  
Bitte geben Sie an, in welchem Grade Sie die folgenden Aussagen ablehnen (1) oder ihnen 
zustimmen (7). Bitte lassen Sie keine Aussagen aus, auch wenn Sie den Eindruck haben, 
dass die Ansichten sich ähnlich sind. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Die 
beste Antwort ist Ihre eigene Meinung. 
 











1. Ich fühle mich mit Deutschen verbunden. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Ich fühle mich Deutschen gegenüber solidarisch. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Ich fühle mich Deutschen gegenüber verpflichtet. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Ich bin froh, Deutsche/Deutscher zu sein. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Ich denke, dass Deutsche eine Menge haben, auf das sie stolz 
sein können. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Es ist angenehm, Deutsche/Deutscher zu sein. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Ich denke oft über die Tatsache nach, dass ich 
Deutsche/Deutscher bin. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Die Tatsache, dass ich Deutsche/Deutscher bin, ist ein 
wichtiger Bestandteil meiner Identität. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Deutsch zu sein ist ein wichtiger Bestandteil davon, wie ich 
mich selbst sehe. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Ich bin vielen anderen Deutschen ähnlich. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Deutsche haben sehr viel gemeinsam. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 














1. Ich betrachte mich eher als Weltbüger/in denn als ein/e 
Bürger/in eines bestimmten Landes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Die Bürger eines Landes sollten sich eher um sich selbst 
kümmern, anstatt sich um andere Menschen aus anderen 
Teilen der Welt zu sorgen. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Ich würde mich eher als treue/treuer Bürger/in meines 
eigenen Landes bezeichnen denn als ein/e Weltbürger/in. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Menschen aus jedem Land sollten sich um ihre eigenen 
Angelegenheiten kümmern. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Ich identifiziere mich mehr mit der Menschheit als mit einer 
bestimmten Nationalität. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Ein/e gute/r Weltbürger/in zu sein, ist ein wichtiger 
Bestandteil davon, wie ich mich selbst sehe. 
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Abschnitt B: Wahrnehmung von Geschichte 
Wir sind an Ihrer Wahrnehmung der Konsequenzen historischer Ereignisse auf die gegenwärtige 
Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und seinen direkten und indirekten europäischen 
Nachbarländern interessiert. Auf den folgenden Seiten werden Ihnen einige Fragen zu Ihrer 
Wahrnehmung der Konsequenzen, Ihren Gefühlen und Gedanken zu Hitlers Herrschaft in 
Deutschland und Deutschlands Kriegsvergangenheit gestellt. 
Bitte beantworten Sie die Fragen so ehrlich wie möglich, in dem Sie die Antwortskala von 1 (starke 
Ablehnung) bis 7 (starke Zustimmung) verwenden. Bitte lassen Sie keine Fragen aus. Es gibt keine 
richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Die beste Antwort ist Ihre eigene Meinung. 
Bitte geben Sie an, in welchem Maße Sie jede der folgenden 











1. Diskussionen über das Vergeben und Entschuldigen deutscher 
Kriegsverbrechen sind heute nicht mehr von Bedeutung. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Der Unmut und die Verbitterung, die mit Deutschlands 
Kriegsverbrechen zusammenhängen, werden auf die nächste 
Generation übertragen. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Heutzutage ist kein Bedarf mehr vorhanden, über den Schaden 
zu reden, den Deutschland in der Vergangenheit verursacht hat. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Geschichten von Überlebenden deutscher Kriegsverbrechen 
vermitteln das Gefühl, dass die Wunden heutzutage immer noch 
offen sind. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Abschnitt C: Gefühle und Gedanken 
In den folgenden Aussagen geht es um Deutschlands Verbrechen in der Vergangenheit und um Ihre 
Einschätzung der Auswirkungen dieser Verbrechen auf das Deutschland von heute. Bitte geben Sie 
an, in welchem Maße Sie jede der folgenden Aussagen ablehnen (1) oder ihr zustimmen (7). Bitte 
lassen Sie keine Aussagen aus. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Die beste Antwort 











1. Ich fühle Bedauern für Deutschlands Gräueltaten in der 
Vergangenheit an anderen Gruppen. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Ich fühle mich schuldig für die negativen Dinge, die meine 
Vorfahren anderen Gruppen angetan haben. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Ich fühle Reue für einige von den Dingen, die Deutschland anderen 
Gruppen in der Vergangenheit angetan hat. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Ich glaube, dass ich den Schaden wiedergutmachen sollte, den 
Deutschland bei Anderen in der Vergangenheit verursacht hat. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Ich kann mich sehr leicht schuldig für die schlimmen Folgen 
fühlen, die Deutschland in der Vergangenheit hervorgebracht hat.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. Ich schäme mich, weil Deutschland in der Vergangenheit so viele 
Verbrechen an anderen europäischen Nationen begangen hat. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Ich schäme mich für das, was unsere Urgroß- und Großeltern 
während der Hitler-Diktatur und während des Zweiten Weltkrieges 
getan haben. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Ich schäme mich, wenn Ausländer den Holocaust erwähnen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Verbrechen, die von Deutschland während der Hitler-Diktatur und 
während des Zweiten Weltkrieges verübt wurden, sind ein großes 
schwarzes Schandmal in der Geschichte Deutschlands. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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5. Öffentliche Diskussionen über die vergangenen Verbrechen meiner 
Vorfahren bereiten mir Schamgefühle. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. Die deutsche Regierung hat durch das Eingestehen der während 
des Zweiten Weltkriegs begangenen Gewalttaten einen 
Gesichtsverlust der deutschen Bevölkerung hervorgerufen. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Das Eingestehen der während des Zweiten Weltkriegs begangenen 
Gewalttaten durch die deutsche Regierung hatte einen nicht 
wiedergutzumachenden Gesichtsverlust der deutschen Bevölkerung 
zur Folge. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Es ist verständlich, dass Deutsche heutzutage über offizielle 
Entschuldigungen für den deutschen Aggressionskrieg besorgt 
sind, weil diese in der Vergangenheit einen Gesichtsverlust für die 
deutsche Bevölkerung bedeuteten. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Die Bitte um Vergebung durch Vertreter/innen des deutschen 
Staates hatte einen Gesichtsverlust für die gesamte Nation zur 
Folge. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Einstellungen zu Wiedergutmachung/Reparationszahlungen. 
Bitte geben Sie an, in welchem Maße Sie die folgenden Aussagen 











1. Es ist wichtig, dass ehemalige Opfer von Deutschlands 
Kriegsverbrechen unterstützt werden, wenn sie Forderungen 
stellen. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Ich zeige meine Bereitschaft, ehemalige Opfer von Deutschlands 
Kriegsverbrechen zu unterstützen, indem ich Buttons/Aufnäher 
mit politischen Aussagen trage. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Ich bin bereit, mich aktiv in einer Institution zu engagieren, die 
für die Fortsetzung der Ausgleichszahlungen für Deutschlands 
Kriegsverbrechen sorgt. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Ich bin bereit, Leute für Unterschriftensammlungen anzuwerben, 
die die Forderungen für die Fortsetzung von 
Ausgleichszahlungen unterstützen und an die deutsche Regierung 
gerichtet sind. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Ich denke, ehemalige Opfer des Zweiten Weltkrieges verdienen 
für das, was ihnen während des Krieges passiert ist, eine Art von 
Wiedergutmachung von Seiten Deutschlands.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Die folgenden Aussagen sind Aussagen über die Bitte um Vergebung 











1. Die Bitte um Vergebung kann die Kommunikation zwischen 
ehemals in Konflikt stehenden Gruppen einleiten. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Der erste Schritt zu sozialer Harmonie zwischen Gruppen könnte 
die Bitte um Vergebung sein. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Ein Gesuch um Vergebung ist gleichzusetzen mit einem 
Eingeständnis der Tatsache, dass die verletzenden Taten wirklich 
passiert sind. 
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Bitte geben Sie an, in welchem Maße Sie jede der folgenden Aussagen 












1. Ich versuche mir vorzustellen, was andere Europäer während des 
Zweiten Weltkrieges durchmachen mussten. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Manchmal denke ich darüber nach, wie sich andere Europäer 
während des Zweiten Weltkrieges gefühlt haben. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Ich versuche mir die Dinge, die während des Zweiten Weltkrieges 
geschehen sind, aus der Perspektive anderer Europäer zu betrachten. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Normalerweise bin ich in der Lage, die Ansicht anderer Europäer zu 
verstehen. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Bitten tragen Sie im nebenstehenden leeren Feld den oder die 
Name(n) der Europäischen Nation(en) ein, die Sie im Kopf hatten, 
während Sie antworteten: 
 
 
Bitte teilen Sie uns mit, wie Sie sich den Interaktionen zwischen 
deutschen und anderen Europäern gegenüber fühlen. Bitte geben Sie 
an, in welchem Maße (von ‘l’ (überhaupt nicht) bis ‘7’ (sehr viel)) Sie 









1. Denken Sie, dass die meisten Europäer versuchen würden, fair zu 
sein? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Würden Sie sagen, dass andere Europäer meistens versuchen, 
hilfsbereit zu sein? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Würden Sie im Allgemeinen sagen, dass man den meisten Europäern 
vertrauen kann? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Bitten tragen Sie im nebenstehenden leeren Feld den oder die 
Name(n) der Europäischen Nation(en) ein, die Sie im Kopf hatten, 
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Abschnitt D: Demographische Informationen 
 
1. Sind Sie?               weiblich      männlich 
2. Wie alt sind Sie? __________Jahre 
3. Welcher Religion gehören Sie an (falls Sie einer angehören)? 
___________________________ 
 3a. Wie wichtig ist Religion in Ihrem Leben? (Bitte markieren Sie die 
entsprechende Ziffer) 
1 = überhaupt nicht wichtig, 2 = etwas wichtig, 3 = ziemlich wichtig, 4 = sehr wichtig 
4. Praktizieren Sie aktiv eine Religion (z.B. in die Kirche gehen)?    ja     nein 
4a. Falls ja, wie oft tun Sie dies? (Bitte markieren Sie eine Ziffer zwischen 1 (sehr 
selten) und 7 (täglich): 
(sehr selten) 1        2 3 4 5 6 7 (täglich) 
5. Ihr höchster Bildungsabschluss? 




 Hochschulreife (Abitur) 
 Lehre / Fachschule 
 Fachhochschul- / Universitäts-Abschluss 
 ____________________________ 
6. Erlernter Beruf / Beschäftigung:____________________________________________ 
7. In welchem Land wurden Sie 
geboren?________________________________________ 
  7a. In welchem Bundesland wurden Sie geboren? 
___________________________________ 
8. Welche Staatsbürgerschaft besitzen Sie?___________________________________ 
9. Wie lange haben Sie insgesamt im Ausland gelebt?_____ Jahre _____ Monate 
10. Hat Ihre Familie einen Migrationshintergund?  ja;  nein;  teilweise 
   10a. Falls ja, aus welchem Land stammt Ihre Familie /ein Teil Ihrer Familie? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
  10b. Wie lange leben diese / leben Sie bereits in Deutschland?______Jahre 
____Monate 
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11. Wenn über politische Themen gesprochen wird, verwenden die Leute oft Ausdrücke 
wie „links― oder „rechts―, um ihre Ansichten zu beschreiben. Wie würden Sie sich 
selbst anhand dieser Ausdrücke einschätzen? Kreisen Sie die Nummer zwischen 1 
(links) und 7 (rechts) ein, die Sie am besten beschreibt:  
(links) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (rechts) 
11a Andere politische Orientierung: _____________________________ 
12. Welche Partei würden Sie bei der nächsten Bundestagswahl wählen? 
_____________________________ 
 
Herzlichen Dank für die Unterstützung dieses Projekts durch Ihre 
Teilnahme! 
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You are invited to participate in an international survey on your views and perceptions of 
current relations between Japan and her Asian neighbours. 
 
We would appreciate it, if you would be willing to fill out the following questionnaire. Your 
participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any stage before you complete 
and hand back the questionnaire to us. You grant your consent to participate in this research by 
filling in the questionnaire. 
 
On the following pages, you will see some questions about some general and specific statements 
about politics and international relations. Please answer these questions as honestly as possible 
using the provided rating scales. It will take about 30 minutes to fill out the questionnaire.  
 
 Your answers are completely anonymous and only investigators directly involved in the 
project will have access to the data.  
 You will never be personally identified in this research project or in any presentation or 
publication.  
 The information you provide will be coded by number only. In accordance with the 
requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, your coded data may be 
shared with other competent researchers. 
 Your coded data may be used in other, related studies.  
 A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody of investigators. 
 
Please do not write your name or any identifying information on the questionnaire 
itself. 
 
The data you provide may be used for one or more of the following purposes: 
 The overall findings may be submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or 
presented at scientific conferences. 
 The overall findings may form part of a PhD thesis that will be submitted for 
assessment. 
 
Please remember, there are no right or wrong answers.  
We are interested in your personal opinion on these issues. 
 
Thank you very much for your help and cooperation. 
 
Katja Hanke Assoc. Prof. James H. Liu 
PhD Student Associate Professor 
Victoria University of Wellington Victoria University of Wellington 
School of Psychology School of Psychology 
PO Box 600 PO Box 600 
Wellington Wellington 
New Zealand New Zealand 
Email: katja.hanke@vuw.ac.nz Email: james.liu@vuw.ac.nz 
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Section A: Identity  
Please indicate to which degree you disagree (1) or agree (7) with each of the following 
statements.  
There are no right or wrong answers. The best answer is your own opinion 
 









1. I feel a bond with Japanese people. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I feel solidarity with Japanese people. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I feel committed to Japanese people. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I am glad to be Japanese. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I think that Japanese people have a lot to be proud of. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. It is pleasant to be Japanese. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I often think about the fact that I am Japanese. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. The fact that I am Japanese is an important part of my identity. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Being Japanese is an important part of how I see myself. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I am similar to many Japanese people. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Japanese people have a lot in common with each other. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 













1. I think of myself as a citizen of the world rather than of one 
particular country. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Citizens of each country should look after themselves instead of 
worrying about people from other parts of the world. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I think of myself as a loyal citizen of my own country rather than 
as a citizen of the world. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. People from each country should mind their own business. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I identify with the human race more than any particular 
nationality. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Being a good citizen of the world is an important part of how I see 
myself. 





































Section B: Perception of history 
We are interested in your perception of the consequences of historical events on current relations 
between Japan and her Asian neighbours. On the following pages, you will be asked a number of 
questions about consequences, perceptions, emotions and thoughts about Japan’s colonial and war-
time past.  
 
Please answer these questions as honestly as possible using the provided rating scales. 
There are no right or wrong answers. The best answer is your own opinion. 
 
Please indicate to which degree you disagree (1) or agree (7) with each of 










1. Discussions about apologizing and forgiving related to Japan’s 
harmful past actions towards other Asians are not important any 
more. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Grievances and resentment related to Japan’s harmful past actions 
towards other Asians will be carried to the next generation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Today there is no need to talk so much about the harm committed by 
Japan in the past. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Other Asians’ stories of surviving Japan’s harmful past actions make 
me feel like the wounds are still open today. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Section C: Emotions & Thoughts 
The following statements are about the relation between past misdeeds of Japan and Japanese 
people today Please indicate to which degree you disagree (1) or agree (7) with each of the following 
statements. There are no right or wrong answers. The best answer is your own opinion. 
 
 











1. I feel regret for Japan’s harmful past actions towards other groups. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I feel guilty about the negative my ancestors did to other groups. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I feel regret for some of the things Japan did to other groups in the 
past. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I believe that I should repair damage caused to others by Japan in 
the past.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I can easily feel guilty for the bad outcomes brought about by 
Japanese people in the past.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 










1. I feel ashamed because Japan committed so many misdeeds against 
other Asian nations in the past. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I feel ashamed about what our (great) grandparents did during the 
occupation of Asia, the Sino-Japanese War and World War II. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I feel ashamed when foreigners mention the Nanjing massacre and 
the Comfort Women Issue. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Misdeeds committed by Japanese during the occupation of Asia 
and World War II are a big black mark in Japan’s history. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Public discussions about past misdeeds make me feel ashamed of 
my ancestors’ past actions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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1. If Japan’s government acknowledges the harm done during the 
occupation of Asia and World War II, Japanese people will lose face. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. If Japan’s government acknowledges the harm done during the 
occupation of Asia and World War II, the extent of face loss for 
Japanese people will be irreparable. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. It is understandable that Japanese people would be concerned about a 
loss of face, if official apologies to another country for Japan’s war 
of aggression are issued.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. If the Japanese prime minister seeks forgiveness from other Asian 
countries, he risks a loss of face for the whole nation.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Attitudes towards compensation. 










1. It’s important to support claims of compensation of former overseas 
Asian (non-Japanese) victims of Japan’s harmful past actions during 
the occupation of Asia and World War II.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I am willing to show my support for former overseas Asian (non-
Japanese) victims of Japan’s warfare through wearing badges with 
political statements.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I am willing to be actively involved in an institution by running 
information stalls that supports the demand for an official 
acknowledgement of Japan’s harmful past actions towards other 
(non-Japanese) Asians.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I am willing to recruit people to sign petitions that supports 
compensation claims addressed to Japan’s government.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I think that former overseas Asian (non-Japanese) victims of Japan’s 
harmful past actions deserve some form of compensation from Japan.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The following statements are statements about seeking forgiveness.  
Please indicate by circling a number to which degree you disagree (1) or 










1. Seeking forgiveness can open up communication between once 
conflicting groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Seeking forgiveness may be the first step towards social harmony 
between groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. A request for forgiveness equals recognizing that the harm done 
actually happened. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. To ask for forgiveness of past misdeeds means to lose pride in 
one’s own group identity. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please indicate to which degree you disagree (1) or agree (7) with each 









1. I try to imagine what other Asians have gone through during 
World War II. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I sometimes think about how other Asians might have felt during 
World War II. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I am trying to look at things that happened during World War II 
from the perspective of other Asians. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Usually, I am able to understand the other Asians’ point of view 
regarding World War II. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Please fill in the name of the Asian  nation(s) you had in mind 
while answering: 
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Please tell us how you feel about interactions between Japanese 
and other Asians. Please indicate to which degree from ‘not at all’ 









1. Do you think most other Asians would try to be fair? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Would you say that most of the time other Asians try to be 
helpful? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Generally speaking, would you say that most other Asians can 
be trusted? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 






  248 
Section D: Demographic Information 
 
1. Are you?               female      male 
2. What is your age? __________years 
3. What is your religion (if any)? Please specify: ___________________________ 
3a. How important is religion in your life? (please circle a number between 1 and 4 to 
describe how you feel) 
 
1=not important at all, 2=somewhat important, 3=fairly important, 4=very important 
4. Do you actively practice a religion (e.g. going to church, temple)?    yes     no 
4a. If yes, how often do you practice your religion? Please circle a number between 1 
(very seldom) and 7 (daily) that best describes you: 
(very seldom) 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 (daily)      
5. What is your highest form of education? 
 Secondary school 
 Apprenticeship 
 Polytechnic 
 University  
6. What is your occupation? ____________________________________________ 
7. What is your Country of Birth? ________________________________________ 
8. What is your Nation of Citizenship(s)?___________________________________ 
9. How long have you lived in countries outside of this one?  _____ years  _____ months 
10. Does your family have a migration background?  yes;  no;  partially 
c. If yes, from which country did your family or parts of your family come from? 
______________________________________________________________ 
d. How long have they been living in Japan?______years ____months 
11. Often, when people talk about political matters they use terms like "conservative/ right-
wing" or "liberal/ left-wing" to describe their views. How would you describe yourself 
in these terms? Circle a number between 1 (liberal/left-wing) and 7 (conservative/right-
wing) that best describes you: 
(Liberal/left-wing) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7(conservative/right-wing) 
a) Other political orientation, please specify: _____________________________ 
 
Thanks a lot for your participation and your help in this research! 
 
 
 
